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INTRODUCTION

During the 100 days of bloodshed between April and July 1994, ordinary Hutu citizens
killed between 500,000 to one million of their Tutsi neighbors in the Rwandan genocide.1 The
killings occurred in churches, homes, street roadblocks, and in the dense Rwandan bush. The
killers did not discriminate between child and adult, or woman and man. Many perpetrators
committed mass rape and sexual violence and tortured their victims before killing them. Many
Tutsi tried to pay for a quick death by bullet in order to avoid being slowly tortured to death. As
the murders took place the United States, the United Nations, and the rest of international
community actively avoided deploying a sufficient intervention force to stop the murders. The
sheer number of murders, the close proximity between victims and perpetrators, the intricate
organization of the killings, and the international refusal to intervene makes the genocide one of
the most infamous events of the twentieth century. The question remains: How do we
understand it?
For many, the events of the 1994 Rwandan genocide were beyond human
comprehension. For journalist Fergal Keane, the violence in the genocide represented an
unexplainable evil.2 Keane reported for the BBC during the genocide’s final weeks, and his
writing reflects an individual traumatized by what he witnessed. Tutsi survivor Révérien
Rurangwa argues similarly in his memoir that the actions of Hutu génocidaires are beyond
intellectualization.3 Such accounts demonstrate the emotional trauma the violence held for
witnesses and victims. But they also call for a distinction between using intellectual arguments
to apologize for perpetrators’ actions and the need to look at why the genocide occurred. To
1

The number of people who died during the genocide has been disputed. The number 800,000 is the generally
accepted number, however, many scholars and organizations place that number higher and others lower. Alison
2
Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: a Rwandan Journey, 1st ed (London; New York: Viking, 1995), 4.
3
Révérien Rurangwa, Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda (London: Reportage Press, 2009), 31-32.
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view the genocide as beyond comprehension risks what East African scholar Mahmood
Mamdani describes as the pitfall of describing the genocide as an “anthropological oddity,” an
ahistorical event, and a human cataclysm beyond explanation.4
For others, the genocide originated from a historical ethnic conflict between Hutu and
Tutsi. The early European accounts and ethnographies pitted Hutu and Tutsi as inherent rivals.
British explorers, European missionaries, and German administrators viewed Tutsi as a superior
Semitic race that originated from Ethiopia to subjugate the Hutu negroid masses. The German
colonial administration adopted this view that the political domination of Tutsi elites stemmed
from an ancient cultural invasion from Ethiopia. Tutsi elites became longstanding members of
the German and later Belgian colonial system, their political power rationalized by the colonial
view of Tutsi superiority. An influential ethnographer of mid-twentieth century Rwanda,
Jacques Maquet, compiled an entire study that assumed that Tutsi invaded from Ethiopia and
possessed a different culture from Hutu.5 Despite speaking the same language and engaging in
the same culture, the colonial distinction of Hutu and Tutsi as two separate races caused the
West to view the genocide as ethnic violence. As the genocide transpired, the Western press
diminished the violence as yet another example of African tribal violence.6 As put by Mahmood
Mamdani, this perspective argues, “two tribes fight because they are different tribes!”7
Others contest the tribalism perspective by pointing towards the legacy of colonial rule
in contributing to the divisions in Rwandan society. Scholar Aimable Twagilimana emphasizes
that the violence of the 1994 genocide emerged partly from the colonialists’ racial interpretation

4

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide
in Rwanda (Princeton University Press, 2002), 7.
5
Jacques Jérôme Pierre Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda; a Study of Political Relations in a
Central African Kingdom (London: Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University
Press, 1961).
6
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London; New York: Verso, 2004), 231.
7
Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (Monthly Review Press, 1978), 3.
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of Rwandan society.8 This perspective focuses heavily on the ways in which colonial rule
established and reinforced the stereotypes, myths, and inequalities that made up genocide
ideology. Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre co-founder James Smith argues that colonial rule
magnified the small differences in Rwandan society. He writes, “The relative harmony that had
existed between Hutu and Tutsi was soon eroded after the European colonists arrived.”9
Colonial rule racialized the “Hutu” and “Tutsi” identities, introduced the idea of foreign Tutsi
origins, and established many racial stereotypes adopted by post-independence Hutu politics and
genocide propaganda.
Another view argues that the genocide occurred as a result of a double genocide first
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A rebel group composed of Tutsi exiles that
fled from the violence of the early 1960s independence period, the RPF invaded Rwanda in
October 1990. The invasion transpired into a four-year civil war between the Hutu government
and RPF. Before the genocide, human rights violations occurred on both sides. Hutu citizens in
the RPF-controlled north experienced atrocities and displacement at the hands of the RPF. As
RPF victory became imminent, the genocide became an increasingly popular plan amongst Hutu
leaders for maintaining power. But afterwards as the Hutu community suffered in exile, the
genocide became conceptualized as a response to a double genocide explanation. Jason Stearns
observed that many aid workers and local Zairian groups in the mid 1990s became influenced by
revisionist ideas from within the Hutu community that the RPF and Habyarimana government
killed equally in proportion and in method.10 East African scholar Gérard Prunier notes how the
idea of a double genocide has become the mantra for genocide apologists within the former
8

Aimable Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
(University Press of America, 2003), 35. Twagilimana looks at the following factors of the genocide: the
racialization of ethnicity and regionalism.
9
James M. Smith, introduction to We Survived Genocide in Rwanda, ed. Wendy Whitworth
(Nottinghamshire: Quill Press, 2006), 2.
10
Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of
Africa, 1st ed (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 38–39.
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regime.11 This does not dismiss the hundreds of thousands of Hutu who died during the refugee
crisis from 1994 to 1999. Many Hutu succumbed to disease, infighting amongst the
Interahamwe, and attacks from Congolese rebels. Additionally, many Hutu died during the
Rwandan civil war, RPF revenge killings, and in RPF atrocities that occurred during the
Rwandan invasion of Zaire. For many, their deaths became a way for rationalizing the genocide
and to politically de-legitimize the new RPF government.
In the African and human rights scholarly community, recent efforts have been made to
place the genocide and its aftermath within a more complicated political and historical context.
Noted political scientist David Apter argues that the attention on the colonial era diminishes the
African history that occurred before the arrival of Europeans. He writes, “Colonialism is without
doubt a critical benchmark in African history. But it is also an interlude. To forget this is to
dilute and diminish the importance of agency by and among Africans themselves.”12 Apter’s
idea of a much larger history, one that looks beyond colonialism as the only determinant, is an
idea embraced by many recent studies. The works of distinguished Rwandan scholars JeanPierre Chrétien, Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, and Jan Vansina highlight the importance
in the progression and re-imagination of pre-colonial history in understanding the Rwandan
present.13 Other East African specialists such as Mahmood Mamdani, René Lemarchand, Gérard
Prunier, and Filip Reyntjens emphasize that the Rwandan genocide must be contextualized
11

Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and The making of a Continental
Catastrophe (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12–13; hereafter cited as Africa's World
War.
12
David E. Apter, edition introduction to The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic
Nationalism, by David E. Apter, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 1997), xxix.
13
Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York: Cambridge,
Mass: Zone Books; Distributed by MIT Press, 2003); Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of
History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 7–24; Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of
Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988);
David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties,” The International
Journal of African Historical Studies 34, no. 2 (January 1, 2001): 255–314, doi:10.2307/3097483; David S.
Newbury, “The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis,” Africa: Journal of the International African
Institute 50, no. 4 (January 1, 1980): 389–403; Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya
Kingdom, Africa and the Diaspora (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).
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amidst a larger East African regional crisis, one in which the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are
political identities.14 Through refugee spillovers, silenced cases of mass atrocity, and guerilla
rebel movements, they contextualize the genocide as the most terrifying episode in a larger
history engulfing Burundi, present day Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and
Uganda. Scholars such as Daniela Kroslak and journalist Linda Melvern look at the failures
within the international community in the complicity and support of the genocide.15 Following
in the footsteps of these scholars, I place my independent study project as an attempt to look at
several popular representations of the genocide in light of this greater regional perspective. In
this independent study I will look at popular representations of the genocide in cases of official
state-sponsored history, in cinematic depictions, and in protest accounts. I will show examples
of positive efforts to remember and honor the victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide while also
pointing towards overshadowed and diminished accounts.

HISTORY, MEMORY, AND REMEMBRANCE
An extensive literature already exists concerning the theory of history, memory, and the
nation. It is beyond my scope to provide a comprehensive review of this literature. But I will call
to attention a selection of studies that have influenced my project. While not writing directly
about Rwanda, their insights speak to a larger issue of memory’s relationship with history and
politics. I will first attempt to shed some light on the broad concepts of memory and history.

14

Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa,
National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009);
Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 0 ed. (Columbia University Press, 1997); Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World
War; Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 1st paperback ed
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
15
Daniela Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2008);
Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Second, 2nd ed. (Zed Books,
2009).
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Writing on French national identity, French historian Pierre Nora proposes that memory
and history exist as two distinct entities. He defines memory as "a perpetually actual
phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present" while contrasting history as "a
representation of the past."16 He writes that memory contains a sacred quality, while history
exists as an intellectual and secular phenomenon.17 "Memory,” writes Nora, “takes root in the
concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects; history binds itself strictly to temporal
continuities, to progressions and to relations between things."18 Nora sees an overlap between
the two in a history of memory model called lieux de memoire, or sites of memory that preserve
traces of the past inside their structures. Archives, anniversaries, monuments, textbooks, national
rituals, memorials, or moments of silence all serve as examples of lieux de memoire. In the
French tradition, memory coupled with history to form the pillars of French national identity.19
Memory, much more than mere reflection, anchors the French past with the present at these sites
and presents them for historical interpretation.
World War I historian Jay Winter complicates Nora’s analysis on memory. He criticizes
the tendency to misuse the term “memory” as a way of generalizing the past. He promotes the
term “remembrance,” arguing that the overly broad term “memory” lazily lumps the past, the
personal, and the collective together.20 He particularly criticizes the misuse of the term
“collective memory” as representing a national memory. He writes, “States do not remember;
individuals do, in association with other people. If the term ‘collective memory’ has any
meaning at all, it is the process through which different collectives, from groups of two to
16

Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire,” Representations no. 26 (April 1,
1989): 8–9; hereafter cited as “Les Lieux De Mémoire.”
17
Ibid.
18
Nora, “Les Lieux De Mémoire,” 8-9.
19
Nora argues that once the nation became unquestioned, history and memory uncoupled. See Nora, “Les
Lieux De Mémoire,” 10–11.
20
Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century (Yale
University Press, 2006), 3–4; hereafter cited as Remembering War.
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groups in the thousands, engage in acts of remembrance together.”21 He emphasizes that the
memories of individuals build a greater collective community as opposed to a “collective
memory” that builds the memories of individuals.
While Jay Winter criticizes the idea of a national memory, Benedict Anderson argues
that nations are imagined communities.22 He argues that national communities form just as much
out of the population’s imagination as they do out of economic and political relations. Writing
on the cultural history of nationalism in the early 1980s, Anderson argues that nationalism
acquired an “emotional legitimacy” over time that explains the sacrifices made by citizens for
the “imagined” nation.23 But in order for this “imagined political community” and identity to
form, the population often undergoes a state-sponsored process of forgetting or selective
remembrance.24 Anderson, Nora, and Winter each grapple with the following question: How do
we remember? Before analyzing genocide remembrance in Rwanda, I want to highlight three
concepts: the power of national forgetting, the memory of violence, and the complexities in
national mourning.

21

Winter, Remembering War, 4.
Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Rev.
ed. London; New York: Verso, 2006), 6; hereafter cited as Imagined Communities.
23
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3-7.
24
An exploration in the history of nationalism exists outside my study’s scope, but I point out that the rebuilding of Rwanda comes in conjunction with a larger global obsession with the nation-state. African scholars
such as Emmanuel Katongole highlight the pitfalls to this acceptance of the nation-state as the default political
model for Africa. Katongole looks at recent African political history in showcasing the sociopolitical
consequences to the blind acceptance of nation-state omnipresence. Katongole argues that the current
incarnation of the nation-state in Africa promotes the colonial model of promoting African inferiority,
exploitation, and negligence to the population. He argues that all structures and relations in modern African
society tie back to this nation-state narrative. He advocates for Christian theology as an alternative. See
Emmanuel Katongole, The Sacrifice of Africa: A Political Theology for Africa (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2010).
22
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NATIONAL FORGETTING
The phenomenon of forgetting and national amnesia further complicates memory and
history. Anderson highlights Ernest Renan’s famous insight on the role of forgetting in French
national memory. Renan states in his publication Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, “The essence of a
nation is that all individuals have many things in common and also have forgotten many things
in common…Every French citizen must forget the Saint-Bartholomew Day’s Massacre.”25
Renan argues that French citizens must forget the divisive memories of past atrocities (in this
case the Saint-Bartholomew massacre in which Roman Catholics massacred French Huguenots
in Paris) in order for a national French identity to form. This argument flattens memory into a
clash between events that unite the citizenry and those whose memories divide and embitter. For
Renan, forgetting is necessary for the building of the nation.
While national amnesia can gloss over dark episodes of the national past in favor of
unity, such forgetting can come at a cost. Henry Rousso critiques the French amnesia over the
popularity of and widespread collaboration in crimes committed by the Vichy government in his
book The Vichy Syndrome. He argues that the French people repressed the memories of
collaboration with Vichy (in particular the mass deportation of French Jews) in the decades
following the war in favor of a unifying resistance myth.26 President Charles de Gaulle
promoted the myth of resistance partly out of national unity, but the myth’s popularity came into
question in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a new generation politically challenged the
Gaullists.27

25

Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” Oeuvres Complètes, 1947, quoted in Anderson, Imagined
Communities, 199.
26
Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer
(Harvard University Press, 1994), 7–10; hereafter cited as The Vichy Syndrome.
27
Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, 10.
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Tony Judt makes a similar point to Rousso, pointing to widespread post-war
exaggeration of Nazi resistance in German-occupied territories.28 But he also writes of a cultural
recall of memory that may emerge in later generations due to corresponding shifts in politics and
culture. Judt writes how the Jewish suffering and the Jewish voice did not fit into the socioeconomic rebuilding plan for Europe. Therefore, the post-war rebuild silenced the memory of
Jewish victimization as the Marshall Plan took place. But as time passed and Israel rose to
power, newer generations refocused on Holocaust memory. Only at that point did newer
European generations begin to historicize the collective responsibility of Europeans in the
Holocaust. While the nation may silence memories of victimization, those memories remain in
the hearts and minds of individual citizens. As political regimes or cultural norms change,
memories of victimization can re-emerge and acquire a new meaning.

REMEMBERING VIOLENCE
Forgetting⎯in the name of national unity or economic reconstruction⎯can impede the
process of taking responsibility for past atrocities. But the remembering of victimization also
carries the risk of preserving and re-politicizing old hatreds. Susan Sontag explores the ways in
which the recall of traumatic memory can impede reconciliation. She writes, “But history gives
contradictory signals about the value of remembering in the much longer span of a collective
history…too much remembering…embitters. To make peace is to forget. To reconcile, it is
necessary that memory be faulty and limited.”29 The forgetting of certain details becomes a way
around continuing cycles of violence. Sontag argues that remembering may foster further
divisions and that perhaps only a “limited” memory can peacefully bring people together. Her
point brings up a larger philosophical question of the value of remembering, especially in cases
28
29

Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006), 803-831.
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux: 2003), 115.
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of atrocity and victimization. In an interview with the Boston Review, author Phillip Gourevitch
goes even farther by arguing that there exists a “fetishization of memory.” He argues that postconflict societies feel an unquestioned “injunction to remember” beginning with the memorial
culture surrounding the Holocaust. He states:
And it [the duty to remember] also comes from…the belief that anything that is
not exposed and addressed and dealt with is festering and going to come back to
destroy you. This is obviously not true. Memory is not such a cure-all. On the
contrary, many of the great political crimes of recent history were committed in
large part in the name of memory…Memories can hold you back, they can be a
terrible burden, even an illness.30
Gourevitch and Sontag call for a questioning of the duty to remember, not to diminish the
suffering or the feelings of empathy for victims, but to acknowledge memory’s role in
continuing cycles of violence.
The memory of violence and victimization sat at the forefront of the Balkan Wars in the
1990s. In her analysis of post-socialist dead body politics, Katherine Verdery illustrates the
national politicization of victimhood in the midst of a nationalist awakening in the former
Yugoslavia. The reburial of the Serbian Prince Lazar in 1987, killed by the Ottoman Turks at
the Battle of Kosovo (in 1348) coincided with the rise of Serbian nationalism in the breakup of
communist Yugoslavia. Lazar’s bones traveled to monasteries that coincided with the borders
claimed by the Serbs for their proposed state.31 Similarly, the discovery of Yugoslav political
massacre sites from World War II, in this ethno-nationalist awakening, led to a re-framing of the
World War II massacres from a conflict between fascist and communist factions to massacres
perpetrated between ethnic groups.32 The feelings of ethno-nationalist victimization, ethnic
nationalization of dead bodies, and the discovery of mass graves pushed the Croat, Serb, and
30

Alduy, Cécile. “Telling Stories About the Stories We Tell.” Boston Review, September 19, 2012.
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.5/philip_gourevitch_narrative_human_rights_rwanda_syria.php.
31
Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change, The Harriman
Lectures (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 17–18; hereafter cited as The Political Lived of Dead
Bodies.
32
Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, 100–101.
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Bosnian ethnic-nationalist groups towards conflict in 1991.33 The role that memory played in the
politicization of old Yugoslav atrocities, conflicts, and massacres should reinforce the fine line
between feeling empathy for victims and survivors and the constructing of a national identity
through traumatic memory. In the case of Serbian nationalism, the memory of past victimization
played a role in the formation and acceptance of extreme Serbian nationalism.
The memory of victimization can also create dual meanings for opposing political
groups. Ruth Linn and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev argue that the Holocaust exists as a dual symbol of
victimization in Palestinian and Israeli communities.34 For many Israelis, the Holocaust
politically represents the Zionist justification for Israel’s right to exist. In the Palestinian
community, the Holocaust represents Palestinian subjugation due to its legitimation of the Israeli
state. James Young illustrates the interplay between these two interpretations at the Warsaw
Uprising monument. The memory of Jewish martyrdom in the Holocaust becomes a politically
symbolic legitimization of Zionism. But the site also holds meaning to the Palestinian
community. The Palestinian Liberation Organization laid a wreath at the monument in 1983,
viewing the monument’s depiction of the Jewish uprising against the Nazis as parallel to their
own uprising against the Zionist state.35 In both interpretations, the memory of the Warsaw
Uprising reinforced later political narratives.

MOURNING
The mourning of victimization exists in many contexts. For the outside observer
mourning can be an act of moral empathy. Whether through listening to a survivor, watching a

33

Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, 97–101.
Ruth Linn and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, “Holocaust as Metaphor: Arab and Israeli use of the Same Symbol,”
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 11, no. 3 (1996): 195-206.
35
James Edward Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), 180–181.
34
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testimonial video, or reading a memoir, the confirmation and acknowledgment of victimhood
holds value in mourning atrocities. Jay Winter claims that an audience must engage in the act of
listening out of morality. He writes, “the act of stopping our own speech acts to allow those who
have faced what Kant termed radical evil to tell their tale.”36 The survivors may put their
memory into writing in order to take control of that period of their life, or to define it for their
descendants.37 In Primo Levi’s poem that opens his memoir Survival in Auschwitz, he
aggressively confronts his viewer on the duty to remember. He memorably writes, “Never forget
that this has happened. Remember these words. Engrave them in your hearts, when at home or in
the streets, when lying down, when getting up. Repeat them to your children. Or may your
houses be destroyed, may illness strike you down, may your offspring turn their faces from
you.”38 He argues that forgetting the suffering of the victim signifies an act of immorality. The
memory must transfer from author to reader, who must learn, respect, and preserve its lessons
for the sake of mankind.
When mourning collectively as a nation, analyzing remembrance entirely through the
lens of the nation risks an overly top-down approach. There exists something extremely personal
in remembrance, particularly through the mourning of the dead. In a context such as Rwanda
where mass atrocity (whether perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced) became a collective
experience, remembrance also possesses a deeply personal meaning. Jay Winter’s study on
World War I commemoration serves as an example of the interplay between collective, national,
and personal mourning. During the mourning process of commemoration after World War I,
families embarked on intensive investigations to find their lost sons. Even if it meant only a

36

Jay Winter, “Introduction: The Performance of the Past: Memory, History, Identity,” in Performing the
Past: Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe, ed. Jay Winter (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam
University Press, 2010), 20; hereafter cited as “The Performance of the Past.”
37
Winter, “The Performance of the Past,” 19.
38
Primo Levi, Survival In Auschwitz (Simon and Schuster, 1995), 11–12.

12

trace, such as the place of death, the truth about how a loved one died outweighed not knowing
anything at all.39 Even finding the faintest trace or relic of a loved one held a significant place in
the mourning process. Families preserved photographs, signatures, and clothes of their lost sons
long after the war’s conclusion.40 After the war, survivors, friends, and family of the dead went
on pilgrimages to war cemeteries and other sites of memory in France. A kinship bond emerged
between survivors and victims’ families as people faced the emptiness of loss together.41 While
Winter acknowledges how over time these sites of memory (whether a memorial, monument, or
cemetery) became “reinvested” with a collective and often nationalist meaning, they originally
stood as personal sites of mourning.42 While the ritual of visiting the dead through the sites
could certainly devastate the mourner, it could also help them move on. Commemoration
became a ritual in which the mourner came to terms with his or her grief instead of dwelling in
“melancholia.”43 Despite the emphasis on national forgetting, remembering, and mourning,
remembering mass atrocities contains a personal characteristic that transcends politics and
nationalism.

RWANDAN GENOCIDE REMEMBRANCE
The Rwandan state exists in the midst of a political conflict that has produced dual
memories of victimization. While the genocidal violence inflicted on Tutsi should be
commemorated as uniquely cruel and inhumane, many Hutu experienced similar acts of
genocide in Burundi. Both innocent and guilty Hutu died during the Rwandan civil war, the
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genocide, and the refugee crisis in Zaire. While a different type of violence than the elaborate
genocide plan concocted by the Hutu génocidaires, the RPF has been accused as the perpetrators
for many revenge crimes, refugee massacres, and acts of political violence. As the RPF embarks
on re-building the state, Tutsi victims, Tutsi returnees, Hutu perpetrators, and Hutu victims face
the challenge of living side by side with these memories of victimization and perpetration.
During this transition, the RPF established a dominant and official history for the purpose of
rebuilding the nation-state. Specifically, the official history legitimizes the RPF as an
exceptional political liberation movement but also simultaneously silences cases of RPF crimes.
While the narrative rightfully mourns Tutsi victimization, it leaves out many memories of Hutu
victimization. Additionally, the complex regional crisis has been simplified in the state’s official
discourse, and the personal mourning of victims must co-exist with the state’s larger goals of
rebuilding the nation-state. We see a silencing of memory within the official history at such sites
as the Kigali Memorial Centre exhibition, where Hutu subjugation during colonialism is deemphasized. This official discourse dominates international representation in film, where
dramatizations of the genocide reflect the RPF’s official discourse. The interplay of competing
narratives exists at memorial sites where Tutsi survivors’ push to preserve proof of (and mourn)
their loss contrasts with Hutu memories of victimization from RPF crimes. We also see dissent
from this official view in memoir, where many Tutsi and Hutu victims live in exile because they
hold memories or political beliefs that do not correspond with the RPF’s vision. In this
independent study, I argue that the complex history of Rwanda has been compressed at many
major memorial sites and official representations into one state-sponsored way of interpreting
the Rwandan past. While these competing views have in many cases been silenced, they
continue to reside under the surface in the Rwandan consciousness.
I center my project around three points that will support my argument. First, Rwanda
contains a complex history that transcends simple ethnic or colonial explanations. While
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ethnicity and colonial rule play a large role in Rwandan history and mythmaking, they coincide
with a Rwandan history featuring complex patronage relationships, elitist dynasties, social
inequalities, and regional violence. In chapter one, I consult the vast scholarly literature to give
the genocide a historical context.
Second, Rwandan regimes have demonstrated a trend of re-interpreting history for
political survival and legitimacy. The current Rwandan government follows this tradition
through its official interpretation on Rwandan history. In chapter two, I look at the presentation
of this official history at the Kigali Memorial Centre, Rwanda’s main memorial museum of the
genocide. In chapter three, I analyze two Western-directed feature films produced in
Rwanda⎯Alrick Brown’s Kinyarwanda (2011) and Lee Isaac Chung’s Munyurangabo
(2009)⎯that reflect the official narrative’s depiction of the genocide and its vision for the
future.
Third, the official history competes with a wide range of dissenting views and provides
an outlet for international guilt. In chapter four, I look at the preservation of memory at
Rwandan genocide memorial sites. Preservation creates an experience for the international
community to learn about the massacres, express shame for not intervening, and to mourn the
dead. But the memorial is also an example of official history. Through the preservation of bones
and artifacts, the Rwandan memorial sits at a competing intersection between international
accountability, personal mourning, perpetrator memory, and Hutu victimization. In chapter five,
I will look at four memoirs from Rwandan exiles whose memory of victimization competes with
the RPF liberation narrative. This chapter will review the following: Tutsi survivor memory in
Révérien Rurangwa’s Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda, Hutu rescuer memory in Paul
Rusesabagina’s An Ordinary Man, post-genocide Tutsi political memory in Joseph Sebarenzi’s
God Sleeps in Rwanda, and post-genocide Hutu refugee memory in Marie-Béatrice Umutesi’s
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Surviving the Slaughter. For my conclusion, I will briefly reassess the current Rwandan
reconciliation process in light of competing Rwandan victimization narratives and the alternative
South African Truth and Reconciliation model.
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CHAPTER ONE
A COMPLICATED HISTORY:
AN OVERVIEW OF RWANDA FROM THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT

In Jean Hatzfield’s collection of Hutu perpetrator testimonies, Joseph-Désiré Bitero
recalled, "I was raised in the fear that the mwami⎯the Tutsi kings⎯and their commanders
might return; that was because of all the stories old folks told us at home about unpaid labor and
other humiliations of that sad period for us, and because of the awful things happening to our
brothers in Burundi.1 For Bitero, the memory of Tutsi hegemony (while not something he
directly experienced) played a large role in why he joined the killers. In Rwanda, memories of
victimization and oppression have been handed down from generation to generation in all
communities. While these memories hold a sensitive place in Rwandan hearts, Bitero’s
testimony shows how easily they can be used to generate and rationalize violence. For any
Rwandan scholar, questioning where these memories originated from historically becomes the
key for locating the genocide in a larger historical narrative.
In this chapter, I argue that the genocide occurred in the context of a long-term political,
regional, and historical conflict. This chapter will not provide a comprehensive analysis of
Rwandan history. Instead, I will point to several key elements in the vast Rwandan scholarly
literature that challenges the idea that the genocide emerged from ethnic determinism. One,
inequalities in the pre-colonial society occurred independent to colonialism. Two, Hutu and
Tutsi are political identities that colonialism racialized and established as its base for indirect
colonial rule. Three, the 1959 Hutu revolution occurred due to an emerging Hutu political
consciousness that arose out of exploitive labor atrocities that benefited the Belgians and a small
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group of Tutsi elites. Four, the Hutu regimes that followed employed a racist depiction of the
Tutsi in order to unite a politically and regionally divided country. Five, the unresolved refugee
crisis from independence contributed to a larger regional refugee crisis that eventually produced
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1980s. Six, victim and perpetrator are fluid labels
between Hutu and Tutsi, as the RPF committed war crimes in tandem with Hutu genocide
crimes.
This chapter does not intend to diminish the suffering and victimization of the Tutsi
during the 1994 genocide. For 100 days the Hutu⎯whether ordinary citizens, soldiers, or
extremists⎯participated in one of the most cruel, diabolical, and infamous massacres in human
history. Somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsi died. Contextualizing these killing
with cases of Hutu victimization does not excuse the actions of Hutu perpetrators; nor does the
mentioning of RPF crimes against humanity. The purpose of this chapter is not to argue which
group has suffered more historically. Rather, this chapter seeks to contextual the political and
historical complexities that surround the genocide.

INEQUALITIES IN PRE-COLONIAL RWANDA
While the violence in Rwanda over the past century may appear to be ethnic in nature,
most Rwandan scholars express caution in explaining Rwandan history through the lens of
ethnic determinism.2 The historical myth argues that that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are rival tribes,
stemming from an ancient Tutsi conquest of Hutu land. The idea of inherent ethnic opposition as
the root cause to the Rwandan conflict assumes that Rwandan culture and identity exists in the
2
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same state today as it did centuries ago. By looking at regional, dynastic, and client-patron
histories, leading Rwandan scholars provide a much richer and more complicated
contextualization to the violence of the twentieth century. Pre-colonial Rwanda contained both
large kingdoms and local communities, mobile and heterogeneous populations, and distinct
religious rituals and traditions.3 Contrary to the colonial historiography and the Hutu Power
propaganda machine, there exists little evidence of an ancient Tutsi invasion from Ethiopia.4
Pottery evidence suggests that cultural differences originated from different ecological zones,
which opposes the idea that high culture transferred during the invasion of a superior racial
group.5 Contrary to this interpretation of long-term racial subordination, the social hierarchy and
cultural diversity in pre-colonial Rwanda revolved around several systems of clientship that
connected rich lineage groups, clans, and clients. While ethnicity existed, a plethora of other
factors explain the social friction observed by German colonizers at the end of the nineteenth
century.
Pre-colonial Rwanda consisted of co-existing agricultural and herding economies. While
cattle herding is often imagined as an exclusively Tutsi practice, linguistic evidence shows that
many different cultural groups possessed pastoral skills and owned cattle.6 While cattle became
associated with ruling dynasties and elite groups for their social value, cattle in the region
predated the more contemporary dynasties. This conflicts with the idea that a racially Tutsi
group introduced cattle via migration.7 Herders and farmers originally coordinated with each
other on how to use the land, but tensions arose as the population increased and available land
3

David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 263–266.
While “micro-migrations” played a large role in human settlement, the “iron age” technological advances in
the region from around the year 1000 A.D. probably occurred via an internal social and economic revolution.
This conflicts with the colonial interpretation that “civilization” arrived to the region from the outside. See
Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York  : Cambridge,
Mass: Zone Books  ; Distributed by MIT Press, 2003), 44–58.
5
David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 267–268.
6
David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 268.
7
Ibid.
4

19

decreased in the eighteenth century.8 The use of local political units to dictate land tenure
became a necessity in order to deal with these tensions.9 Local political structures based on
ancestry, lineage, and clanship directed the early political structure as opposed to ethnicity or
race.
In such regions as Kinyaga in southwest Rwanda, ancestral lineage served as the central
political unit. Lineage heads managed disputes and controlled land distribution.10 Catherine
Newbury’s study on client relationships in the Kinyaga area illustrates that before the late 18th
century, clientelism worked more toward forging alliances between elites than in subjugating the
population.11 Social relationships such as umuheto, in which patrons of chiefs protected the
lineage cattle in exchange for payments and services, were often mutually beneficial. Good
relations with the patron meant protection of the lineage’s cattle in the patron’s fields, significant
considering chiefs and raiders often stole rival herds.12 Over time, the umuheto relationship
became de-emphasized in favor of the ubuhake contract, which provided a similar system for
linking individuals to a patron. Ubuhake consisted of a cattle transfer from patron to client in
exchange for services. While ubuhake contracts often benefited both parties, these early clientpatron systems in peripheral territories occurred in a context of limited central government.13 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Tutsi-elite controlled Nyiginya kingdom of central
Rwanda expanded and began to centralize these relationships in a more coercive and exploitive
manner.14
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This shift towards a more coercive social climate comes in context with the central
Nyiginya kingdom’s expansion beginning in the eighteenth century. In particular, the kingdom
was unique in that it established a permanent military, and thereby engaged in brutal military
campaigns.15 In this political system, the mwami (king) held absolute spiritual and political
power.16 But conflict between the Nyiginya king and aristocratic elites from 1796 to 1802 led to
a shift in political power from the king to the aristocracy. The aristocracy outgrew the number of
land tenure posts, thereby fostering internal rivalries that the weakened king could not
overcome.17 The empowered aristocracy embarked on a period of power grabbing during which
subjects became increasingly impoverished as the aristocracy and military enclosed land, took
control over cattle herds, and demanded tributes.18 This period of dynastic rivalry at the end of
the eighteenth century also led to conflict in the east over resources for cattle and caused
massive immigration to the central and western territories.19
Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri ruled from the 1860s to his death in 1895 and oversaw a
period of intense state violence in pre-colonial Rwandan society. A full analysis of Rwabugiri’s
reign is beyond the scope of this study.20 A few highlights from his rule include matricide,
patricide, the extermination of rival elites, and several bloody war campaigns.21 While there
may be an inclination to characterize mwami Rwabugiri’s reign as the work of a conniving
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absolute monarch, scholars point out that his behavior came very much in response to growing
animosities and political competition from within the aristocracy.22 War existed historically as
an “instrument of power” for the Nyiginya kingdom because of its role in bringing new wealth
to elites and kings, but Rwabugiri’s atrocities in the late nineteenth century also represented
insecurity over the power of elite factions in the royal court.23 The empowerment of the
aristocracy at the turn of the eighteenth century evolved into deep elitist factions between rival
clans and lineages. This led to an increasingly unstable political environment that factored in
Rwabugiri’s violent atrocities in order to maintain power.24
Even more significantly, state centralization accelerated under the reign of mwami
Rwabugiri who re-shaped internal social dynamics and created tensions in peripheral
communities. As the state centralized, Rwabugiri’s power overran local ritual powers and
subjugated a large portion of the population (predominantly Hutu land owners) into a “serf-like”
tribute system.25 This centralization produced more exploitive client-patron systems that carried
over into the later colonial period. A forced labor system called ubureetwa emerged in which
clients made a payment of services to the centralized chief for the use of land.26 The power
balance between patron and client changed from a more elitist exchange to a system where poor
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families received loaned goods (such as cattle) from rich patrons in exchange for labor.27 This
system became a tool for the central authority in breaking up and dividing the power of local
lineages.28 Ubuhake also became a more exploitive system as it gradually changed from a
voluntary relationship to a more coercive one.29 The centralization of land tenure contracts after
the 1870s further disrupted the local land distribution system, embodying the ways in which late
nineteenth century Rwandan violence constituted more of a "center versus periphery affair" as
opposed to ethnic rivalry.30 As a result of increasingly coercive ubuhake practices, peripheral
liberation movements emerged from local communities against centralized Tutsi elites, land
became centralized, and the ubureetwa practice became exclusively used to contest local (often
Hutu) lineages. At this point, the term Tutsi became increasingly associated with centralized
elites. Farmers and lineage heads that revolted were labeled Hutu, but they did not contain the
collective Hutu political identity and consciousness exhibited by the later Hutu Power
movement of the twentieth century.31
By the dawn of the colonial state, Rwandan society contained major inequalities and
social tensions that originated from historical and political processes independent from the
colonists. Internal divisions occurred at the top of royal society, in the contested relationship
between central and peripheral communities, and in the internal dynamics of local communities.
While Rwabugiri attacked Hutu lineages and local Hutu chiefs both militarily and politically, he
did the same with Tutsi elites. An ethnic explanation to the violence shortchanges the
complicated political divisions that arose at the end of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the
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modern conceptualization of pre-colonial Rwanda as a harmonious nation-state, late pre-colonial
Rwanda was a violent and tense society.32

COLONIALISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF “HUTU” AND “TUTSI”
“Hutu” and “Tutsi”—as terms—contain within themselves long politicized histories.
From a simple outsider perspective, “Tutsi” have historically been classified as upper class cattle
herders and “Hutu” as a more lower class farming peasantry. But scholars of the pre-colonial
period note the role social origins and regionalism play in complicating the terms. While in the
modern day many associate all Tutsi with cattle herding, Jan Vansina argues that the term
“Tutsi” probably meant a social elite amongst seventeenth century cattle herders.33 A similar
simplified interpretation associates “Hutu” exclusively with farming. But this interpretation
disregards the fact that historically many Tutsi farmed and many Hutu owned cattle.34 The term
“Hutu” most probably constituted a “transethnic identity” that referred to subjects of the precolonial Rwandan state.35 Socio-economically, Hutu who gained wealth and political power
could achieve Tutsi status, illustrating a social fluidity between the terms that lasted into the
colonial period.36 At the same time, the existence of many rich Hutu lineages and principalities
in addition to poor “petit Tutsi” refute the binary of Hutu as poor and Tutsi as rich.37 Hutu and
Tutsi lived within the same culture, spoke the same language, and lived side by side.
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During the period of Nyiginya state expansion, “Tutsi” and “Hutu” gradually
transformed from social identities to political identities. Specifically, “Tutsi” became associated
with close proximity to royal court while “Hutu” became associated as an inferior identity.
Catherine Newbury emphasizes that while the terms as social identities depended on many
different factors including birth, wealth, cattle, and social ties, the political purposes of the
identities depended on those in power.38 East African scholar Mahmood Mamdani echoes this
assertion by emphasizing the misconception of the terms as ethnic or tribal identities. He argues
that first and foremost, the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are not cultural identities, but political
identities.39 By Rwabugiri’s reign, the terms became associated with levels of power as the
mwami expanded the state and appointed chiefs to formerly autonomous regions.40 Patron-client
relationships between Tutsi and Hutu became exclusionary (to Hutu disadvantage), increasing
social tensions.41 Tutsi identity became more politically advantageous than Hutu identity as
Rwabugiri eliminated the spiritual powers of Hutu abiru court ritualists, imposed ubureetwa
exclusively against Hutu, and broke up Hutu lineages.42
The political transformation of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” developed in response to the colonial
interpretation of Rwandan society. In particular, the European Hamitic interpretation of
Rwandan society and its subsequent racialization of Rwandan society presented drastically
different historical pictures. In 1863, British geographical explorer John Hanning Speke
published his account of exploring the Great Lakes region in search of the Nile River’s source.
Speke viewed the common "agricultural aborigines" that tilled the land as a distinct racial group
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from a richer herding class that controlled cattle.43 He argued that the pastoral Tutsi chiefs were
invaders from long ago who descended from Abyssinia [Ethiopia] and ruled based on racial
superiority.44 This marked the beginning of the European interpretation of Rwandan society
based on race. Speke's observations on origins and migrations come from a Victorian mindset
that coupled race, culture, and history.45 In this framework, the Europeans interpreted the Tutsi
as Semitic descendants of Ham, the cursed son of the biblical figure Noah.46 Instead of
conceptualizing pre-colonial Rwandan society’s complex clan and lineage structures, Speke and
the Europeans emphasized “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as racial opposites.47 This racialization made
“Hutu” an indigenous identity and “Tutsi” an alien identity, which added (but did not create)
another important element to the political relationship between “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” The Hamitic
hypothesis became the genesis of the historical propaganda generated by the Hutu propaganda
machine of the early 1990s.
The Hamitic myth also developed deep physical and racial stereotypes of “Hutu” and
“Tutsi” as Europeans settled in Rwanda at the turn of the twentieth century. The Germans
claimed the territory of modern-day Rwanda at the 1885 Berlin conference and nine years later
arrived to inform mwami Rwabugiri that his kingdom was now under German rule. Count
Gustav von Götzen, one of the first German explorers in the area, used Speke’s observations of
migrations and origins as the basis for his expedition.48 German missionaries echoed Speke and
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other explorers’ racial interpretation of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” in their early ethnographies.
Missionary Louis de Lacger, for instance, wrote of the Tutsi, “Their supremacy is not to be
contested. What does it rely on? Three elements: the first [is] racial…their physical superiority:
they are tall and imposing people…the second is economic: they are magnates whose richness is
constituted by herds of cattle…the third is political: they are men born for command.”49 He
characterized the Tutsi as encapsulating the European definitions of physical beauty, wealth, and
intellect. His description of the Hutu, on the other hand, mirrored European racism of the
“Negroid” people. He writes, “[The Hutu have an] average height of 1.67 meters; very dark skin
coloring and curliness of hair…flat nose and thick lips…ethnologically and morally sedentary;
taste and skills for agriculture…simplicity of manners, sociability and joviality.”50 The first
colonizers conceptualized Hutu as simple, morally inferior, short, unfit to lead, and embodying
racist black stereotypes. In seeking the origins of the Tutsi genocide, many scholars have looked
to the policies of the colonial period that reflected racist European black stereotypes.51 But
taking into the account internal divisions that developed in Rwanda in the late nineteenth
century, it is clear that colonialism contributed and heightened internal political (as opposed to
racial) divisions that already existed in Rwandan society. The colonial racialization of Rwandan
society cemented “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as opposing political identities and made them “more
volatile than ever in history.”52
The Germans never sought to build a colonial state in Rwanda that matched the Belgian
Congo, which managed to enslave much of the Congolese population and extract resources at a
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high rate.53 Instead, the German colonial state delegated power to Tutsi chiefs. This continued
the expansion of centralized Tutsi chiefs over Hutu principalities and local communities.54
While colonial authorities did coerce many Tutsi elites to serve as colonial chiefs, these chiefs
acted in their own interest by expanding power through breaking up local ruling systems in order
to attain regional authority. Additionally, this group of elite Tutsi held their own internal
factions as the colonial state emerged upon a backdrop of a courtly power struggle between elite
Tutsi factions and lineages.55
When the Belgians took over in 1919 as part of the postwar settlement, discrimination
against Hutu increased. The Belgian colonial system heightened tensions by favoring Tutsi in
political appointments, the educational system, and the job sector. On a local level, the colonial
system eradicated mutually beneficial patron-client relationships like umuheto and consolidated
all hill chiefs into one provincial chief of Tutsi identity. As certain positions often went to Hutu,
this contested the local political power of many Hutu elites.56 Quota systems limited the number
of Hutu who could enroll in higher education.57 This inequality left Hutu out of the Western jobs
generated by the colonial state in the political and economic sectors.58 Finally, starting in the
1920s, the Belgians began to use Rwanda as an economic and labor resource for supporting the
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Belgian Congo.59 The pre-colonial practice of ubureetwa became institutionalized into a
coercive practice called corvée. This forced labor system applied only to Hutu males and
became a way for the state to exploit direct labor for revenue-driven projects.60 Tutsi chiefs
became labor recruiters for the colonial enterprise and in doing so, chief- rule became
increasingly oppressive.61 It became more desirable for Hutu to work directly for the Belgians in
mining projects in the Congo than for Tutsi chiefs.62

THE RISE OF THE HUTU REPUBLIC
The period from the 1920s to the 1950s reveal much larger political and social
consequences than colonial exploitation. For one, corvée illustrated the role of political identity
in colonial society. The central authorities exempted the impoverished petit Tutsi, though alike
with Hutu neighbors in wealth and culture, from corvée.63 Even though a small group of Tutsi
elites ran the political system, the lower petit Tutsi still benefited socially and politically despite
living in identical conditions to impoverished Hutu. Two, the Belgian colonial authority
eradicated the social mobility of Hutu and Tutsi identities in the early 1930s. The 1933-1934
colonial census classified Rwandans who owned ten or more cows as Tutsi and those who
owned less than ten as Hutu.64 Tutsi could no longer legally fall socially to Hutu status and Hutu
could no longer legally rise to Tutsi status. This political difference coupled with the racial
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distinction froze Hutu and Tutsi as legal identities.65 Three, awareness of Tutsi privilege (in
particular the exemption of petit Tutsi from corvée) stirred a political consciousness in rural
Hutu communities.66 “Hutu” became a collective political identity. Exploited and constantly
reminded of their “racial” inferiority, a culture of hatred toward Tutsi emerged in the Hutu
community.67 This rising political consciousness reached its peak in the scramble for political
power in the late 1950s.
Inequalities persisted even after reforms in the late 1940s and early 1950s abolished the
practices of ubuhake and ubureetwa.68 Despite these changes, Hutu still found themselves in an
unfavorable land distribution system that made them dependent on Tutsi chiefs for access to
land for cattle grazing and farming. These inequalities heightened anger at individual chiefs and
against Tutsi as a collective identity.69 Tutsi chiefs still held power over land distribution,
pasturage, educational opportunities, and wealth. But when the Tutsi monarchy called for
independence in the 1950s, Belgian colonial authorities became dissatisfied with the Tutsi
monarchy and gradually moved to developing a Hutu political movement.70 The Catholic
Church followed suit in rallying behind Hutu liberation movements. After years of supporting
Tutsi, the Catholic Church in the 1950s sympathized with the Hutu community’s struggle
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against an oppressive Tutsi elite.71 Forming an education system with a Hutu quota, the Church
educated many future Hutu intellectuals and political figures such as the first Rwandan President
Grégoire Kayibanda.
The Hutu community finally developed a coherent political voice as Hutu political
parties such as Kayibanda’s extremist PARMEHUTU party and the more moderate
APROSOMA party emerged in the late 1950s.72 While one might look at these parties as
reflecting a shift in Belgian and church political allegiance, ultimately these Hutu political
movements achieved popularity because of the collective political consciousness that linked
rural Hutu with centralized Hutu intelligentsia. The anger from rural Hutu masses fueled the
national Hutu leadership, not visa versa.73 Anti-Tutsi sentiment in the new Hutu political
movements served as a rallying point for synthesizing that anger into a more unified Hutu
community.74
In response to unequal representation in the government,75 Hutu leaders released the
Hutu Manifesto in 1957. The Manifesto argued that the Tutsi held a social monopoly over the
Hutu and Twa communities and pushed for economic, legal, and political reforms. But at the
same time, the Hutu Manifesto explained the political monopoly in terms of race, specifically
invoking the idea of an ancient Tutsi invasion.76 Tensions exploded in November 1959 when
members of the Tutsi monarchist party UNAR attacked Hutu sub-chief Dominique
Mbonyumutwa. Hutu mobs then went from house to house attacking Tutsi authorities and
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homes. Tutsi counter-attacked and Belgian authorities responded by implementing military
rule.77 They replaced Tutsi chiefs with Hutu, and as Tutsi persecution increased, thousands of
Tutsi fled into exile in neighboring countries.78 PARMEHUTU won the 1960 communal
elections and the 1961 electoral elections over UNAR. Sponsored and supported by Col. Logiest
and the Belgian authorities, Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU gained control of Rwanda from the
monarchist Tutsi well before formal independence on July 1, 1962.
The power changeover resulted in an adaptation of the Hamitic hypothesis as a source of
political legitimization. During colonialism, Tutsi elites utilized the Hamitic hypothesis to their
advantage by legitimating their rule through the myth of superior racial origins from Ethiopia.79
In the aftermath of independence, the myth of superior racial origins legitimated Hutu political
power by invoking the threat of Tutsi invasion as a historical precedent.80 This reframing
legitimatized the emerging Hutu Power movement under Kayibanda. An extremist ideology bent
on preserving a Bantu state and suppressing Tutsi political power, Mahmood Mamdani argues
that Hutu power formed in order to defend (as opposed to acquiring) power since Hutu elites
already controlled the state after the 1959 revolution. While a legitimate liberation movement,
Mamdani argues that the Hutu Power also tragically preserved the fear of Tutsi privilege and
failed to reform the colonial legacy by preserving the native-Hutu/invader-Tutsi binary.81
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Independence and Hutu rule came in relation to a larger regional crisis. Tutsi exiles,
called Inyenzi82 by Hutu extremists, carried out attacks and raids from across borders that held
grave consequences for the Tutsi still living in Rwanda. An attack from Burundi in late 1963 led
to a government-induced pogrom that eliminated Tutsi politicians who remained in Rwanda and
claimed the lives of 10,000 Tutsi.83 These massacres strengthened Kayibanda’s personal rule by
unifying the Hutu political collective against a common Tutsi enemy.84 In an example of the
larger refugee crisis, the Hutu republic’s political victory affected neighboring Burundi’s
internal politics. Tutsi refugees poured into Burundi, bringing with them a politicized ethnic
animosity against Burundian Hutu. They subsequently supported and helped legitimate the
repressive Burundian government, controlled by a Tutsi military clique. Burundi in many ways
became an inverted Rwanda, one in which Hutu Burundians experienced similar political
oppression as Rwandan Tutsi.85
Historical manipulation and the regional refugee crisis between Rwanda and Burundi
reached a violent pinnacle between 1972 and 1973. In Burundi, a failed Hutu coup against the
Tutsi military state led to thousands of Tutsi deaths and a government response culminating in a
“selective genocide” of anywhere from 200,000 to 300,000 Hutu.86 Kayibanda used the
genocide and refugee spillover to his political advantage and used regional power to operate his
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regime, giving most army positions to southern Hutu.87 The Kayibanda regime used anti-Tutsi
sentiment to unify the Hutu community against a common enemy and to deflect regional and
internal tensions. 88 In 1973, Kayibanda oversaw a policy of racial purification in which many
Tutsi lost their jobs and Hutu mobs terrorized Tutsi by burning down houses and engaging in
other acts of violence. But despite these acts of terror, the regional divide between northern and
southern Hutu political communities still cost Kayibanda power in the summer of 1973.89

FROM HABYARIMANA TO GENOCIDE
Northern army chief Juvénal Habyarimana led the 1973 coup and brought an uneasy
peace between Hutu and Tutsi. Violence against Tutsi generally ceased and life became stable
for the vast majority of Tutsi.90 But institutional inequalities against Tutsi remained in business,
education, and politics. Under Habyarimana, Rwanda became a model for development through
a wide range of international partnerships. But like Kayibanda, Habyarimana ruled by personal
rule, patronage, and regional favoritism. A northern Hutu clique consisting of Habyarimana, his
wife Agathe’s family, and other northern Hutu elites (known as the Akazu, or “little house”)
continued the political precedence of elitist and regional rule. Rwanda remained a single-party
state that tightly controlled the populace.91 By the end of the 1980s, the drop in the price of
coffee internationally made Rwanda economically vulnerable. Coupled with France’s 1990 La
Baule conference (which forced multi-partyism in all Francophone nations), the Habyarimana
regime began to lose power.
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The unresolved refugee crisis from the 1959 Hutu revolution resulted in the development
of Tutsi armed militias, culminating in the highly trained Rwandan Patriotic Army. In Uganda,
the diaspora met persecution and violence from the local population due to their oversaturation
of land and jobs.92 Many refugees made it out of the region, receiving education in Europe and
North America. Organizations emerged that pushed for the right of Tutsi to return to Rwanda,
also opposing the Habyarimana regime. The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU)
became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. The RPF recruited military soldiers mostly
from the Ugandan diaspora into its army contingent the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Young
future RPF leaders played a large role in Yoweri Museveni’s rebel National Resistance Army
(NRA) that defeated President Milton Obote in 1986 after a bloody war in the Luwero Triangle.
Paul Kagame (who fled to Uganda on the back of his mother in 1959) became the NRA’s deputy
head of military intelligence and his close friend Fred Rwigyema became deputy army
commander in chief.93 Members of the RPF held high positions in the NRA military and the
Ugandan government, which produced tensions with indigenous members of the NRA.94 At the
same time, land disputes between indigenous ranchers and Rwandan squatters led to a
prohibition of Rwandan squatters from owning land or holding political positions in Uganda.95
These internal dynamics in Uganda were a factor in the RPF guerilla invasion of Rwanda on
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October 1, 1990, thereby underlining the ways in which the regional citizenship crisis
contributed to the RPA invasion.
The RPA invasion triggered a four-year civil war that ended in the 1994 genocide. The
reason why ordinary Hutu became killers has been the research question of many studies.96
While a definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this research, the interpretation
of history during the period illustrates the ways in which Hutu extremists made the idea of
genocide popular. This is significant because the genocide became the brainchild of Akazu elite
as they reacted to the possibility of power sharing (or even defeat) with the RPF.97 In addition,
the forced introduction of multi-partyism in 1990 caused the Habyarimana regime to gradually
lose power. Rival Hutu moderate groups, such as the Parti Liberal and the Republican and
Democratic Movement (MDR), posed a direct challenge to Habyarimana’s National Republican
Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND). As acts of internal violence emerged
throughout Rwanda, the Habyarimana regime impeded the democratization process by accusing
the RPF as the culprits.98 Cultivating a culture of fear and planning the genocide constituted a
last-ditch effort from the departing elitist regime to maintain power.
But even more than the Habyarimana regime’s vilification of the RPF, one must not
discount the structural effects of the civil war. The war contributed to the Rwandan population’s
embrace of genocide ideology in powerful ways: the loss of agricultural production, the
destruction of infrastructure, the displacement of the northern population, the influx of
Burundian Hutu refugees from the 1993 Tutsi coup, and a shortage of food.99 Even more
significant, the Hutu rebel groups in Burundi lost the war, thereby bringing disgrace to the
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population. During this context of defeat and fear in the early 1990s, the Rwandan government
began arming and training tens of thousands of civilian youth into militia units called the
Interahamwe (“those who work together”).100 The violent ideology oriented itself around the
idea of a unified Hutu nation-state, creating an “us versus them” effect that pitted ordinary Hutu
in a collective struggle against both Tutsi and Hutu political opponents.101 Simultaneously, Hutu
extremist elites made mass purchases of machetes and created death lists of Tutsi and moderate
Hutu politicians.102
As the war raged on, the government and Hutu Power ideologues circulated propaganda
that heightened tensions and racial awareness. Racist political cartoons and other propaganda
circulated depicted Tutsi as bloodthirsty Hamitic invaders. Among these propaganda
publications included the infamous Hutu Ten Commandments (see Appendix A). The newly
launched radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) spewed hatred
through racist presenters, interviews, and songs later decrying the locations of Tutsi they wanted
killed. Historian Ferdinand Nahimana, a leading figure in the Hutu Power movement, grounded
Hutu Power ideology historically by vehemently arguing that the Tutsi invaded from Ethiopia.103
In 1993, Léon Mugesera delivered a speech calling for the Tutsi to be sent back to Ethiopia via
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the Nyarbarongo River.104 Finally, the assassination of Hutu Burundian President Melchior
Ndadaye and subsequent violence led to another refugee spillover of Burundian Hutu. Over
200,000 Burundian Hutu lived in southern Rwandan refugee camps by April 1994.105 They
became enthusiastic Interahamwe recruits and carried with them hated memories of Tutsi
autocracy.106 A cease-fire brokered by the UN between the RPF and Rwandan government in
August 1993 resulted in the Arusha Peace Accords, which outlined a process of integrating RPA
and FAR (Rwandan) military forces as well as holding multiparty elections. Kangura published
literature arguing that the Arusha peace talks constituted a Tutsi conspiracy.107 A UN
peacekeeping force led by Canadian General Roméo Dallaire attempted to implement the
accords from September 1993 to April 1994.108
On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira
died after their plane was shot down returning from Arusha. While to this day it remains a point
of contention as to which side shot down the plane, radio RTLM reported the RPA as
responsible and relayed the signal to commence the killings. The propaganda coupled the Tutsi
collectively with the RPA. Colloquially, to kill a Tutsi meant killing an RPA informant. Death
squads, armed with lists of ordinary Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians, went from house to
104

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 171–172.
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 205.
106
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 205–206 and 230.
107
Melvern, A People Betrayed, 83–85.
108
It is beyond the scope of my study to provide an in-depth analysis to the international community’s
involvement and non-involvement in Rwanda. Several accounts do exist on the subject, in particular memoirs
from those at the center of the UN’s operations. UNAMIR commanding officer General Roméo Dallaire
provides an insider’s account to the UNAMIR mission that depicts the international community’s complicity in
the Rwandan genocide and attempts to bring accountability to its failure. His memoir articulates in great detail
how his mission reported many warning signs of genocide to the UN. This included reports from an
Interahamwe informant named Jean-Pierre who revealed the location of weapons caches, the construction of
Tutsi death lists, and the training of death squads. But the UN failed to respond to this (and many other) reports
compiled by UNAMIR. His main point revolves around the fact that the UN and Western powers knew
genocide was taking place and refused to intervene when they had the chance. Dallaire argues that the
genocide could have been prevented, and proposes a re-evaluation of the international community’s intentions
in their peacekeeping missions. See Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil. For an insider's account on the
bureaucratic failure from within the UN during the genocide, see Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide:
The United Nations and Rwanda (Cornell Univ Pr, 2003).
105

38

house to kill. Extremist Hutu Power leaders took over the country and eradicated nearly all
moderate Hutu political opponents. These killings demonstrate a political agency to the
massacres, as killing moderate Hutu illustrated an unwillingness of the MRND to compromise
and share power. Many Tutsi sought sanctuary in churches, which had worked in previous
pogroms. This time, Hutu politicians encouraged Tutsi to seek sanctuary, only to send in the
Interahamwe death squads to butcher them by the thousands. On April 9, 1994, France sent in a
force that evacuated all foreign expatriates. While the French soldiers followed strict orders not
to evacuate any Rwandans, France did evacuate members of the Akazu.109 Despite frequent
reports from United Nations peacekeeping force UNAMIR, the international community did not
intervene. For one hundred days, anywhere from 500,000 to one million Tutsi were hunted down
and killed at the hands of Interahamwe militias and the FAR.110

WAR IN THE CONGO, RPA WAR CRIMES, AND THE POST-GENOCIDE STATE
As the génocidaires attempted to cleanse the Rwandan population of Tutsi, the RPF
continued to engage the FAR in warfare. As the RPA neared victory, radio RTLM induced panic
in its listeners. Hutu began fleeing into Zaire in the hundreds of thousands. When the RPF
finally captured Kigali, over 2.1 million Hutu had fled to Zaire. The refugees settled in camps
organized by Hutu extremists bent on rebuilding for a counter-attack.111 Ex-FAR soldiers began
raiding northwest Rwanda, catching Rwandan citizens in Ruhengeri in the crossfire of massacres
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committed by both the RPF and the ex-FAR units.112 A cholera epidemic erupted in refugee
camps in Goma, killing thousands of Hutu refugees.113 Hutu extremists found sympathy from
Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, who helped re-arm Hutu factions.114 The RPF attacked the
refugee camps in 1996 to alleviate the FAR threat, also training Banyamulenge (Congolese
Tutsi) in Eastern Zaire, leading to their rebellion, and later supporting the rebel AFDL military
group in Eastern Zaire during the first Congolese War.115 The RPA cleared refugee camps in
1996 and organized a coalition including Uganda and Zaire that deposed the Mobutu regime and
brought AFDL leader Laurent Kabila to power in 1997.116 But the clearing of refugee camps
came at a high human cost as thousands of Hutu refugees (many of them women and children)
were killed by the RPA and its proxies, were forcefully repatriated, or were forced to flee deep
into the Congolese interior.117
The Congolese War that proceeded incorporated nearly every country in the region and a
plethora of international actors. After Laurent Kabila severed relations with Rwanda and
Uganda, the two countries launched another proxy war to oust Kabila from power. This
complicated power play of shifting alliances, invasions, and assassinations is beyond the scope
of my study, but has been the subject of many comprehensive journalist and scholarly
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accounts.118 For the purposes of this study, I want to point out elements from the Congolese
crisis that point to Rwanda’s involvement in the larger regional crisis. One, the Rwandan
genocide caused a Hutu refugee spillover that de-stabilized Eastern Zaire, leading major African
powers to prey on the country. The violent aftermath brought forth a regional coalition that
ousted Mobutu from power. Rwanda and Uganda became leading actors in the instability of
Eastern Congo region. The refugee crisis also illustrated a larger citizenship crisis in the region
in which refugee spillovers fed a continuous cycle of violence (which we can still see today with
the 2012 M23 rebellion in Eastern Congo). Two, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe cross-border
attacks (that have continued to this day) from Eastern Congo demonstrate that the political
power play continued past the July 4, 1994 liberation. While the RPF-controlled government
officially claims to be building a nation of unity, their political control stems from a crisis in
which a large portion of their population and diaspora views them as not politically legitimate.119
And three, RPF war crimes during the civil war, genocide, post-genocide period, and in the
Congo created a memory of Hutu victimization that the RPF suppresses both within its borders
and in the international community.120
The last point brings forth one of the prevailing debates in analyzing Rwandan genocide
memory: how does one remember the RPF? While it is true that the RPF stopped the genocide,
this does not place their decisions made before, during, and after the genocide above scrutiny.
For one, the RPF chose a military strategy during the genocide that was aimed at military victory
118
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as opposed to Tutsi rescue. They pressured the FAR-controlled central and western regions of
Rwanda by advancing slowly through weaker regions in east and south. While a brilliant
military strategy that presented the best chance of a total victory, thousands of Tutsi died during
the slow maneuver.121 Roméo Dallaire argues that Paul Kagame and the RPF leadership share
some blame because their military operations probably sacrificed many Tutsi lives for a total
victory.122 This does not discount the stories of RPF soldiers bringing safety to Tutsi in hiding or
the fact that many soldiers had family members killed during the genocide. To make the claim
that the RPF did not care about the Rwandan Tutsi is extreme.123 But the idea that the RPF
fought a righteous war of attrition for the benefit of all Tutsi discounts the fact that the RPF’s
first objective (as a political movement) involved attaining absolute power of the Rwandan
state.124 While the RPA ended the genocide, they did so in a manner that prioritized a total
military and political victory (a point they have covered up in present-day depictions of their
liberation). In the larger political history of Rwanda, the RPF followed the example of previous
elitist regimes that used the population as a tool to either maintain or acquire power.
In addition, the RPA committed war crimes during the civil war, genocide, and in the
Congo that have been largely unprosecuted and ignored by the international community. Alison
Des Forges devotes an entire section to unprosecuted RPA human rights abuses in Leave None
to Tell the Story (2009). She compiles evidence that accuses RPA soldiers of pillaging,
abducting, and killing Rwandan citizens in northeastern Rwanda from 1990-1993.125 During the
genocide, several incidents were reported in which the RPF did not distinguish between
121
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Interahamwe and civilians during attacks.126 The RPF organized public meetings in which Hutu
citizens gathered expecting to hear a political speech or receive promised food. Instead, the
soldiers killed the gathered community.127 While an UN-sanctioned (and initially RPFsupported) report by Robert Gersony reportedly estimated that the RPF killed between 25,000 to
45,000 people between April and August 1994, the UN denied the report’s existence in 1996
(probably out of pressure from the RPF).128 While the RPF does not deny killing, they argue that
they only killed Interahamwe and FAR soldiers. But massacres persisted after the genocide as
well, including the April 22, 1995 Kibeho massacre in a southern Rwandan refugee camp, which
left thousands of people unaccounted for, signifying an RPF cover up in which they slaughtered
thousands of unarmed Hutu refugees.129 RPF crimes against humanity have been largely handled
internally and have not been prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).130
As RPF war crimes were largely ignored and tolerated by the international community,
the RPF formed a government that defined national unity as its mission. The “ideology of
national unity” officially contained several key components: colonialism divided a harmonious
pre-colonial past; moderate Hutu victimization during the genocide; and moderate Hutu
politicians should be included in the government.131 But the recent official dubbing of the
genocide as the “Genocide against the Tutsi” signifies an erasing of many Hutu experiences of
suffering. While Hutu suffering at the hands of Hutu extremists is recognized, suffering from
126
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RPF atrocities are not. By ignoring the thousands of Rwandans who were killed or assassinated
by the RPF, countless studies highlight contradictions to the government’s official ideology in
the internal dynamics of Rwandan politics. The government postponed democratic elections
because of both the deep political divisions in the country and the RPF’s struggle to maintain
control. When elections finally did take place, they took place in an open ballot context.132
Kagame won the 2003 presidential election by a landslide, prompting questions to the election’s
legitimacy. Speech laws enacted from 2002 to 2008 with loosely defined terms such as
“divisionism” and “genocide ideology” repressed pluralism and free speech.133 During the past
decade Rwanda has emerged as a star on the western development circuit, receiving enormous
amounts of aid from the United States, Britain, and Germany.134 But allegations of a
“Tutsification” of Rwandan politics and civil society bring forth further questions as to whether
or not Rwanda is really democratic. Evidence suggests that contemporary Rwanda is an elitist
single-party military state posing as a democracy, much like the Habyarimana regime that
preceded it.

CONCLUSION
The politicization of this history makes memory and remembrance both a personal and
political act. Catharine Newbury criticizes the idea of a single Rwandan history, arguing rather
that there exist competing histories.135 Every regime and oppressed group in Rwandan history
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has re-interpreted and re-framed the pre-colonial and colonial histories in order to legitimize
their policies and decisions.136 Similarly, each regime suppressed divergent political memories,
meaning that certain atrocities are recognized while others are left out. This has held disastrous
consequences.137 As argued by René Lemarchand, the memory of Hutu moderates and those
killed by the RPF has been “thwarted” in the name of national unity, the terms “Victim” and
“Perpetrator” have been unofficially cemented as a “Hutu-Tutsi” binary, and acknowledgement
of victimization in both communities has been left out of the official narrative.138 A single linear
view of Rwandan history emerged that conceptualized the pre-colonial society as harmonious,
argued that colonialism made the genocide historically determined, and characterized the RPF as
liberators toward a path of state-building and development.
By examining the scholarly literature on Rwandan history, we can better understand a
more complicated story rather than simply a linear progression from colonialism to genocide.
Research conducted on pre-colonial Rwanda dismisses the portrayal of a harmonious precolonial past. Jan Vansina argues that modern depictions of pre-colonial Rwanda project a
“nostalgic utopia into the past, a past that contrasts with a painful present.”139 Tensions existed
in the pre-colonial society that pre-dated colonialism. While colonialism introduced racist myths
and racial inequalities into Rwandan society, its worse contribution involved the overall
racialization of an already unequal society. This does not mean that the genocide was
historically determined or random. Power plays between political elites, the exclusion of
peripheral classes, the revising of historical relationships, and divergent political memories all
centered around preserving power over the nation-state. This volatile political tradition coupled
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with an equally volatile regional situation in the early 1990s to set the stage for genocide. It took
a regional crisis in which genocide occurred in Burundi, a refugee crisis that de-stabilized
Ugandan internal politics, and a four-year civil war in order for genocide to become a political
option for the survival of the Hutu elite. The connection between violence and the fear of losing
power cannot be ignored, and it is therefore impossible to separate post-genocide Rwanda from
the rest of Rwandan history. The 1994 genocide occurred in relation to a much larger power
conflict that continues in the modern day.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE RWANDAN MEMORIAL MUSEUM:
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AT THE KIGALI GENOCIDE MEMORIAL

The first exhibition panel at the Kigali Genocide Memorial (KGM) makes a poignant
statement on Rwandan history. The panel reads, “We are one people. We speak one language.
We have one history. In recent times, though, genocide has cast a dark shadow over our lives
and torn us apart. This chapter is a bitter part of our lives, but one we must remember for those
we lost, and for the sake of the future.”1 Sensitive to the violence and the trauma of survivors,
the museum does an admirable job in mourning Tutsi victims. It refuses to sanitize the atrocities,
holds the international community accountable for its failings, and emphasizes the need for
peace and reconciliation.2
But KGM also leaves out a wide range of divergent memories and competing histories.
The audio-tour explicitly states that the first fighting between Hutu and Tutsi emerged in the late
1950s. The audio-tour states, “Those who speak of a century’s long feud are mistaken.”3 Instead,
the museum designates the divisions in Rwandan society as beginning with colonialism. In
refuting the myth of an ethnically determined struggle between Hutu and Tutsi, the narrative
constricts many political and socio-economic factors independent of colonialism that contributed
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to divisions in Rwandan society. As many prominent Rwandan scholars have explained, this
type of interpretation holds a distinct political perspective. The exhibition is successful in
remembering Tutsi victimization and the challenges that plague Rwandan society as a result of
the genocide. However, it represents an official view of Rwandan history that leaves little room
for competing perspectives, and simplifies Rwandan history in its goal of unification and
reconciliation.4
This chapter will establish two points. One, I will use the exhibition wall text, audio
tour, and memorial gardens as representations of official Rwandan historical discourse. Two, I
will point to several key transformations in the Rwandan historiography that Rwandan scholars
identify as part of the RPF’s interpretation of the official history. For domestic and international
audiences alike, the museum spreads a particular view of Rwandan history. As we shall see, it is
less than the complete story.

THE KGM MEMORIAL GARDENS
Located on the memorial’s grounds, the audio tour begins by taking the visitor around to
the various memorial gardens (see Appendix C for photographs). The gardens memorialize such
memories as resistance, lost children, and women. Three of the gardens mirror the linear
interpretation of Rwandan history, each garden defined by the audio tour as symbolizing a phase
in Rwandan history. The three gardens connect via a stream of water meant to symbolize the
passage of time. The first garden, called the “Garden of Unity,” symbolizes a harmonious precolonial past. The first garden’s circular shape is meant to represent the traditional Rwandan
home. The water flows from the garden of unity towards a waterfall that zigzags downwards
toward a second garden that rests below. Named the “Garden of Division,” the disjointed stream
4
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and waterfall symbolize a break in the unified harmony caused by colonial rule. Around the
fountain sits several statues of animals looking in different directions, meant to symbolize a loss
of direction in Rwandan identity. The audio tour at this point addresses the visitor and
challenges him or her to sit and reflect on personal responsibility. The final garden, named the
“Garden of Reconciliation,” represents the rebuilding of Rwandan society through a return to the
unified past. The rocks in the fountain’s centerpiece symbolize the rebuilding of a Rwandan
society torn apart by genocide. The five plant holders look away from the center, representing
neighboring countries looking out toward the world. One of the five statues, an elephant, holds a
cell phone. The audio tour claims that the elephant represents the need for the region to inform
the international community to what happened in 1994. In addition to an internal unification of
Rwandan society, the garden calls for the international community to recognize its responsibility
for the genocide.
The gardens reflect the re-imagining of Rwandan history in the post-genocide state. The
memorial gardens place the genocide at the center of Rwandan history. As a metaphor for time,
the stream literally flows to and from the garden of division. This interpretation of time makes
the genocide a historically determined process descending from colonial rule. The gardens do
not represent the regional and political processes that diverge with the linear historical
progression. Political violence—whether violence directed specifically at Hutu during
colonialism or Tutsi during the Hutu republic—becomes compressed into a collective suffering.
The gardens also represent a modern interpretation of the pre-colonial past as a “nostalgic”
harmony.5 The unified depiction of pre-colonial Rwanda de-emphasizes the inequalities and
violence in pre-colonial society. Specifically, historical processes independent of colonialism
(such as the nineteenth-century centralization of client-patron relationships) are forgotten. This
5
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interpretation suppresses the equally distorted history in the Hutu narrative of Tutsi hegemony
and invasion. The “one people” mantra challenges the myth of Tutsi invasion, but it also
suppresses the fact that oppression occurred during the pre-colonial era. The linear framing of
history serves as a state building tool. By conceptualizing Rwandan society as an inherently
unified society tampered by colonial rule, the gardens overlook the political dynamics of the
post-genocide state. The pre-colonial narrative reinforces the government’s “ideology of unity”
and development.6 History becomes an ideological construct meant to rebuild the state as
opposed to questioning internal politics.

THE KGM MUSEUM EXHIBITION
The museum exhibition mirrors the gardens’ linear historical model. The exhibition
consists of the following phases: “Before Genocide,” “Apocalypse,” “Resistance,” and
“Aftermath.” The heart of this exhibition (“Apocalypse” and “Resistance”) provides a powerful
account of the international community’s failings, the horrors experienced by Tutsi victims, and
the resistance of Hutu moderates and rescuers. But the bookends to the center (“Before
Genocide” and “Aftermath”) contain a linear view of where the genocide originated from and a
compressed view of the refugee situation in Zaire. The following section focuses on the three
silences and compressions involving these two exhibition phases: the utopian compression of the
pre-colonial era and the emphasis of colonial introduced divisions,
“Before Genocide” groups the pre-colonial era with the colonial era and emphasizes that
all Rwandans are indigenous to the land.7 The exhibition sums up the entire pre-colonial era:
“This has been our home for centuries. We are one people. We speak one language. We have
6

Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch,
1999) 693-697.
7
While Aegis Trust released a testimonial account We Survived Genocide that referenced mwami Rwabugiri’s
land reforms, the museum exhibition does not deviate from the utopian pre-colonial depiction. See We
Survived Genocide in Rwanda, ed. Wendy Whitworth, Nottinghamshire: Quill Press, 2006, 2.

50

one history.”8 The exhibition places responsibility for social divisions exclusively with
colonialism. The panel “Colonial Times” follows Mamdani’s argument that the colonial era
racialized the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.9 The panel argues that the beginning of social divisions was
the colonial introduction of the 10-cow identity card system in the early 1930s. The panel states,
“We had lived in peace for many centuries, but now the divide between us had begun.”10 This
statement further establishes the utopian perspective. Additionally, the identity card system’s
identification of Tutsi as owners of ten cows makes the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi a
socio-economical one as opposed to a political distinction.
The exhibition does make reference to the political inequalities. One piece of wall text
states, “An imposed identity began to determine an individual’s opportunity in Belgium’s
reshaped Rwanda.”11 Another piece of wall text acknowledges that nearly all the political and
privileged positions went to Tutsi.12 But all political responsibility falls towards the Catholic
Church and colonial state. The Tutsi as a collective political unit providing political privilege to
“petit Tutsi” becomes de-emphasized, represented instead holistically as the actions of a few
Tutsi elites seeking social elevation. Finally, the suffering of the Hutu from corvée does not
appear in the exhibition. Instead of emphasizing the political privilege of the Tutsi identity and
the subjugation of the Hutu masses, Rwandan society is seen as descending collectively towards
genocide.
“Before Genocide” also contextualizes the 1959 Hutu revolution as part of the “final
solution.” The exhibition attributes the Hutu revolution as a colonial construct that uprooted the
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Tutsi monarchy.13 This representation ignores the social tensions against the Tutsi elite that built
up to the 1950s. Only at this point does the exhibition single out a group as victims. One panel
begins, “In 1959 King Rudahigwa died. Thereafter, massacres of Tutsi were organised.”14 In
addition to emphasizing Tutsi victimization and ignoring the Tutsi monarchist party UNAR, the
panel links the early Hutu Power movement, the Kayibanda regime, the Habyarimana regime,
and the génocidaires together. While all of these political groups imposed racism and violence
against Tutsi (and provide dictatorial rule to the rest of the population), the presentation
contrasts the entire Hutu political movement elites with a righteous interpretation of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front.
The exhibition depicts the Tutsi exile in the early 1960s and the formation of the RPF as
transcending the cycles of power imbedded in the rest of the Rwandan historiography. In this
manner, the exhibition reflects a historical interpretation that exists today amongst Tutsi elites.
By identifying the 1959 social revolution as the genocide’s beginning, the RPF experience in
exile mixes with those Tutsi victimized in Rwanda through the genocide.15 Finally, this
interpretation of the Tutsi exile characterizes the RPF as exceptional liberators as opposed to
political elites continuing the overall power play.16
The museum defines the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) as the liberators of the
oppressed and the importers of democracy (as opposed to an army ousted from Uganda and bent
on taking over the Rwandan state). The audio tour explains:
With the commencement of mass slaughter around the country, the RPA
mobilized its troops. The soldiers of the RPA saved tens of thousands of people.
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They ended the genocide, defeating the civil and military authorities that had
planned and executed the nightmare of killing.17
The RPF certainly liberated and saved thousands of Tutsi, but they also committed their fair
share of controversies. The exhibition makes no mention of RPF crimes, the RPF’s opposition to
a broader UNAMIR II mandate, or to the controversy over Kagame’s military strategies
effectiveness in saving Tutsi lives.18 In addition, the exhibition glowingly describes the RPF as
“intent on re-establishing equal rights and the rule of law, as well as the opportunity for refugees
to return.”19 This description gives the RPF moral authority over Rwanda grounded in a right to
return in order to spread democracy.20 This view understates the RPF’s history in Ugandan
internal politics and its goal of political power. While the brunt of the exhibition focuses on the
suffering of Tutsi victims, it also legitimizes the RPF as the liberators of Rwanda from
divisionism. While the RPF certainly liberated many cases of oppressed Tutsi, the controversies
surrounding their military actions contradict their claim to liberating the population from the
genocide itself.
While the museum includes the victimization of moderate Hutu during the genocide, the
absence of RPF war crimes simplifies the genocide into a black and white story. The content on
the civil war focuses on the extremist propaganda, the Arusha Accords, the genocide planning,
and the international community’s failure to recognize the ongoing genocide. All of these details
create an intense, informative, and (for the foreigner) sobering learning experience. But the
silences of the exhibit—in particular the de-emphasis on the civil war’s economic, regional, and
human consequences—makes it impossible to fathom the political motives of the genocide.
17
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As a regional crisis, both the “Before Genocide” and “Aftermath” sections understate the
significance of regional Hutu victimization in Burundi and in the post-genocide refugee crisis in
Zaire in the overall historiography. The museum does this in part by defining the regional
refugee crisis as an exclusively Tutsi experience. The exhibition states, “The refugees were
prevented from returning, despite many peaceful efforts to do so. Some then joined the Rwandan
Patriotic Front [RPF] who, on 1 October 1990, invaded Rwanda.”21 The Tutsi refugee crisis and
the denial of a right of return becomes another legitimating factor to the RPF. The narrative also
leaves out the 1972 genocide against Burundi Hutu, its effects on Rwandan politics, and the role
of Burundi Hutu victimization in Rwanda’s internal extremist politics. For the post-genocide
refugee crisis, “Aftermath” collectivizes the Hutu refugee population in Zaire as génocidaires.
The exhibition includes photos of massacres from border incursions by ex-FAR and
Interahamwe. Another caption criticizes the humanitarian aid agencies that flocked to Hutu
refugee camps, ignoring Tutsi survivors in Rwanda. The panel also briefly illustrates the Hutu
extremists’ coercive practices within the refugee camps. But the exhibition does not mention the
RPF invasion in 1996 or the subsequent war in Zaire. Such an absence may serve a practical
purpose in the museum’s structure, as its mission involves remembering genocide survivors as
opposed to those who died in exile. The museum does an excellent job in illustrating the horrors
experienced by Tutsi victims and challenges faced by survivors. But by including a limited view
of the refugee crisis that does not acknowledge the victimization of innocent Hutu, KGM
effectively removes the memory of Hutu refugees from the official discourse.
For the post-genocide period, the “Aftermath” section does a wonderful job in detailing
the challenges in reconciliation, justice, AIDS, trauma, and remembering the dead with
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dignity.22 But by overlooking the historical inequalities faced by Hutu, the later Hutu extremist
politics appear inherent to the Hutu collective. This does not diminish the scope of Hutu
participation, but violence did occur from the RPF-controlled territories that triggered fears
preserved over the years through memory and mythmaking. In this manner, one can make the
argument that the narrative told in the museum presentation at KGM cements the otherwise
historical fluidity between perpetrator and victim by silencing Hutu victimization.

THE RE-FRAMING OF RWANDAN HISTORY
The narrative presented at the Kigali Genocide Memorial comes on the heels of a larger
political debate over Rwandan history. For decades scholars debated the origins of the Hutu,
Tutsi, and Twa identity. Mahmood Mamdani describes these scholarly debates as the “search for
origins” argument. These debates obsessed over the origins of the Tutsi.23 Other historians took
a very different view that emphasized the unity of Rwandan society and discarded the notion of
a Tutsi invasion. These two perspectives caused an ideological rupture further distorted by the
post-independent Rwandan governments: (1) Tutsi existed in harmony with Hutu and Twa as a
single people in a unified state, or (2) Tutsi (as a separate racial group) migrated and conquered
pre-colonial Rwandan society.24 The Kayibanda and Habyarimana Hutu regimes pressed the
latter history through a national discourse and propaganda that played a large role in fueling the
genocide. Since the genocide, the RPF shifted the official historical discourse towards the
former. The present-day official narrative compresses the political and historical complexities
into three historical phases: (1) a unified pre-colonial Rwandan state, (2) a long-term descent to
22
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genocide brought on by colonialism, and (3) the liberation and rebuilding of Rwanda through the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
This historical interpretation must be viewed in the context of the RPF struggle to
achieve internal political legitimacy post-genocide. The RPF re-constructed the official
Rwandan historical narrative to emphasize national unity.25 They embarked on this carefully
crafted construction of history through the use of commemoration, memorialization, education,
justice, national symbols, and public addresses.26 Scholar Villia Jefremoves observed that
immediately after the genocide the RPF placed the re-writing of history as a first priority.27 In
1995, the Rwandan government banned the teaching of history, citing the practice as
contributing to the divisions in Rwandan society.28 Considering the ways in which history
contributed to the spreading of extremist genocide ideology, such a re-evaluation of education
becomes understandable. However, a “more truthful” official narrative came in a context of
several controversial government measures. Starting in the 1990s the Rwandan government
veered towards single-party rule by banning ethnicities, silencing political opponents with the
controversial legal term “genocide ideology,” and overall restricting political liberties.29 As the
divisions in Rwandan society made democracy a threat to national stability, unity became a
political term synonymous with unchallenged RPF rule and the silencing of the Hutu political
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voice.30 The new narrative that emerged oriented Rwandan history around a few highly
politicized events. The RPF used (and continues to use) media, diplomacy, and policy to
construct an interpretation of the past, present, and future modeled after an ideal RPF-controlled
state.31
The official narrative conceptualizes pre-colonial Rwanda as a unified nation-state in
which all identities lived in harmony.32 This new narrative compresses the pre-independence
history into a linear transformation from a mythical pre-colonial harmony to a divisive colonial
class system. The introduction of colonialism became the source (as opposed to the trigger) of
the tensions in Rwandan society. In the preamble to the RPF constitution, for example, the text
acknowledges the abuses of elites but never mentions Tutsi elites by name. The preamble states:
The Rwandan leadership was controlled by the colonial masters and worked for
their gain instead of the benefit of the Rwandans…The colonial masters used the
divide and rule principle in Rwanda, creating falsehoods claiming that Rwandans
actually had different origins…all [falsehoods] aimed at dividing the
people…[and which] ultimately destroyed their unity.33
The constitution never directly mentions Hutu suffering in colonialism, only hinting at the
inequalities in labor and education introduced by colonialism. Johan Pottier writes that this reframed history highlights the ways in which, “Tutsi victimization in the genocide...is now being
projected back in time: the good Tutsi elite at the royal court had been unable to continue with
its benevolence, after the arrival of the colonialists.”34 Scholars such as Jan Vansina and
Catharine Newbury refute the view that all Rwandans lived in a happy pre-colonial society
30

Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and Themaking of a Continental
Catastrophe (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20–23; hereafter cited as Africa's World
War.
31
Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 51.
32
Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” 9–10; Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering
to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Africa 76, no. 02
(2006): 133.
33
“Constitution,” Rwandan Patriotic Front⎯Inkotanyi, last modified 2012, http://rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?constitution-; hereafter cited as “Constitution RFF⎯Inkotanyi.”
34
Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 118.

57

under the rule of “wise kings.”35 This official history legitimizes a historical Tutsi monarchist
rule, places ethnicity as the principle form of identity, and diminishes historical land
inequalities, conflict between rival kingdoms, and patronage inequalities that existed
independently from colonialism.36
By conceptualizing the history as a descent toward genocide, the narrative diminishes
the oppressive colonial context by which the Hutu political movement emerged. The Hutu
regimes politically abused the memory of exploitation resulting from corvée, remembering the
Tutsi collectively as oppressors bent on re-establishing hegemony. In response, the current
official history suppresses the memory of corvée, instead emphasizing the colonial state’s
reworking of the ubuhake cattle relationship as the genesis of social tensions.37 The early 1930s
colonial state installed a policy of defining Tutsi as those Rwandans with ten cows. The current
narrative makes this event a main point of evidence to the colonial installation of division, deemphasizing the land and labor inequalities that already existed in Rwanda society.38
Colonialism becomes an interrupter of harmony and the beginning of a long-term path towards
genocide.
By viewing the genocide as a long-term historical process, the official history
incorporates all preceding historical events as part of a linear path. In particular, the Hutu social
revolution becomes a stop on a descent towards genocide as opposed to a liberation
movement.39 The present narrative re-frames the 1959 Hutu social revolution as an act by a few
individuals corrupted by colonialism.40 The RPF constitution states, “The majority of those who
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fought for Rwandan independence were Tutsi, so the Belgians began spreading the ideology that
Tutsi were themselves foreigners and had originated from Abyssinia. They encouraged Hutu to
destroy and burn their homes, kill them and send them into exile.”41 While certainly not a false
statement, this perspective shapes the Hutu revolution as a misguided colonial construct as
opposed to a political partnership meant to oppose an elitist Tutsi political threat. To suggest that
the injustices committed by the Tutsi elites towards the Hutu masses contributed to the Hutu
social revolution does not apologize for the victimization of Tutsi that occurred from 1963 up to
1994.42 Rather, such an acknowledgment illustrates that Hutu social revolution occurred because
of political inequalities that oppressed Hutu for decades. While colonialism cemented these
inequalities in the colonial administration, inequalities existed before colonialism.
Furthermore, Mahmood Mamdani argues that the contemporary narrative seeks to
couple the entire Hutu political identity with the 1994 génocidaires. He makes a clear distinction
between the two. Hutu power came in response to colonial Tutsi privilege, while génocidaire
ideology came out of desperation to maintain political power at the end of the civil war. Hutu
power looked for political supremacy, an undemocratic response but not necessarily
synonymous with the “final solution” strategy embarked upon by the génocidaires.43 To link the
1994 “the final solution” with the political ideology of the 1950s and 1960s makes the genocide
historically inevitable from the time of Hutu political control.
Finally, the de-emphasis on the regional crisis presents the RPF as liberators, thwarts the
memory of Hutu suffering, and pressures the international community to support the RPF
regime. The RPF’s invasion becomes an effort to liberate Rwanda from tyranny and bring
development. Pottier argues that Kagame uses the West's history and guilt over not intervening

41

“Constitution RFF⎯Inkotanyi.”
Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 123; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 269–270.
43
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 270.
42

59

as “political capital” for supporting the RPF regime.44 By accepting the RPF's depiction of
events, the international community allows the RPF to get away with war crimes. In this
manner, the official narrative thwarts the memory of Hutu moderates and those killed by RPF by
cementing the labels of victim and perpetrator with Tutsi and Hutu, respectively.45 Ignoring
Hutu suffering does not diminish the Tutsi experience. Rather, as argued by René Lemarchand,
if Kagame wants to claim ownership of the “liberation” narrative he also needs to claim
responsibility for the human rights violations that transpired before reconciliation can occur.46
The RPF has viewed history as a battleground for national identity – and it has
subscribed to (and popularized) an official history that serves its purposes well. In this history,
the memories of Hutu victimization from the pre-colonial to present day are not fully articulated
and represented. This interpretation diminishes any victimized or historical memories that can
fuel an organized political rebellion. Despite the contradictions from the historical record, the
pre-colonial era becomes a model for contemporary Rwandan development and reconciliation.
While emphasizing a historical peace and unity does work in dismissing the historically volatile
Hamitic myth of Tutsi conquest, the interpretation ends up incorporating many root causes to
Hutu oppression. Finally, the romanticizing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front as liberators
legitimates the current RPF-led government in the eyes of the international community. But
internally, the narrative suppresses any political alternatives⎯whether it is extremists from the
previous regime or lawful democratic alternatives. While the Kigali Genocide Memorial
successfully honors the memory of Tutsi victims, by mirroring this political-historical line it also
silences many legitimate competing perspectives.
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CONCLUSION
The Kigali Genocide Memorial exemplifies the official history in Rwanda. The history it
tells responds to the Hutu extremist history by conceptualizing tensions as originating from
colonialism as opposed to migration. By publicly denouncing a Hamitic migration, KGM honors
the memory of victims by fighting the Hamitic myth that fueled the genocide’s propaganda and
ideology. While the unity narrative is far from a bad historical message, its implementation
washes over the pre-colonial inequalities and cases of Hutu victimization that are remembered
within the Hutu community. While many of these Hutu perpetrated, others did not. As a tool of
reconciliation, the museum exhibition does not make room for the representations of
victimization within both communities. While the memorial’s presentation succeeds in calling
for both international accountability and for honoring the memory of Tutsi victims, attention
must also be paid to how the official history collectives the entire Hutu identity as extremist
perpetrators, cements perpetrator-victim as a binary, and silences the memory of Hutu
victimization. As a result of the competing histories at play, the re-building of a unified and
reconciled state should not recognize the suffering of one group (no matter how the differences
in number or manner of the killings) as a reason for silencing another.47 To do so risks fueling
further sentiments of victimization and the potential for another violent counter-movement.
This can be seen in the historical revisionism of Hutu ideologues. For them, RPF war
crimes become part of a “double genocide” interpretation.48 This interpretation rationalizes the
actions of génocidaires as a response to acts of genocide already committed by the RPA and
becomes a way of de-legitimizing the Kagame-run state. Instead of honoring the victims as a
move towards reconciliation, the victimization of both Hutu and Tutsi becomes part of another
47
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cycle of politicized memory. This became evident on a local level through fieldwork conducted
by Elisabeth King that compared the KGM historical narrative with interviews of both Hutu and
Tutsi. King provides a disturbing example of the potential consequences in the suppression of
competing narratives. She found that many Hutu refused to embrace reconciliation efforts
because the official history’s absence of a space to grieve RPF war crimes caused them to look
at Tutsi victimization with disdain.49 A more complicated history exists, one in which the
personal suffering that occurred in multiple communities has been pitted against each other
within a larger political struggle.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE GENOCIDE ON FILM:
FORGIVENESS, FORGETTING, AND LIBERATION IN KINYARWANDA AND
MUNYURANGABO

Film director Nick Hughes states on filming the Rwandan genocide, “There are many
ways of showing and storytelling, but you cannot describe, you cannot show the true horror of
genocide…Some filmmakers look for something that can end on a note of hope…In the real
story of the genocide, there is no hope.”1 Hughes highlights the difficulty filmmakers face in
treating the Rwandan genocide. On the one hand filmmakers feel compelled to commemorate
the victims; on the other hand they feel the need to tell a story that appeals to their audience. The
filmography illustrates this balancing between commemoration and storytelling.
Perhaps the most popular film of the Rwandan genocide, Terry George’s Hotel Rwanda
(2004) tells a popular narrative of hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina’s rescue of over 1,000
Rwandans. Michael Caton-Jones directed another Hollywood blockbuster called Beyond the
Gates (2007) that followed a similar heroic model. Caton-Jones’ film tells the story of a
European priest and young European teacher who decide to stay and save Tutsi who seek refuge
at their parish. While Rusesabagina’s story showcases Hutu heroism in the midst of international
complicity, Caton-Jones’ use of fictional white heroes teeters on revisionism.2 In contrast to the
Hollywood blockbuster, several other films have been released in the past decade that deal with
the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. Roger Spottiswoode’s adaptation of General Roméo
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Dallaire’s memoir Shake Hands with the Devil (2011) produced both a docudrama of the
UNAMIR peacekeeping mission and a moving account of Dallaire’s struggle with guilt and
post-traumatic stress disorder. The HBO-produced film Sometimes in April (2005) presented a
similar narrative structure. Raoul Peck’s film centered on the strained relationship between a
moderate Hutu survivor and his extremist brother locked away in an Arusha prison for genocide
crimes. The film looks back at the genocide in flashbacks, and symbolizes a reconciling of Hutu
identity as represented by the two brothers. While these four films will not be thoroughly
analyzed in this chapter, I acknowledge their importance in disseminating popular understanding
of the genocide to a wide film audience.
An extensive scholarly literature already exists that critiques the cinematic
representation of atrocity and genocide. Particularly, many genocide film scholars have
questioned the ways in which cinema sanitizes the Holocaust through cinematic devices such as
redemption, hope, and closure. For instance, Sara Horowitz questions the use of a Christian
protagonist and a Christian redemption narrative in Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993).3
Rwandan genocide film scholar Alexandre Dauge-Roth similarly argues that the stories of
exceptional figures such as Hotel Rwanda’s Paul Rusesabagina and Schindler List’s Oskar
Schindler make the "ob-scene violence of genocide bearable" and therefore a more attractive
story.4 Dauge-Roth also argues that such examples as Rusesabagina’s heroism and the fictional
Father Christopher’s personal sacrifice in Beyond the Gates may divert attention away from
international responsibility, history, and the victims who died away from the cameras of the
press.5 Likewise, journalism scholar Frank Van Vree also questions the use of redemptive
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themes in cinematic depictions of genocide.6 But in his analysis of Holocaust imagery, he also
argues such film may present more of a moral viewing experience as opposed to historical one.7
Building off of this idea of history on film, Madelaine Hron writes that the Rwandan genocide
may have been “an impossible history” for one film to fully represent and therefore broke off
into several sub-genres.8 These scholars emphasize that concerning the representation of
atrocity on film, critics must pay attention to the type of stories being told and the narrative
devices used to tell them. Bearing these critiques on cinematic narrative in mind, I want to focus
attention to the connection between redemptive narratives and Rwandan dominant discourse in
two recent films about the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath.
For this study I focus on two films that politicize the genocide. Alrick Brown’s
Kinyarwanda (2012) heroically depicts the RPF as righteous liberators who bring the rule of law
to Rwandan society. But the film also addresses Rwanda’s post-genocide struggle for unity and
reconciliation through a non-linear narrative that moves from 1994 to 2004. By incorporating
several characters that each present a case for unity and reconciliation, Kinyarwanda provides an
excellent example of the official history’s depiction of forgiveness and the role of contemporary
politics in conceptualizing the past. Utilizing a different cinematic structure, Lee Isaac Chung’s
Munyurangabo (2007) does not visually depict the genocide. Set in rural Rwanda over a decade
since the genocide, the film instead shows how the memory of the genocide continues to
produce conflict and tensions between ordinary Hutu and Tutsi. The story of a friendship
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between a young Hutu named Sangwa and a young Tutsi named Ngabo, the two embark on a
journey to kill genocide perpetrator of Ngabo’s father. The film argues that the memory of
genocide victimization destroys friendships, preserves tensions within families and
communities, and undermines the RPF government’s overall plans for unity, reconciliation, and
development.
In their depictions of the genocide, these two films emphasize the importance of the
RPF-led liberation movement, the need for unity and reconciliation, and the pitfall of seeking
vengeance. While most Rwandan genocide films center on white characters and the international
community, these films are unique in that they center entirely on Rwandans. While directed by
non-Rwandans, these movies were filmed in Rwanda with largely Rwandan casts and crew.
While neither Brown nor Chung work for the RPF, their films tell a particular point of view that
illustrates the challenges in putting the timeless story of Rwanda into a cinematic representation.
Stories of conflict and reconciliation can tell an extremely humanistic story, but in a context of
politicized history they can also support the dominant political discourse. I argue that while both
are moving human stories of conflict, remembrance, and reconciliation, the official history still
shapes the narrative structures of these two films.

UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN KINYARWANDA
Alrick Brown’s Kinyarwanda (2011) tells a non-linear narrative centering on the
survival of Hutu and Tutsi at Kigali’s grand mosque.9 The story is presented in a complicated
manner, with flashbacks and jumps forward through time. But the film does follow a
progression from the genocide, to the RPF liberation, and finally ends at reconciliation. A halfTutsi, half-Hutu girl named Jeanne falls for a Hutu boy named Patrique. This breaks her Hutu
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Figure 1A and 1B: Emmanuel at the roadblock and remembering Jeanne with Patrique. All screenshots
from Alrick Brown, Kinyarwanda (Breaking Glass Pictures, 2012).

houseboy Emmanuel’s heart. He secretly loves her, and in his heartache joins the Interahamwe.
He breaks into her house to attack her, but instead kills her parents when he finds that she is not
home. Away at the time of the killings, Jeanne returns to find her parents both dead. Patrique
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and Jeanne escape to the Kigali mosque for sanctuary. The Mufti of Kigali decides after much
debate to issue an edict prohibiting Muslims from participating in the killings and decides to
open all the mosques to Tutsi. Father Pierre of the St. Famille Church survives a massacre at his
church and also finds sanctuary at the mosque. Father Pierre and the Imam decide to put aside
their religious differences and embrace those differences in the face of death. Minutes before the
Interahamwe move to enter the mosque, the RPF arrive and liberate the refugees.
A parallel narrative is interspersed throughout these events involving the RPF’s
campaign from Uganda. Lieutenant Rose and Sergeant Fred, both exiled Tutsi from Uganda,
fight in order to create a unified Rwanda for their children. After the RPF liberates the mosque,
Fred is killed in another rescue attempt. The film shows Emmanuel and other prisoners in a reeducation camp ten years later led by Lt. Rose.10 He initially refuses to express remorse, but
after seeing his fellow prisoners express their loyalty to a unified Rwanda he begins to change
his mind. At his Gacaca, he expresses remorse to Jeanne and pledges his allegiance to a unified
Rwanda. Jeanne forgives him and at the film’s conclusion marries Patrique.
These Rwandan genocide films portray the RPF as heroic liberators seeking to establish
a unified Rwanda. The representation displays the RPF soldiers as righteous and civilized.
Brown introduces Lt. Rose and Sgt. Fred in a scene in which a RPF soldier beats up a Hutu
refugee on the road. Sgt. Fred intervenes and demands him to stop despite the soldier’s
insistence that the Hutu refugees are all responsible for the raping and murdering of the Tutsi.
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Figure 2: Lt. Rose chastising RPA soldier who beat up a Hutu
refugee.

Lt. Rose approaches and angrily says, “Right now you are more guilty than these men. We didn't
see what they did but I see what you are doing. We are not here for vengeance. We are here for
justice. These men are our prisoners, but they are men and should be treated as such.”11 While
the scene shows an act of vengeance by an RPF soldier, Lt. Rose’s response portrays the RPF as
embodying a moral code of conduct in the face of atrocity. Among the refugees who thank Fred
for intervening are Father Pierre, Patrique, Jeanne and the Imam, all representing a multitude of
identities thankful to the RPF for restoring order. Rose and Fred’s intervention reinforces the
idea of the RPF as more than a rebel group. The RPF are liberators bringing democracy.
Coupled with the actors’ use of American accents, the RPF appears Westernized compared to
the savage-like image of the Hutu Interahamwe. This American-like portrayal may cause a
Western audience to sympathize with the RPF and leave the film without knowledge of the
crimes against humanity committed by the RPF.
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Brown further hammers this point to his audience by portraying Rose and Fred as
fighting a war of attrition. Lieutenant Rose narrates that there existed many small genocides
prior to 1994. Her family fled to Uganda after Tutsi pogroms in her hometown of Nyamata in
the early 1970s, and she eventually joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front. She includes in her
narration that they fought with the National Resistance Movement (NRA) but ultimately hoped
to return to Rwanda. This narration places the conflict in a larger history of conflict that gives an
explanation to the RPF invasion. After Fred volunteers to lead a liberation mission of a church,
Rose confronts him that he has a baby on the way. He responds, “I want my son to grow up in
this land. I want him to have the opportunities that you and I did not have. I know we are not
fighting for ourselves. I mean yego [yes] we might receive some of the benefits. But it is more
about the legacy we leave for those who come after us. I want my son to grow up in a unified
Rwanda.”12 Fred then receives a call from his wife where he hears the cries of his newborn son
for the first time. This portrays the RPF as actively fighting for a unified Rwanda for the next
generation as represented in the baby’s cries. This purpose distantly echoes the American dream,
which gives an American audience further reason to empathize with RPF. Brown overlooks the
RPF’s human rights violations and remembers them as an organization willing to sacrifice for a
greater Rwandan future.
Brown further portrays the RPF as heroic liberators of the Tutsi through two rescue
scenes. In the first scene (later in the plot but earlier in the film) Fred leads a successful
liberating mission of a church filled with Tutsi. But an Interahamwe member murders him with
a machete. He looks at his hand covered in blood. Its heavy redness sticks out to the audience
amidst the black backdrop of night. As he dies in Rose’s arms, he looks up to the sky and hears
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Figure 3: Sgt. Fred dying in Lt. Rose’s arms after liberating a group of Tutsi.

the cries of his newborn son amidst the gunfire. The second liberation scene occurs just as the
Interahamwe prepare to overrun the mosque. The refugees hear machine gun bullets shot from
behind the mosque. Father Pierre and the Imam turn and see Rose emerge up the hill. Brown

Figure 4: Rose arriving with her RPA unit to liberate the Mosque.
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shoots this scene in a slower speed, emphasizing her and the other RPF soldiers in dramatic
poses. The score pushes this effect as well through a dramatized melody. She announces to the
Father Pierre and the Imam that they will take them to safety at a UN controlled refugee camp.

Figure 5A and 5B: Lt. Rose protecting Tutsi at the Mosque and Sgt. Fred celebrating after
defeating the Interahamwe.

Fred then walks through the front gate with the Interahamwe in the background with their hands
behind their head. He walks heroically towards Rose and shakes her hand. The liberated
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Rwandans then cheer and sing. The audience leaves the theatre with no knowledge of the RPF’s
role in the Congo or of its post-genocide political oppression. Both scenes depict the RPF as
liberating Tutsi from places of worship and end focusing on Fred. The first scene promotes Fred,
Rose, and the RPF as heroic liberators while the second scene portrays Fred’s sacrifice for his
son. Through Fred’s sacrifice, Brown portrays the RPF as sacrificing for all Rwandans.
In addition, Lt. Rose is shown leading a re-education camp for perpetrators in 2004. Her
association with the RPF (and the brief glimpse of Paul Kagame’s portrait in the background)
portrays the reconciliation process as victor’s justice. Lt. Rose calls for the perpetrators to admit
their guilt as a first step towards forgiveness and the rebuilding of Rwanda. Many perpetrators
display a willingness to accept unity and confess their crimes in small groups. When Emmanuel
remains silent, the other prisoners chide him for it. One prisoner named Sagamba Jerome recalls
how the roadblock boss made them all kill a Tutsi family. The boss then took the baby and
chopped off his head. Shortly thereafter Jerome attempts suicide by slitting his writs. As Lt.
Rose cries while trying to stop the bleeding, he mutters, “I killed the baby.”13 Emmanuel stares
in shock that a Tutsi like Rose would feel empathy for a killer like Jerome. This scene mirrors
Fred’s death in Rose’s arms later in the film. Fred sacrifices his life for a unified Rwanda in the

Figure 6: Lt. Rose stabilizing the Sagamba Jerome after his suicide attempt.
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next generation. In contrast, Jerome’s admission of guilt coupled with Rose’s attempt to stop the
bleeding can be interpreted as symbolizing reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. A more
political interpretation may state that Rose’s attempt to stop Jerome’s bleeding symbolizes the
RPF heroically holding the society together and allowing the Hutu perpetrators the chance for
forgiveness. From this view, reconciliation seems forced and the acknowledgment of guilt onesided. Nowhere in the film does Brown represent the RPF as anything less than an exceptional
organization. RPF atrocities in the Congo and the entire civil war is white washed in favor of
Rose’s explanation of a right to return.
Brown uses nearly every single relationship in Kinyarwanda to convey a message of
unity. The theme of unity and reconciliation features prominently in the love triangle between
Jeanne, Patrique, and Emmanuel. Coming from mixed parents, Jeanne’s characterization itself
represents a union between Hutu and Tutsi. By falling in love and eventually marrying a full
Hutu like Patrique, her entire love life occurs without ethnic prejudice.

Figure 7: Jeanne and Patrique
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Furthermore, Emmanuel and Patrique come to symbolize two different directions for Hutu male
youth. Patrique represents the moderate Hutu; his love for Jeanne leads him to avoid joining the
Interahamwe. Emmanuel on the other hand decides to engage in extremist behavior once he sees
Jeanne with Patrique.14 Through the Gacaca process Emmanuel receives redemption. He admits
killing Jeanne’s parents and looting their property. He promises if the court pardons him he will

Figure 8: Emmanuel at his Gacaca trial seeking forgiveness from Jeanne.

work to pay off the damage he inflicted and to work to rebuild the country. He tells Jeanne that
he wishes to be her neighbor again if she pardons him. She accepts his apology and immediately
walks over to Patrique. Forgiveness completes the film’s narrative and in doing so gives the
audience a satisfying ending complete with marriage, forgiveness, and justice. The audience
leaves with the impression of Rwandan reconciliation as a clean process. The film characterizes
acts of genocide through Emmanuel, but they come not from politics, the civil war, or
14

This brings up a wide range of questions regarding the sexualizing of the Tutsi women. Helen Hintjens
points that a sexual obsession with the Tutsi women became predominant themes in extremist propaganda.
Tutsi women became viewed as corrupters of Hutu society as a response to Hutu men competed with Tutsi
men for Tutsi wives. See Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 264-265.
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victimization but from love. Jeanne’s act of forgiveness comes from a similar motivation. While
she does not love Emmanuel, she seems to understand his crimes as originating from love as
opposed to hate. The entire Gacaca reconciliation process, the reasons why Hutu killed in the
first place, and the tensions that continued long after the genocide ended are simplified into a
love triangle.

Figure 8: The Imam and Father Pierre.

The film uses religion as another model of unity. Particularly striking is the use of
Christian-Muslim relations to promote unification. When Father Pierre receives refuge at the
mosque, he immediately asks another Christian how the Muslims treat them. The Christian says
they treat them very well and that he trusts them. The Imam approaches Pierre, welcomes him,
and mentions that he heard what happened at Saint Famille church. He says, “I don’t confuse the
word of God with actions of man. Often it can be very different. There are people of many faiths
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here. Many Catholics and Muslims. Some Tutsi. Some Hutu.”15 Brown uses this exchange to
show unification between different religions and ethnicities.16 The alliance between the Imam (a
Hutu) and Father Pierre (a Tutsi) symbolizes both a religious and ethnic unity. The dual
narrative structure of religious unity and RPF liberation exemplifies the ways in which the
current regime wishes to portray itself. In this framework, unity officially transcends any
divisive religious or ethnic division. While certainly a great message to promote, the focus on
religion diminishes the role of politicized ethnicity. The choice for promoting unity between
Muslims and Christians diverts attention from the most important challenge facing postgenocide society⎯reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. While the Muslim council discusses
the origins of ethnicity, they describe divisionism as a colonial constructs. But as political
identities, the film makes little time for explanation. Such cinematic narrative is perfectly
acceptable, however the film’s inclusion of the RPF political narrative makes the film’s point of
view highly problematic. The film remembers the genocide from the current regime’s
perspective of official unity and neglects the political role of “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” This
perspective becomes even more apparent in Emmanuel’s apology to Jeanne. While Emmanuel’s
apology comes out of empathy and love, he also has a change of heart when he sees Lt. Rose
help Jerome. The over-exaggeration of the RPF as a democratic and judicially enlightened group
may occur subtly to the casual viewer, but in light of the larger regional narrative it overruns the
“human” stories to the film. While the film may tell inspiring stories in its narrative, the
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“Chapter Five: The Witch,” Kinyarwanda.
The Imam goes further by pointing out that many people are losing their faith. He asks Pierre to give them
counsel. He provides him with a place to hear confession and finds Priest garb for him to wear. In a later scene
Brown shows Christians and Muslims praying in adjacent rooms. They become friends and when their death to
the militia seems imminent they hold hands. The Imam’s restoration of Father Pierre’s religious duties forms a
memory of religious presence and civility during the genocide. Considering the amount of massacres that
occurred in churches, this representation (which culminates in survival) creates a redemptive narrative that
does not represent the majority of Rwandans who fled to places of worship. Instead of representing the
experience of those who died in places of worship, the film focuses on unity and tolerance represented between
the two religious leaders.
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religious and RPF-driven aspects to the narrative has little to do with the autocratic reality of
post-genocide Rwandan state building.

LIBERATION AND FORGETTING IN MUNYURANGABO
Lee Isaac Chung’s Munyurangabo (2007) tells the story of two young men. Tutsi
Munyurangabo (nicknamed Ngabo) and his Hutu friend Sangwa both work in Kigali at the
Kimisagara market.17 After Ngabo steals a machete from the market, the two set out on a
journey to the countryside to kill the perpetrator of Ngabo’s father. Chung distinguishes himself
by setting his film away from Kigali and in rural Rwanda. His use of handheld camera makes
many sequences feel shaky and unstable. In the context of underlying tensions between Hutu
and Tutsi, this technique serves as an interesting filmmaking tool. The peaceful scenery of the
Rwandan countryside and the close friendship between the two boys feel fragile and foreboding
thanks to the shaky camera. The film also does not center on the Rwandan Hutu or Tutsi elite,
the international community, or the military. Instead, the film illustrates how the memory of
Hutu-Tutsi tensions persists in the post-genocide Rwandan state.
The viewer does not learn whether Sangwa or Ngabo are Hutu or Tutsi until the two
make a stop at the home of Sangwa’s parents. While his mother is happy to see him, Sangwa’s
father is angry that he abandoned the family. For three years Sangwa lived in Kigali without
communicating or sending aid for his younger sibling’s education. During the visit Sangwa
attempts to prove himself to his father by working hard in the fields and rebuilding the house’s
outer wall. In conjunction with Sangwa’s redemption, his mother overhears the neighbor Gwiza
questioning Ngabo on where he and his parents originate. While Ngabo answers with great
reluctance, by telling Gwiza his parents died in the genocide he effectively admits his Tutsi
identity. This revelation further stratifies the victim-perpetrator binary between Tutsi and Hutu.
17

Lee Isaac Chung, Munyurangabo (Film Movement, 2009); hereafter cited as Munyurangabo.
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Many Hutu died in the genocide and left many Hutu orphans (including Gwiza). But unlike
Gwiza (a Hutu) who belongs to a community, Ngabo’s role as a strange drifter causes much
suspicion in the community. The film portrays the Rwandan rural community as a tight-knit
place where everybody knows each other. Ngabo avoids revealing his Tutsi identity in a largely
Hutu countryside. Admitting his parents died in the genocide becomes dangerous information.
Sangwa’s mother realizes that her son’s friend is Tutsi. The family shuns Ngabo by refusing to
give him food.
Chung masterfully allows the visibility of ethnic tensions to correspond with the
deterioration of Ngabo and Sangwa’s friendship. In the beginning of the film it appears that their
identities don’t matter. They walk down forest paths and busy Kigali streets arm in arm.

Figure 9: Friends Munyurangabo and Sangwa walking through the streets of Kigali. All screenshots from
Lee Isaac Chung, Munyurangabo (Film Movement, 2009).

But the reaction by Sangwa’s parents demonstrates the underlying presence of ethnic tensions in
the older generations. Sangwa’s father even brings up a victimization narrative within the Hutu
community in a conversation with Sangwa. He approaches Sangwa and asks him if he realizes
that Ngabo is a Tutsi. He asks, “Don’t you know that all Tutsi are nasty? They have put our
people in submission. Now I’m suffering because of them. They tried to put me in prison even
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though I’m old. And yet you walk with them. Hutu and Tutsi are enemies, don’t you know?”18
Sangwa’s father challenges his son to blame the inequalities facing the family on Tutsi
hegemony. Later Ngabo and Sangwa rebuild the wall around the family home, and

Figure 10: Sangwa and his father.

Sangwa threatens Ngabo after he playfully pulls one brick down. Ngabo’s action of pulling
down a brick may symbolize a disturbance in the family brought upon by his Tutsi identity,
further demonstrating how these identities continue to divide communities and families. In this
manner, Chung illustrates a competition between Sangwa’s friendship with Ngabo and his
loyalty to his family, which on a more symbolic level may represent a conflict between a
reconciled Rwandan future and the continuation of Hutu-Tutsi tensions. When Sangwa
announces his intentions to stay home long-term, Ngabo lashes out at Sangwa by yelling that it
was people like Sangwa’s family members who killed his family. He leaves, but not before
telling Sangwa’s father of their plot. After his father brutally beats him, Sangwa tries to continue
on with Ngabo. But Ngabo tells him he no longer wants him around.

18

“Chapter Five: Food for Thought,” Munyurangabo.
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After disposing of Sangwa, Ngabo walks through the Rwandan countryside to murder
his father’s killer, reflecting on his past. His mother hid in the marshes with him as the
Interahamwe killed his father. For the first time in the film the genocide is directly referenced
with detail. He remembers:
Back then we saw a lot of dead and many horrors. We saw rivers clogged with
bodies, children killing…and the blood covered the earth. Sometimes those days
were all I could remember. I remembered my mother carrying me through the
marshes below our home. There were voices all around, crying and screaming.
My mother burned the photo of my father and I don’t know why. I forgot his
face. After my mom died, sometimes I forgot her face too.19
The story is told in voiceover. By not portraying Ngabo’s past in flashback, Chung represents
the legacy of the genocide as a suppressed memory. Chung shoots landscape shots during this
narration, creating an effect that paints the suppressed memory and trauma of 1994 onto the
current Rwandan countryside. Ngabo’s memory of the genocide in the narration contrast with
the cinematographer's framing of the peaceful landscape. This cinematic contrast suggests that
the memory of the genocide remains imbedded in the countryside and continues to divide
society.
Ngabo’s memory (or lack thereof) of his parents plays a prominent role in his need for
revenge. He honors the memory of his father by promising revenge. The film illustrates memory
as harmful to peace building. For Ngabo, to remember is to seek revenge. Everywhere he goes
Ngabo is consumed by his memory of the genocide. For instance, he tells Sangwa, “The way he
[Sangwa’s father] looked at me when I entered your home shows me that he was among them
[the killers].”20 His memory of the genocide comes to the surface and reveals the extent to which
he feels victimized. Ngabo yells at Sangwa, “Hutus killed my family!” and “My life would have
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“Chapter Nine: On the Trail,” Munyurangabo.
“Chapter Eight: The Dance,” Munyurangabo.
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been better without them [Hutu]!”21 His journey to his father’s killer becomes an attempt to
carry out justice through revenge.
Chung further exemplifies this point in his opening scene that shows an obsession within
Ngabo’s sub-consciousness. After stealing the machete in the beginning of the narrative, Chung
frames Ngabo sitting on the ground with the machete covered in blood. The camera zooms in on
Ngabo’s face and then zooms out back to the machete. This frame shows the machete without

Figure 11A and 11B: The stolen machete.
21

“Chapter Eight: The Dance,” Munyurangabo.
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blood, signifying that the blood only existed in Ngabo’s sub-conscious. He later admits in an
internal narration, “I imagined many times the way I would strike him, the man who killed my
father.”22 These tensions and fantasies of revenge remain beneath the surface, signaling that the
cycle of violence will continue into the next generation.
The film takes a sharp turn as Ngabo finally arrives in his hometown. Chung introduces
the RPF’s mission of liberation as a peace building solution. Ngabo stops in a bar where a young
poet spots his machete in his backpack. Assuming Ngabo’s intentions, the poet decides to share
with Ngabo the poem he composed for the upcoming liberation day.23 The poem advocates for

Figure 12: The “Liberation” Poet.

national unity, development, and liberation from Rwanda’s history of violence (see Appendix B
for full poem). Nearly ten minutes long, the poem states, “Liberation is a journey.” The poet
describes Rwanda from his youth, calling it a place of war, and a place were he considered Tutsi
as enemies. He states:
We were given bows and spears and foreign countries gave us guns. Really.
Darkness came to Rwanda, machetes in place of peace, I saw people killed,
22
23

“Chapter Nine: On the Trail,” Munyurangabo.
Liberation is celebrated on July 4th in Rwanda to mark the RPF’s takeover of Kigali on July 4th, 1994.
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Muslims and Christians worked together, joined by machetes and their will to
kill. And our Rwanda burned. Rivers flowed with bodies and corpses covered
fields.24
He does not explain the political and historical complexities of Rwandan politics and ethnicity.
Instead, the past appears as a blurred memory of horror and atrocity. His poem does not seek to
explain the past, but rather to set up his argument of the need for Rwandans to liberate from the
past.
The poet also provides a sympathetic and glowing recommendation of the RPF’s
political and military legitimacy in his reflections on liberation. He recites:
And the RPF army I was taught to hate decided that it was time to defend
Rwanda…I will thank them [RPF] wherever I am. Their heroics will be known
worldwide from Darfur in Sudan to the Comoros Islands they will be
admired…But now that they have conquered, I ask of them, ‘Free us from
poverty and illiteracy since liberation is a journey.’25
He portrays the RPF as saviors and defenders of Rwanda with their peacekeeping interventions
in Darfur and the Comoros further evidence to their heroism.26 Furthermore, the poet places their
narrative as the pathway to development. The poem places the RPF not only as the militant
liberators of Rwanda but also liberators from the state’s structural issues, underdevelopment,
and inequalities. For this historical and economic liberation to occur, the past must be forgotten.
The poet effectively argues Ngabo must forget his vendetta in order to confirm the RPF’s vision.
This scene completely changes the direction of the film. When Ngabo decides not to kill the
perpetrator in the subsequent scene, the choice becomes less an act of empathy than a political
choice. For reconciliation to occur, the film suggests that it must come through the vision of the
RPF-led state.
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“Chapter Ten: The Poet,” Munyurangabo.
Ibid.
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Considering the emphasis on the RPF’s international endeavors, it is telling that the Eastern Congo is not
mentioned.
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Figure 13A and 13B: Munyurangabo outside the perpetrator’s home and the perpetrator dying
of AIDS on his floor.

If Chung did not include the poem in his narrative, the film would still make a moving
argument for ending the cycle of violence. Ngabo finds his father’s killer lying on the floor
withered, shivering, and begging for water. After deciding not to kill the perpetrator, the film
then segues into an imagined conversation between Ngabo and his father. They appear on a hill
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Figure 14: Munyurangabo and his father in a dream sequence.

overlooking the countryside with their backs turned to the camera. As in Ngabo’s narration, his
father’s face remains unseen. His father tells him the origins of his name. He tells him that
Munyurangabo was a mighty warrior who fought in front of other in order to clear the path. His
father then challenges him by asking, “What is your battle?” This fantasy sequence may
symbolize a confrontation of Ngabo’s past. His father reminds him that he has a choice and that
nothing is determined. He can move forward and provide an example to those behind him.
Ngabo then dreams of his time spent working with Sangwa at the Kimisagara market and the
value of their friendship. He decides to return and fill the killer’s Gerry can. The film ends with
a frame of Ngabo and Sangwa looking in opposite directions. Whether or not the scene is real or

Figure 15: Munyurangabo and Sangwa in the final frame of the film.
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imagined remains ambiguous, but as a final frame it illustrates that reconciliation is still
incomplete. The two boys symbolize that point by looking in opposite directions, which may
indicate that friendship amid such tensions remains a possibility.
While Brown’s Kinyarwanda endorsed the RPF, told a story of religious unity, and
portrayed an RPF-driven reconciliation process, Chung’s Munyurangabo explores the
possibilities and challenges of co-existence between Hutu and Tutsi. The film portrays a postgenocide Rwandan society still gripped by ethnic tensions. The film shows a generational gap in
which youth of Hutu and Tutsi background show a willingness to become friends. Yet, Chung
presents the memory of the past and the prejudices still harbored by older generations as
roadblocks to a unified future of peace and friendship. The film makes a case for a selective
forgetting because of the suffering felt by all Rwandans. Ngabo feels pity for his father’s
perpetrator because he has AIDS. Similarly, despite their prejudices Sangwa’s family is shown
struggling in poverty. But the idea of a collective suffering becomes the basis for the RPF
liberation narrative. The RPF poet argues that the RPF provides a solution to poverty, to the
history of violence, and to illness through the rebuilding of the state. The film shows coexistence as an unfinished project, but it also endorses joining the RPF as a way to move
forward. While one might interpret Ngabo’s choice to forgive as breaking the cycle of violence
out of human empathy, one might also argue that his decision holds a dual meaning as a political
act of complicity to the current regime’s vision.

CONCLUSION
As cinematic remembrances of the genocide, Kinyarwanda and Munyurangabo coincide
with a larger dominant historical representation pervading Rwandan society. For one, the two
films grapple with several models for preventing future conflicts. One can certainly read these
models from a political view or from a humanist view. By de-emphasizing the importance of
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contemporary politics, Kinyarwanda becomes a pervasive argument for the role of religion,
forgiveness, and unity in re-building a more peaceful Rwandan society. While an inspiring story,
the film provides little historical context and neglects to explore exactly why Hutu killed Tutsi in
mass numbers. Instead Brown condenses the entire Hutu Power movement into Emmanuel, who
kills out of sexual jealousy as opposed to more complicated political reasons. In Munyurangabo,
Lee Isaac Chung complicates this model by showing how the memory of the 1994 genocide still
divides the community in contemporary Rwanda. The forgiveness that Emmanuel seeks and
receives does not appear as widespread in Chung’s film. Instead, Chung makes a case for what
Susan Sontag described as “limited” memory that forgets in order to avoid divisive memories
that prolongs conflict.27 Tensions will continue as Hutu and Tutsi will both continue to feel
victimized. From a more humanist perspective, Ngabo foregoing vengeance becomes an ethical
act. But his denial of vengeance also reflects a scholarly observation that Susanne BuckleyZistel describes as “chosen amnesia,” in which Rwandans attempt to forget the past for the
purpose of social cohesion.28 Both films exemplify a fundamental question in post-genocide
Rwandan society: how will Hutu and Tutsi continue to live side by side and avoid future
conflict?
But at the same time the political overtones of these films are hard to ignore. In
Kinyarwanda, Lt. Rose and Sgt. Fred connect the experience of the Tutsi victim with that of the
RPF soldier. The RPF become the ones who bring justice and democracy to the Rwandan state.
Even the reconciliation process occurs under the supervision of Lt. Rose. In Munyurangabo,
Ngabo makes his decision to forgive and move on partly after his exposure to the RPF liberation
poem. This view that emphasizes development makes Sangwa’s father into an RPF archetype
for the Hutu who continues to harbor genocide ideology and thereby impede cohesion. In this
27
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88

manner, both movies place post-genocide history as a potential break from the history of
violence. The RPF formation and subsequent liberation are represented as transcending the
recent political history as opposed to playing a leading role within it. Hutu victimization is
present, but not victimization that occurred at the hands of RPF during the civil war, genocide,
and Zaire. As a result, the two films disseminate the official history to a wider film audience.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GENOCIDE MEMORIALS:
THE PRESERVATION OF A TRAUMATIC PAST

In his analysis of Holocaust memorials and monuments, Jewish studies scholar James
Young writes, “A society’s memory, in [the memorial and monument] context, might be
regarded as an aggregate collection of its members’ many, often competing memories.”1 Present
day Rwanda faces a similar challenge as groups with a wide range of memories figure out how
to remember and commemorate the genocide. The government faces challenges of
commemorating the genocide in a population still in the process of reconciling. Tutsi survivors
struggle to commemorate their loved ones in communities where perpetrators and survivors live
side by side. For innocent Hutus, they too harbor memories of hardship, poverty, and
victimization from the civil war and refugee flight to the Congo. Amidst these memories and
missions, some competing and others related, many Rwandans strive to remember and
commemorate the victims of the 1994 genocide. This chapter will look at one way Rwandan
society remembers the past and educates foreign visitors.
Since the genocide ended, the Rwandan government and survivors have made efforts to
preserve and document the massacre sites where Hutu perpetrators killed thousands of Tutsi.
These massacre sites occurred in churches, schools, and in the Rwandan bush. In this chapter, I
will first look at the preservation and presentation of four Rwandan memorial sites from my
research visit in January 2013: Murambi, Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. I will then make a
case that through preservation of remains and weapons these sites construct an experience of
witnessing the genocide for foreign visitors. While this presentation supports a larger theme of
1

James Edward Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), xi; hereafter cited as The Texture of Memory.
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national mourning of the genocide, I argue that preservation also stems from the personal
mourning of survivors. Therefore, competing memories and narratives between the government,
international visitors, Tutsi survivors, and the Hutu community present different meanings to
these sites. While memorial sites present a dominant political view for remembering the
genocide, they also present an environment for personal mourning, political protest, and
international regret.

CHURCH MEMORIAL SITES
Since 1994, Rwanda has constructed seven national memorials.2 At these memory sites,
the Rwandan government emphasizes the role of preservation. In an April 2012 article, the
Rwandan government revealed its hope to implement techniques that will conserve remains for
up to 1,000 years.3 In the same month, the Executive Secretary for the National Commission for
the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG) Jean de Dieu Mucyo emphasized in a press release that it
“shouldn't be looked at as a responsibility of the government only [to maintain sites]; every
Rwandan should have a stake in the maintenance of the memorial sites.”4 In post-genocide
Rwanda, the emphasis on preservation and the push for collective maintenance of massacre sites
speaks to the ways in which memorials have been deemed important places in Rwandan society.
I visited and photographed three of the most famous church memorials in Rwanda: Nyamata,
Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. At each of these sites thousands of Tutsis died through the
collaboration of the Interahamwe, gendarmerie, clergy, and the collaboration of local

2
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sites designed and observed by victims.
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politicians.5 Now each church has been transformed into a national memorial site (save for
Nyarubuye, which functions both as a church and as a memorial site). At these sites a tour guide
walked me through the preserved structures. All three sites function as a national memorial sites,
and they each tell a slightly different story (See Appendix C for photographs of each site).
The sheer numbers of casualties at these churches tell a story in themselves. Around
5,000 people died at Ntarama, 10,000 at Nyamata, and upwards of 50,000 at Nyarubuye.6 Tutsi
fled to the churches to seek sanctuary, only to be brutally murdered inside the churches. In prior
Tutsi pogroms in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1990s, any Tutsi who sought sanctuary at these
same churches survived the pogrom. In 1994, the génocidaires used this practice to their
advantage by rounding up Tutsi in churches in order to make killing more efficient. One
survivor of the Nyamata massacre recalls, “It was not yet noon when the Interahamwe arrived
singing: they threw grenades, they tore down the railings, then they rushed into the church and
started slicing people with machetes and spears…They struck with swinging arms. They cut
anyone, without choosing. People not streaming with their own blood were streaming with the
blood of others.”7 People died alongside their family, friends, and neighbors. The perpetrators
killed without mercy. These sites represent a collaboration of the state and the local populace to
perform acts of the highest cruelty. These memorials preserve a volatile historical moment.
Preservation creates the illusion of witnessing the massacre for the visitor, creating a
space that attempts to transport the visitor back to 1994. At each site, the tour presented me with
5
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physical proof from the massacres. At all three memorials, I encountered the clothes of the
victims, which hauntingly reminds the visitor of the number of people who once wore them. At
Ntarama and Nyamata the clothes cover the pews and walls of the churches. Both sites preserve
the damage inflicted by grenades and artillery against the buildings. At Ntarama, the memorial
preserves the structural damage inflicted by grenades and other weapons with large steel roofs
that extend over the buildings. This further demonstrates the national effort to preserve these
sites. The Nyamata memorial preserves the bloodstains on the walls, the ceiling, and even on the
statue of the Virgin Mary. At the altar lie machetes and identity cards next to rosaries and
crosses, which contrasts the idea of the church as a house of God with the instruments of
genocide. This presentation discomforts the visitor by showing the violation of the churches’
sanctity.
At Nyarubuye most people died outside the church, so (unlike Ntarama and Nyamata)
the church remains a place of worship. The artifacts are lined up in one of the former Sunday
school classrooms. On a table laid a pile of victims’ shoes with an excerpt of Kangura, the Hutu
extremist propaganda publication, placed on top. On another table the guide showed me a pile of
different weapons. The guide showed me a blood stained carjack used to kill Tutsis, a meat
grinder used for cannibalization, an altered hoe for piercing skulls, and more rusting machetes.
The hall also kept several jugs used to hold the hot sauce pilli-pilli.8 After the tables of weapons,
clothes, and shoes sat display cases of skulls and femurs. As at Ntarama and Nyamata, I could
discern the ways in which the people died from the types of wounds cut into the skulls. At the
end of the hall sat a statue of the Virgin Mary, decapitated because the killers felt it looked
Tutsi. Outside the tour guide showed me additional evidence, including a rock used to sharpen
machetes, a latrine where bodies had been found, and an outdoor stove used for cannibalization.

8

Perpetrators placed the burning sauce on the eyes of victims to see if they still lived.
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Ntarama, Nyamata, and Nyarubuye each display skulls and bones on shelves or display
cases. At Nyamata, the visitor descends into open crypts dug behind the church, where bones are
piled on shelves organized by skulls and femurs. The feeling of descent weighs into the
experience as the tight space makes for a claustrophobic feeling. At Ntarama the bones sit on
shelves inside the sanctuary building. Coupled with broken stain-glass windows from the
Interahamwe’s grenade attacks, the coffins of identified bodies in the pews, clothes lining the
walls, and the collection of rosaries and machetes near the altar, the contents of the building
contradicts the previous function of the church as a place of worship and sanctuary.
The sites also preserve the suffering of children. At Ntarama the guide took me to a wall
inside the Sunday school classroom. During the genocide, perpetrators smashed the skulls of
children against the wall at that exact spot. The bricks (still discolored from the traces of blood
and brain matter) disturb the visitor in a powerful manner. Through various products, the
National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide and local organizers preserved the spots of
blood and brain matter.
These sites also preserve the evidence of rape. Next to the brick spot of children’s brain
matter at Ntarama stands a stick used to rape women. The tour guide at Nyamata took me to a
chamber dug into the sanctuary’s floor. Built after the genocide, the chamber consists of glass
shelves exhibiting skulls and bones. Below the shelf deep in the ground rested a single coffin. In
the coffin lies a woman named Mukandoli Annonliata, who was raped multiple times during
massacre. She died when her rapists shoved a long stick through her vagina and into her
cranium. As of 2004 her skeleton sat visible in the chamber, including the pieces of wood
sticking out of her pelvis.9 I found out during my visit that her family requested that she be
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placed in a coffin.10 Separated from the rest of the skeletons, Mukandoli represents the sexual
violence committed against women during the genocide. This representation presents an ethical
question on whether or not the visitor becomes a voyeur by looking at weapons and victims of
sexual violence.11
The construction of memorials in Rwandan churches represents a larger debate between
“the preservation of memory and the definition of the sacred space.”12 Longman and
Rutagengwa give an excellent critique by arguing that (while probably not designed as a direct
attack on the church) these memorials signify a black mark on the church’s reputation.13 As a
heavily Christian nation, these sites may represent a balancing within Rwandan society between
remembering church massacres events and re-defining the sacred space. Longman and
Rutagengwa argue that the church memorial creates a new sacred space, one not necessarily for
Christianity but for education and remembrance of the victims.14 Janet Jacobs echoes Longman
and Rutagengwa’s point by writing that these Rwandan memorial sites are in the midst of a “reconsecration.” She writes specifically on the intersection between the sacred and the profane.
“While the clothes and skeletal remains of the deceased are reminders of horrific death and
suffering,” she argues, “they also represent the sacred remains of those whose lives were
taken.”15 She goes further by arguing that the preservation of artifacts, “[in] their realism and
authenticity, they construct a separate sphere of remembrance where the sacred and profane
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coexist.”16 The visitor is struck by the juxtaposition between the presence of the sacred and the
human despair that these sites are meant to commemorate.17 The church memorial sites take
these memories of genocide and place them in a context that inverts the sacred in a way that
portrays the genocide as somehow transcending history.

BODIES AT THE MURAMBI MEMORIAL
In the southern prefecture of Gikongoro lies the Murambi memorial, a technical school
under construction at the time of the genocide. Major attacks on Tutsi occurred during the 1960s
and 1970s in Gikongoro, but the area made it through the early days of the civil war with only a
few scattered attacks against Tutsi.18 Several powerful Hutu elites, including the sub-prefect
Damien Binega and retired Lt. Colonel Aloys Simba, played a large role in using their wealth
and influence to plan, coordinate, and distribute weapons for the massacres.19 Officials from
neighboring communes promised Tutsi safety at Murambi. However, officials pushed Tutsis to
go there mainly because the hill’s isolation and visibility made it vulnerable to attack. The
militia cut off the water supply to the not yet finished school, and Tutsi refugees had little food.
For close to two weeks they held out before the re-armed militia led an assault in the early
morning of April 21, 1994.20 Survivor Athanase Bugirimfura described the massacre, “The
attackers only came once. They came and killed everyone⎯except those who ran off and
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escaped…Those who couldn’t run, they lay there until they were found and killed.”21
Somewhere between 40,000 to 50,000 Tutsi died that day. Only a handful of people survived.
The memorial tour begins with a short exhibition designed by Aegis Trust. It includes a
short history of Rwanda that follows the linear path towards genocide. The exhibition pays
specific attention to France, criticizing Opération Turquoise for refusing to arrest government
officials and militia and allowing them to escape into Zaire. Afterwards, the visitor walks
through the unfinished classrooms where bodies preserved with lime rest on tables. Shortly after
the genocide, survivors and family members of the victims unearthed the mass graves to find the
bodies reasonably discernable. They then dosed the bodies in lime in order to preserve them as
evidence. Of the 50,000 to 60,000 Tutsi who died at Murambi, the survivors preserved 848
bodies in this manner. The lime gives off a strong smell that parches the nostrils. But at the same
time the preservation method is not permanent. The viewer also smells the decomposition of the
bodies, slowed by the lime. This preservation method allows the visitor to see the final moments
of the dead. The lime preserves the dead’s facial features in their final moments, often their
mouths agape in horror. Many bodies hold their arms up to their face, shielding themselves from
machete blows. As I passed through the later rooms, I noticed more and more mothers and
children. Often the remains of a mother still cradled the body of a child. One room I walked into
held only the bodies of babies and young children. Nearly all of them contained machete
wounds on their head.
The discernible features of these bodies make Murambi a slightly different experience
than Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. Unlike skulls on a shelf or in a crypt, the dead feel
present at Murambi. The dead’s last traumatic moments become frozen in place in these rooms,
which emotionally connects with the visitor in a manner that a museum exhibition or cinematic
21
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representation cannot. The memorial allows the visitor to walk up to an individual body and
look closely at the dead’s individual features. At the same time, the sheer enormity and
anonymity of the amount of bodies makes the memorial overwhelming. The smell stays with the
visitor long after leaving the memorial as well. Etched in the nostrils, it creates a sensory
experience that even Nyamata and Ntarama cannot provide. When walking through these rooms,
the genocide feels less an historical event than a scene from an everlasting hell.
But shortly after walking through the rooms filled with preserved bodies, the tour takes
the visitor straight to three marked sites with highly political meanings. The first site marks the
place where the French flag stood during the Operation Turquoise encampment at Murambi. A
sign written in English, French, and Kinyarwanda marks this spot. Next, the tour arrives at
another sign that marks where French soldiers played volleyball in the months after the
massacre. Other signs marking mass graves stand next to the former volleyball court. The tour
pushes the connection between the French soldiers relationship with the perpetrators and the
mass graves. The memorial argues that the French expressed complicity and indifference when
camped out on the same hill where 50,000 Tutsi died only two months removed from the
massacre. Instead of treating the hill as a sacred ground, they played volleyball near the visible
mass graves.
This presentation of Opération Turquoise illustrates the RPF’s greater anger at the
French. The French held a close diplomatic relationship with the Hutu regime, incorporating the
French-speaking Habyarimana regime into its greater France-Afrique network for several
decades. French financial aid to Rwanda tripled during the civil war, and French weapons sales
to Rwanda also increased between 1990 and 1994.22 There exists much evidence of French
involvement in actually fighting the RPF during the civil war. A French Special Forces
22
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command tailored specifically for Rwanda formed in June 1992. France maintained that the
deployment of soldiers in Rwanda had only the sole objective of protecting French citizens.
However, French soldiers reportedly took part in engaging with the RPF in combat, operating
checkpoints in Kigali, and participating in activity directed against the RPF.23 During Opération
Turquoise, Hutu draped French flags on street corners, and people chanted “Vive la France!” in
the streets, embracing the French arrival as a liberation from the RPF.24 The Interahamwe and
the regime in particular embraced their arrival.25 While the RPF and French did not clash
militarily, the RPF abhorred the intervention for it provided a relatively safe passage for the
Hutu militants to Zaire. While France did save, rescue, and protect many Tutsi (especially with
the cameras nearby), they also committed their fair share of controversies. Tutsi resisting the
militias in the hills of Bisesero came out from their hiding spots upon the arrival of French
soldiers. Instead of protecting them, the French left them only to return three days later. The
Hutu killers murdered nearly a thousand of them after the French departed.26 After the genocide,
France allegedly helped fund and train Hutu militias seeking refuge in Zaire. As opposed to
disarming the génocidaire militias, the French re-armed and continued to maintain contact with
alleged génocidaire leaders in October and November of 1994.27 France evacuated Akazu
members such as Agathe Habyarimana to France immediately after the genocide commenced,
and many key Akazu members continue to walk freely in Paris.28
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The ways in which the Murambi memorial presents France raises questions on the
possible politicization of the preserved bodies.29 The tour takes the visitor to the site of the
French flag and volleyball courts almost immediately after visiting the preserved bodies. By
preceding the French section of the tour, one might interpret the bodies as supporting evidence
for a larger moral crime committed by France. There certainly exists great value in informing
the visitor of French complicity and the controversies of Opération Turquoise. But at the same
time, the French were not present in April 1994 at Murambi nor directly responsible in the
murders. The dead become slightly de-emphasized as individuals, instead becoming a form of
collective evidence in a much larger national narrative. The Murambi memorial structures a
multi-layered experience that at once frames the genocide as a transcending event and calls for
international accountability.

THE DEAD AS EVIDENCE, THE VISITOR AS WITNESS
In her evaluation of the Murambi memorial, Susan Cook describes a “freezing” effect in
which preservation of remains “[halts] the natural processes of change” and freezes the witness’
sight on a particular moment.30 She writes, “With reference to the aftermath of genocide, then,
preserving genocide sites entails making decisions about what to preserve (bodies, buildings,
weapons, documents), and at what moment in their history.”31 The decisions made on what to
preserve at these sites emphasizes a historical framing around the genocide. The “frozen” site
marks the turning point in the current narrative, the lowest moment of the linear descent from
the pre-colonial “Eden.” The preservation of “debris of history” holds large consequences to
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historical remembrance because it partly signifies the genocide’s significance in Rwandan
society.32
But at the same time, there is a risk to overemphasizing the national reading of these
sites because of the role of survivors in preservation. Despite the tendency to view memorials
from a national lens, Rachel Ibreck dissents partly from the idea that the RPF holds complete
control of the memorial narrative by pointing out that survivors actually played a large role in
the arrangement of bones in the first place.33 Many of these sites became memorials in the
immediate aftermath of the genocide through the efforts of survivors and local politicians.
Before leaving Rwanda, forensic anthropologist Clea Koff and her excavation team returned to
the Kibuye massacre site to help the Kibuye préfet set up a memorial consisting of two skeletons
in a glass display case. The préfet already set up a memorial at the stadium that explained what
happened on a large sign next to the uneven soccer field ground where a mass grave lay.34 Only
two years removed from the genocide, Kibuye’s local political leadership viewed the displaying
of bodies as a part of memorialization.
Survivors played a large role in the preservation of many other large memorial sites. At
the time of Susan Cook’s research at the Murambi memorial in 2000, local communities took
responsibility for preserving and memorializing many of these sites.35 At Murambi in 1995,
local citizens took part in the lime preservation of remains. Similar survivor participation in
preservation occurred in Nyamata and Ntarama. In a 1996 article reporting from the Nyamata
memorial site, journalist Paul Ames interviewed a Hutu survivor who hid Tutsi in his home and
subsequently fled the Interahamwe. In 1996, a memorial existed in a tent beside the church
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consisting of bones gathered from the area. The Hutu survivor interviewed explained that they
[survivors] did not immediately bury them out of necessity to show the world what happened.
While they did begin the process of burying the bodies in more dignified mass graves, the
survivors also explained that they viewed the bodies as evidence and necessary for display at
memorials.36 At Ntarama survivor Dancila Nyirabazungu serves as caretaker of the memorial,
despite losing her husband and two daughters in the massacre.37 She admits to distancing herself
from feeling grief through her work and providing for her children. She viewed her work as
contributing towards genocide prevention by explaining to visitors what happened.38 Despite the
nationalization of the seven largest memorial sites, survivors contribute to their preservation and
presentation. The decisions for preservation partly originated in the local community. While
reservation on displaying the dead probably existed in the community, the overwhelming fear of
the world forgetting the genocide made preservation the main strategy for memorialization.
By preserving the genocide as a historical event, the sites create a “witness” experience.
Susan Cook writes that the preservation of these sites demonstrates the fact that humans
performed, stood aside, and collaborated in the genocide:
The three dimensionality of a physical location, the sight of hastily dug pits and
mass graves, and the smell and look of human remains makes the locations
where genocide has taken place haunting reminders that genocide is an artifact of
human society, not a natural calamity. Genocide sites, then, often attain special
status in the aftermath of violence as places that reveal the truth of what
individual members of a society have done to their fellow citizens.39
To witness the atrocity as a human project in a concrete “three dimensional” form causes the
visitor to reflect and question whether the international community could have intervened. In
this manner, the “freezing” of memory at these sites provides visitors with the illusion of bearing
36
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witness to what happened in 1994 and causes the visitor to look inward. Coinciding with the
abandonment of the international community during the genocide, this model forces the foreign
visitor in particular to reflect in a personal manner.
In addition to a reflection on international culpability, the “witness” experience provides
a place for grief and a space for personal reflection. Visitors may experience a moral reflection
as they visit these memorials because of the illusion in bearing witness that the preservation of
bodies and artifacts promotes. Cook establishes this point by arguing that by witnessing the
preservation of dead and other debris from genocide, the site pushes the visitor to reflect on an
educational, religious, and moral level.40 Pilgrimages to these sites becomes a way of paying
respect to the dead, and for many Western politicians official visits to site of massacre provided
an eye-opening re-evaluation of their own personal accountability. Clea Koff recalls Madeleine
Albright bringing flowers to the Kibuye excavation site in 1996.41 The same Madeleine
Albright, who only two years prior obstructed any Western intervention, recounted in the
documentary Ghosts of Rwanda of visiting Kibuye and seeing a skeleton the size of her own
grandchild slashed with machete wounds. She expresses her remorse in the documentary that
she did not propose an intervention, even though she claims it would never have passed.42
Anthony Lake expressed similar thoughts upon visiting Nyarubuye.43 Many memorial tours
provide a structured moment for reflection. The audio tour at the Kigali Genocide Memorial
invites the visitor to take a moment to reflect on the dead in the memorial gardens. At Murambi,
the tour stops for a moment of silence out of respect for the dead prior to walking to the rooms
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of preserved bodies. In this manner the memory of the dead reaches out to the visitor, creating a
gripping emotional response and a time for reflection.
For many Rwandans, the need to preserve the past has become a dominant expression of
genocide remembrance. In a 2004 African Times article, Rwandan sociologist and survivor
Jeanne Murekatete explains, “The Nazi genocide of the Jews was immortalized by abundant
works of literature, cinema and various other art forms. We, on the other hand, don’t have much
except the victims’ remains.”44 For both Rwandans and foreign visitors, the preserved remains
provide the most expressive and vivid link to the past. This link anchors the memory of Tutsi
victimization in history and wards off attempts to silence it. Supporting this point, Rwandan
Director of Culture Butoto Muhozo states in the same article, “To make these bones disappear
would simply mean killing off the memory of the Tutsi genocide.”45 The preservation serves a
functional purpose as evidence in addition to a form of expression. As stated by Muhozo, the
failure to maintain the sites would mean the failure to preserve the Tutsi memory. In her memoir
on the forensic excavation of Kibuye and Kigali massacre sites, forensic anthropologist Clea
Koff echoes this point. Her forensic team felt a pressure to recover as much as possible at these
sites for future genocide tribunals. But Koff also remarks on the role of remains in fighting
genocide denial, “Unfortunately, physical proof is necessary⎯there really are people who don't
believe there was a genocide.”46 While constructed witness experiences, many Rwandans view
the visiting of preserved remains by foreigners as a way of acknowledging that they occurred.
Phillip Gourevitch argues that there exists a gap between witness and body. But he also
adds an interesting observation on the beauty of the skeleton and the role of the visitor’s gaze.
Arriving two years later, Phillip Gourevitch opens his book We Wish to Inform You That
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Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda with a description of the
massacre site at Nyarubuye. The bodies had been left out as part of a memorialization process.
He describes the skeletons as hauntingly “beautiful.” He writes, “The randomness of the fallen
forms, the strange tranquility of the rude exposure, the skull here, the arm bent in some
uninterpretable gesture⎯these things were beautiful, and their beauty only added to the affront
of the place.”47 The exposure of the body speaks of man’s mortality, but it also in this context
speaks of the individual. Men, women, and children with individual stories all died. Their bones
become a reminder to this individuality. But he also writes of his awareness in a voyeuristic gap
between himself and the bodies. He writes, “I couldn’t settle on any meaningful response:
revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, shame, incomprehension, sure, but nothing meaningful. I just
looked, and I took photographs, because I wondered whether I could really see what I was
seeing while I saw it, and I wanted also an excuse to look a bit more closely.”48 The role of the
visitor’s gaze comes into question in the search for meaning within the bodies. The bodies
remind the visitor of mortality, but this ends up conflicting Gourevitch as he tries to think of an
appropriate emotional response to the victims’ suffering. Paul Williams writes similarly that the
presence of bones may fulfill the visitor’s urge to actually witness the event.49 The preservation
of massacre sites creates the illusion of witnessing that fulfills this urge.
This illusion of witnessing may also cause the visitor to experience trauma. Frank Van
Vree defines “indigestible” images in the following manner:
As documents, they give proof of and epitomize the atrocious tragedy in its
barest form, but as such they are...'indigestible', not letting themselves be
absorbed by a story that takes the viewer away. They don't offer any comfort or
opportunity for empathy or understanding, but evoke feelings of shock, shame,
47
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terror, and guilt⎯images we want to banish from our world…like the mutilated
faces of solders of the First World War, the chopped heads of the Rwanda killing
fields, or the people jumping from the Twin Towers.50
The bareness of the horror in such images shocks the viewer from accepting redemptive
narratives. The weight of hopelessness and suffering transferred from image to viewer
discomforts and unsettles. Talking about the role of image in Rwandan documentary film, 100
Days, filmmaker Eric Kabera makes a connection between image and trauma for the viewer that
may relate to the emotional experience of Rwandan memorial site visitors. He remarks, “Every
time you see a glimpse of a decomposed body on the street of Kigali or Nyamata it brings
trauma. At times it brings about an initial blackout. You think to yourself that you don't want to
see it and you don't. But ultimately the image is there for people to remember and be
remembered.”51 It is through personal memory that the outsider connects with the image of the
dead. The images may stay with visitors, or at the very least they may return after an “initial”
blackout. When they do, the feeling of helplessness and hopelessness preserved at these sites
may become the visitor’s lasting memory of the dead.

SITES OF MOURNING
While sites of memory often attain larger collective meaning pertaining to the state, the
literature also suggests that initially they held a functional purpose as sites of bereavement and
mourning. In his analysis of World War I sites of memory, Jay Winter maintains that over time
memorials deconstruct the horror of war and “reinvest” it with a collective meaning. He writes
that through the memorial, “the dead are no longer individual people. They appear solely as
names, inscribed on the war memorial. Their sacrifice thereby takes on the form of an
50
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expression of a general will, a collective spirit embodied in the state. In these memorials, the
state affirms its right to call on its citizens to kill and to die.”52 But Winter also suggests that
reading these memorials as mere objects of the state glosses over their functional role as a site of
mourning. People traveled to sites of memory because they helped them collectively mourn the
anonymous dead. But as time passed and a new generation emerged that did not directly
experience loss from the war, these sites of memory shifted to a more politicized and nationalist
interpretation.53 They initially served as a tool of bereavement, and only with the passage of time
did they attain other political or social meanings connecting to the state or other historical
narratives.54 The proximity of the genocide as an event with commemoration makes Rwandan
memorial sites differ from World War I sites. While many World War I sites initially served as
sites of bereavement and then emphasized a nationalist narrative as generations passed, the
intersection between the national narrative and personal mourning occurs simultaneously at
Rwandan sites.
Commemoration each year begins on April 7, the day the genocide began after President
Habyarimana’s plane crashed on the night of April 6. Every year at a memorial site chosen on a
rotating basis, President Kagame delivers a speech during commemoration week that reflects the
status of the nation. He has addressed everything from issues pertaining to France, the situation
in eastern Congo, the necessity for national unity, and Rwanda’s economic development plan.55
National commemoration officially lasts for one week, but survivor groups perform their own
set of remembrance rituals and commemoration through the 100 days. On a local political level,
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district politicians often use commemoration to enforce their power or bring up community
issues that relate to the treatment of survivors or the lack of attendance during commemoration
ceremonies.56 Like the long-term collective meanings explored by Jay Winter, these
commemorations hold larger national meanings.57
Many Western politicians have paid their respects during April commemoration. For
many Western politicians, the memory of the genocide plays a dominant role in the international
political discourse concerning Rwanda. For American politicians like current U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Susan Rice⎯instrumental in pushing against an intervention force during
the genocide⎯remembering the genocide invokes not only feelings of guilt but also motivation
for future peace building. At the 2009 commemoration, Rice spoke about her personal memory
of visiting massacre sites:
I'll never forget the horror of walking through a churchyard and schoolyard
where one of the massacres had occurred. Six months later, the decomposing
bodies of those who had been so cruelly murdered still lay strewn around what
should have been a place of peace. For me, the memory of stepping around and
over those corpses will remain the most searing reminder imaginable of what our
work here must aim to prevent.58
Partly apologizing for her role in preventing a U.S. intervention force, Rice recalls how the
memorials and commemoration ceremonies caused her to re-evaluate her role in U.S.-Rwandan
relations. Commemoration has also become a stage for Western politicians to promote their
economic development plans. In May 2009, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the
Nyamata memorial as part of launching his “African Governance Initiative.” He expressed his
grief and incomprehensibility of the numbers of lives lost during the genocide. He pledged that
genocide must never happen again, remarked on what he viewed as the country's transformation
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since 1994, and complimented the government for moving past Rwanda’s political status quo by
exhibiting compassion for its people.59 Both Blair and Rice’s remarks symbolize the way in
which commemorating the genocide has become a part of the Western world’s relationship with
the current Rwandan state.
But commemoration also becomes a time for the remembering of traumatic memories.
Many survivors experience trauma during commemoration ceremonies that breaks the barrier
between history and the present. Specifically, commemoration through mourning rituals brings
the haunting memories of survivors out in the open. In a collection of testimonies commissioned
by the Kigali Genocide Memorial, survivor Freddy Mutunguha recalls that only during
commemoration in April does he experience traumatic nightmares of Interahamwe killing
people.60 Additionally, many of the commemorative rituals compress time between the genocide
as part of the historical past and the present. Rachel Ibreck describes these rituals as including
“long walks to memorial sites and all-night rituals replicate aspects of their [survivors’]
traumatic experiences during the genocide.”61 While the Rwandan government stresses
unification, the trauma felt by survivors during commemoration symbolize how traumatic
memories of the genocide remain fresh in their minds.62
Furthermore, these memorials function as sites of bereavement for survivors. During
commemoration survivors will often partake in all-night vigils that may include reciting poetry,
singing, and listing names of the murdered.63 They may use the memorial site to lay a wreath or
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pray.64 Considering the number of anonymous dead unearthed every year from newly discovered
mass graves, the sites serve an important function in giving survivors a place to mourn loved
ones lost among the anonymous bodies. The significance of having a site to mourn the dead
actually extends mourning sites back to pre-colonial religious traditions in which the living felt
an intimate connection to the dead. Longman and Rutagengwa write that both family members
and whole communities practiced mourning rituals at commemorative sites (often burial sites)
where they thanked the dead for looking after them by providing them with gifts.65 When
Rwanda was heavily Christianized in the 20th century, many of these traditions carried over to
the church. Janet Jacobs reinforces this argument by also pointing out that the pre-colonial
Animist beliefs of Rwanda included religious rites that called on dead ancestors for protection.
Jacobs argues that despite the status of these memorials as sites of terror, they are also sacred
spaces for the family of the dead. The tradition of this belief system makes it significant that
survivors have a place to reconnect with dead family members.66
Additionally, identification whenever possible aids in the mourning process. Clea Koff
saw a similar process of identification and mourning around Rwandan remains and relics much
like the preservation of relics by widows and parents of WWI dead. She found that that the
identification of the body helped family and friends mourn their loved ones. She writes, “a body
disallows a relative from maintaining that the person is being held in a prisoner-of-war camp or
that the person survived but can't get in touch. Similarly, in places where government or military
propaganda continually denies that certain people were killed, the exposure of graves and the
analysis of remains refutes the 'official story.”67 Identification both helps the mourner to move
on and acts as evidence of the crimes committed against their loved ones. In the case of
64
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genocide, identification may help the survivor respond to genocide deniers and begin the
mourning process. Koff found that even the identification of clothes or a prosthetic limb became
a significant part of the mourning process.68 She cites one example during the Kibuye
excavation of a father and daughter (who survived the massacre) who came looking for his
wife's clothing. That day Koff and her team only displayed a portion of the recovered clothing,
and father and daughter left empty handed and disappointed. Koff remarks that even though the
daughter witnessed her mother’s murder, she and her father felt the need to come and claim “that
bit of proof or that bit of memory.”69 Koff found that the identification of the remains of a loved
one helped mourners find closure.70 While Koff’s account principally analyzes the
documentation and preservation of evidence for war crimes tribunals and memorial construction,
she illustrates how these sites functioned as sites of mourning for survivors.
The intersection between the state narrative and personal mourning comes together again
in the reburials that occur during commemoration. This reflects the sad reality that new mass
graves are discovered every year. Reburial of remains found in the areas surrounding memorial
sites occurs during the commemoration ceremonies. On a practical level, reburial serves a
necessary function because bodies are often found in degrading mass graves hastily dug by
perpetrators to hide the evidence of the crimes. Reburial rituals become a way of giving the dead
a dignified burial. Ibreck argues that the state claims ownership over the dead in this manner by
showing them the respect that the previous government lacked. She writes, “it [the state] treats
the dead with care and respect, applies the conventions of burial and mourning and demands
collective recognition of the victim's humanity. With this act, the past is symbolically laid to
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rest.”71 But re-burial represents something more than a symbol of the state. Considering the
magnitude of mass graves, reburial becomes a practical necessity every year because of the
continuous discovery of mass graves. During my visit to the Nyamata memorial, I viewed a
special mass grave that housed the bodies of over 100 people thrown in a nearby latrine. The
bodies’ new resting place consisted of a headstone that included the names of every victim who
could be identified. On a symbolic level, it restores the victim’s dignity to identify them and
provide them a place to rest. To rebury those bodies in such a mass grave echoes Ibreck’s point
that reburial serves both a practical purpose (the discovery of bodies called for documentation
and identification) and a symbolic purpose by providing a dignified space for mourning.72
In addition, commemoration becomes an opportunity for perpetrators and opponents of
the government to perform their own forms of protest. While it is important not to generalize the
entire Hutu population as continuing to harbor thoughts of genocide, there have been many
instances of violence during commemoration involving former perpetrators. Grenade attacks
occurred around commemoration directed at memorial sites.73 There have been high profile
cases of mockery of survivors and personal threats, demonstrating that many of the anxieties and
hatreds from the genocide still exist and thereby resurface around commemoration.74 These
tensions in the community illustrate some of the challenges to commemoration. The preservation
of Rwandan sites of massacre occurs in deeply divided communities in which perpetrators and
survivors live side by side. Unlike World War I memorial sites that became sites of pilgrimage,
Rwandan memorial sites sit in the middle of a post-conflict struggle for reconciliation.
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Commemoration also breaks the political construction of the genocide by indirectly
creating a political space for ordinary Hutu and Tutsi. Ibreck notes that survivors maintain a
privileged position during commemoration. They may challenge the issues surrounding Gacaca,
noting the challenges in living in the community after giving testimony. They also may
challenge the neglect of memorial sites or the reduction of Gacaca sentences. Through voicing
these issues, commemoration often creates a political space for survivors in addition to
functioning as a site of mourning.75 By not participating in commemoration, Hutu make a
profound political statement. Longman and Rutagengwa found in their interviews that many
Hutu felt that the commemoration ignored the suffering of Hutu refugees. They found this clash
between competing memories especially prevalent in the northern districts, communities
inhabited often by more Hutu survivors from crimes committed during the civil war and in
refugee camps than Tutsi survivors from the genocide. This creates tensions during
commemoration as Hutu find their memories of victimization silenced by the official
commemoration ceremonies. One Hutu woman from their interviews in the northern town of
Buyoga explained, “They commemorate the genocide of the Tutsi, but the experience of those
who went to the camps [in Congo] is put to the side.”76 A Tutsi survivor also from Buyoga
added that only Tutsi survivors participate in commemoration while Hutu spend the time
working in the fields.77 Non-participation becomes a form of protest against the suppression of
competing narratives. While many perpetrators may not participate out of guilt or for continuing
to harbor genocide ideology, this one example demonstrates that many do not participate
because their own traumatic narratives have been left out of the official commemoration of
genocide. After the government’s announcement in December 2012 for a planned RPF liberation
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museum in the northern town of Mulindi, it will be interesting to see reactions from the local
populace.78 Finally, high profile sites of RPF massacres are not commemorated. At the site of
the 1995 Kibeho refugee camp massacre, the memory of Hutu victimization by RPF forces is
not commemorated. However, Tutsi victimization did occur at the same site a year prior during
the genocide. Longman and Rutagengwa note that the Tutsi massacre has been commemorated,
further signifying the official silencing of Hutu victimization from RPA crimes against
humanity.79

CONCLUSION
Preservation at Rwandan memorial sites falls in line with the view of history promoted
by the current Rwandan government. These sites present the genocide at its height and its most
vulnerable. But as James Young emphasizes with Holocaust museums, there needs to be
attention to the fact they are still constructed sites.80 The decision to preserve represents a
specific political and social choice. By orienting the historical narrative around the 1994
genocide, the government makes a clear distinction between perpetrators and survivors. This is
not an accident. Rwanda remains a country with a population still traumatized by 1994. But
focusing on these frozen historical moments risks heightening divisions. These are moments of
genocide, the highest form of divisionism. Parts of the population ruthlessly murdered other
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parts. Taken out of historical context, these sites risk heightening tensions unless they are
directed towards education and prevention. The ruins and artifacts provide proof of the
unimaginable violence inflicted against Tutsi during the genocide. But they also divert the story
away from what occurred after 1994, including the war in the Congo, the pursuit of justice, and
reconciliation attempts. Ironically, the commemoration of the Tutsi who died as the world
looked away may cause another silencing of Hutu victimization. While mourning is a personal
matter, Rwanda’s politics has been largely shaped as a nation in mourning. While, of course, an
understandable occurrence (the genocide occurred less than two decades ago), the
nationalization of mourning makes the acknowledgment of Hutu victimization necessary for
building a unified nation and a lasting peace.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RWANDAN MEMOIR:
FOUR EXAMPLES OF COMPETING VICTIMIZATION

This chapter will examine a set of memoirs of the Rwandan genocide: Révérien
Rurangwa’s Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda, Paul Rusesabagina’s An Ordinary Man, Joseph
Sebarenzi’s God Sleeps in Rwanda and Marie Béatrice Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaughter: The
Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire.1 I decided on these four memoirs not to create a
comprehensive sample of Rwandan testimony, but rather to make two distinct points. One, these
memoirs expand the definition of genocide victimhood by showing the interplay of competing
Rwandan memories. Two, these memoirs simultaneously acts as a form of political dissent
against the RPF government and question the international community’s continued support of
President Paul Kagame. Before exploring the personal narratives of the four memoirs, I want to
acknowledge two influences of Rwandan testimony that I chose not to analyze.
First, I want to briefly mention a few influential collections of survivor and perpetrator
testimony from Rwanda. Since 1994, several scholars and organizations released influential
testimonies that give voice to both survivors and perpetrators. French journalist Jean Hatzfield in
particular released two outstanding volumes on Rwanda. In Life Laid Bare, he interviews
fourteen survivors from Nyamata and Ntarama.2 These interviewees, encompassing a wide range
of backgrounds, give heartbreaking and horrifying testimony to their stories of survival. Several
of these interviewees actually sought refuge in the churches and subsequently hid amongst the
bodies and the surrounding marshes. Hatzfield’s collected testimony showcases the extent
1
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trauma, hatred, and a sense of loss pervades in the lives of survivors. In a second collection titled
Machete Season, Hatzfield presents testimony of several Hutu perpetrators from the same
region. He expresses a chilling account of killers who will openly talk about the murders, yet
distance themselves from openly expressing any remorse for their crimes.3 Other works of
survivor testimony include the Kigali Genocide Memorial’s We Survived Genocide in Rwanda
and Samuel Tottem and Rafiki Ubaldo’s We Cannot Forget.4 These collections deliver powerful
and traumatic personal narratives in which the act of reading becomes a moral act by the reader.
Second, a study of Rwandan genocide memoir would be incomplete without mentioning
Lt. General Roméo Dallaire’s Shake Hands with the Devil. Dallaire’s memoir of the UNAMIR
mission depicts the international community’s complicity in the Rwandan genocide and attempts
to bring accountability to its failure. He served from August 1993 till August 1994, and he
writes in great in detail of the ways in which the mission traumatized him to the point of a
suicide attempt in the late 1990s. His memoir articulates the details of how his mission reported
many warning signs of genocide to the UN. This included a report from an Interahamwe
informant named Jean-Pierre who revealed the location of weapons caches, the construction of
Tutsi death lists, and the training of death squads.5 But the UN failed to respond to this (and
many other) reports compiled by UNAMIR. His main point revolves around the fact that the UN
and Western powers knew genocide was taking place and refused to intervene when they had a
chance. Dallaire emphasizes that principle blame for the genocide belongs to those who planned
and carried out the genocide. He calls the atmosphere of extremism a combination of the
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colonial legacy, refugee life, racism, jealousy, and power plays that infected both sides during
the civil war.6 But he also places specific blame on Kagame for not speeding up his campaign
when the genocide became clear, France for further destabilizing the region with Opération
Turquoise, and the United States for actively working against UNAMIR.7 Dallaire argues that
the genocide could have been prevented, and proposes a re-evaluation of the international
community’s intentions in their peacekeeping missions.
The memoirs presented in this chapter will make a similar call for an international reevaluation, but from a Rwandan perspective that exhibits the competing memories of
victimization in Rwandan society. These books speak to the silences and oversights made by the
international community in both the genocide and early post-genocide periods. In a critique of
Marie Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaughter, Aliko Songolo writes, “Closely linked to a historical
event, the memoir personalizes history or historicizes the personal.”8 In other words, the memoir
allows the author to insert the personal narrative into the larger historical narrative. This
becomes significant in a context where the RPF regime holds a “monopoly on truth.”9 Behind
the charming elites and impressive development projects lies a regime that killed tens of
thousands of its own citizens.10 In a society filled with silence, complicity, and fear, the personal
narrative attains an even greater power as a form of dissent. All four memoirs reviewed in this
chapter come from survivors who live in exile, and each tells a story that conflicts in one way or
another with the official narrative. They de-couple the RPF narrative from the Tutsi survivor
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narrative, speak to the genocide’s greater regional consequences, and portray the RPF as
continuing the historical cycle of elitist state power.

TUTSI VICTIMIZATION IN GENOCIDE: MY STOLEN RWANDA
In Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda, Tutsi survivor Révérien Rurangwa writes a traumatic
memoir that details his family’s murder by a Hutu neighbor. Fifteen years old at the time of the
genocide, he describes the genocide as a loss of innocence. Before April 1994 he interacted with
Hutu children regularly. While he experienced discrimination from his Hutu neighbors, he never
foresaw mass murder.11 After the massacres began, Rurangwa’s family fled to their church.
Forty-three members of his family hid in a twelve square meter shed. Eventually, his Hutu
neighbors found their hiding place, tortured them, and then hacked them to death. Severely
disfigured and mutilated, he hid among his family’s bodies for days. He places specific attention
to the crimes of his neighbor Sibomona. Rurangwa refers to him throughout the memoir as his
“murderer,” which considering his survival demonstrates an internal death. While Sibomona did
cut off Rurangwa’s arm and an eye, his actions also uprooted Rurangwa from this home and cast
him away into exile. He discovers that his pursuit of justice against Sibomona, his visible
physical scars, and his will to remember his family makes life in Rwanda in the late 1990s
dangerous and unbearable. Therefore, his account demonstrates two important points. One, it
reveals the struggle of the Tutsi survivor in finding a place amongst a culture of forgetting in
post-genocide Rwandan society. Two, it demonstrates the role of trauma in remembering
atrocity.
Rurangwa miraculously survived the massacre and found asylum in Switzerland. Exiled
to rural Switzerland, he describes himself as “an uprooted survivor.” He writes on leaving
11
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Rwanda, “The plane which takes off from the Kigali runway tears me away from my country,
which more than ever has come to resemble a head cleaved in two by a machete. It tears me
away from all that went to form me over fifteen years and made me the adolescent that I am,
now forever traumatized.”12 But nonetheless he attempted to confront his trauma by returning to
Rwanda and seeking justice for his family. He returns to his village and confronts Sibomana,
who promptly denies everything. Rurangwa laments that while he possesses proof (his wounds),
he lack witnesses to tie Sibomana to the crime because they are either dead or Hutu. The RPF
soldiers imprison Sibomana on the spot, but a Hutu mob descends on Rurangwa’s house and
threatens him. He flees to Kigali, and the RPF eventually releases Sibomona from the
overcrowded prisons.13 He writes, “Everyone pretends to be pretending to forget, survivors most
of all. And then, there are risks inherent in pressing charges. Hundreds of witnesses have been
eliminated, by knife or by poison.”14 Rurangwa found himself stuck in a liminal space between
honoring his family by pursuing justice and a present Rwandan society focused on moving on.
The perpetrators denial of their crimes and their subsequent use of intimidation causes
Rurangwa to seek exile again.
First and foremost, Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda exemplifies the ways in which
testimony empowers the survivor. An internal struggle, Rurangwa finds value in remembering
because it allows him to fight his perpetrators through the preservation of the word. “The only
revenge available for me is to bear witness,” he writes, “This way, we may pay tribute to the
victims, offer respect and redress to the survivors, and ensure that the thousands who committed
crimes against humanity⎯ including my own assassin⎯ do not get away unpunished.”15 But
Rurangwa expresses his testimony in a vengeful tone. This reflects his frustration with the
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flawed justice system for genocide crimes. His perpetrator Sibomona remains free. With
institutional justice not an option, memory becomes defiant:
The only revenge that would really matter would be if that murderer who sought
to annihilate me after hacking my family to pieces were to read these pages. And
then he would say: “I did all that for nothing. He's alive! He's still standing! He
will live on! And his people will live on in him!”16
Simple existence becomes a form of revenge. Through the written word, his memories fight
back. But in this case individual memory falls into a gap between audience and writer. The
audience may read the words, but that does not guarantee that they will remember. He adds, “A
duty to remember? You make me laugh. In truth, who wants to remember?”17 He argues that the
duty to remember does not fall with the audience, but with the keeper of memory. Memoir
empowers the survivor, articulating the memory into a form that fights back. While his audience
may not want to remember, Rurangwa still feels a need to bear witness. By merely telling his
story, his testimony demonstrates what Jay Winter describes as the rescuing of “histories
trampled on by military dictatorships.”18 Rurangwa sums up his mission as exemplifying a “duty
to pass it [his story] on. The duty to try to explain what has happened so that such horrors don't
happen again⎯ and who cares if no one listens!”19
But more broadly, the memoir illustrates a culture of forgetting in post-genocide
Rwanda. He argues that Tutsi genocide memory becomes not only an embarrassment for
perpetrators, but also many Tutsi returnees. After the genocide, thousands of Tutsi from the
diaspora returned and repopulated Rwanda. Faced with a society divided between ambitious
entrepreneurs and long-term exiles and a traumatized group of survivors, Rurangwa states that
survivor testimony conflicted with Paul Kagame’s goal of national unity. After returning from
16
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exile two years later, Rurangwa describes the immediate post-war politics under Kagame as “all
about forgetting” because of their focus on re-building the state. He writes:
The new government, led by Paul Kagame...urges the Tutsis in exile to return
home: they may have halted the genocide, but not because they want to hear it
spoken about. This black page of history needs to be turned, there is a country to
rebuild. The exiled Tutsis don't want to hear survivors' laments; nor do the Hutus
and for good reason. So survivors are not welcomed by anyone.20
In his writing, he argues that the culture of forgetting and the silencing of memory is a product
of rebuilding of the Rwandan nation-state. He writes that part of this immediate culture of
forgetting comes from the arduous task of punishing two million perpetrators. He points out that
the prisons are overcrowded. But he criticizes the government for ignoring justice and for not
making the Tutsi survivor a priority. This is an extreme accusation that certainly neglects the
role of the government in providing reparations to survivors and the reality of the sheer number
of perpetrators who needed to be tried. But by making such a harsh accusation, Rurangwa
reveals a limit to the survivor’s willingness to forgive. Writing on the hypothetical question of
forgiveness, he answers, “No chance of forgiveness while justice has not been done.”21
While his anger certainly does not typify all survivor opinions on the government,22 he
speaks to an uncoupling of the RPF liberation experience from the Tutsi survivor experience. He
expresses that narratives of the genocide become an embarrassment to the Rwandan state if they
do not contribute to the rebuilding process. He writes, “We [survivors] embarrass the Rwandans.
We sense that it's better not to tell, not to disturb the 'peaceful cohabitation' between the two
ethnic groups...The only permitted discourse is along the lines of 'Reconstruction,
Reconciliation.'”23 His “duty to remember” presents a competing view from the RPF narrative.
20
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RPF liberation may have rebuilt the nation-state, but that does not make it synonymous with the
traumatic existence of Tutsi survivors. Rurangwa found the state narrative insulting, especially
the culture of forgetting. He cites Kagame as telling citizens, “Shut your feelings in the cupboard
and throw away the key.”24 Rurangwa’s memoir stresses disillusionment between traumatized
Tutsi survivors and the RPF liberation narrative.
Rurangwa becomes a case study of both mental and physical trauma. Traumatic memory
lives within him physically. Horribly deformed, Rurangwa’s body testifies to the crimes
committed in his community. Despite his disgust of his appearance, he refuses major plastic
surgery on his face in order to preserve the evidence of Hutu atrocities. He explains:
And even if I struggle to cope with my own image, I want to keep the hallmarks
of this evil scored into my body. That way, I carry out a double duty of
remembering. The Hutus have cleaned up the churches, the fields, all the sites of
the genocide, but they cannot take my scars from me. Memorials may display
carpets of skulls or carefully piled-up tibias and femurs, but survivors' scars
remain the living, bodily, palpable witness to the crimes against humanity.25
Refusing to repair his body becomes a way of re-claiming his body. It also serves as evidence
against the perpetrator’s crimes. But he also argues that even the evidence displayed at
memorials forgets. While historical artifacts are symbols of cruelty, the individual agents of
these crimes cannot be discerned. The wounds testify to the cruelty, the malice, and the
humiliation committed in cold blood by members within his community. He knows who
committed the murders, and his wounds testify that the crimes occurred. The preservation of his
deformities allows him to fight a state-imposed culture of forgetting.
The mental trauma from his experience plays a large role in his mission to remember.
The memoir stresses that the memory of the genocide for survivors is continuous. He describes
the eyes of his family’s killer [Sibomana] in detail, “The eyes of your assassin. They stay in your
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mind's eye until death. I will never forget the black pupils of Simon Sibomana the moment he
brought down his blade on my head. They are seared in my mind forever.”26 Rurangwa
remembers the hatred, the humiliation, and the cruelty of the perpetrators. This traumatic
memory lives within him. He describes his ordinary day-to-day activities in exile as marred by
“flashes of butchery.” He plays the scenes of genocide in his mind over and over again. He
imagines ordinary people on the streets suddenly attacked by genocide perpetrators.27 Rurangwa
continues to re-live the memory and undergoes a constant cycle of re-traumatization. He cannot
forget because the memory lives inside him. Sadly, his story parallels other collectives forced to
internalize their memory because of their contradictions to the states’ status quo.
But the preservation of such traumatic memory also risks de-contextualizing the entire
conflict. A critique of such traumatic memory certainly can appear cold and cruel, but traumatic
memory also risks fostering divisions for future generations to read and re-invest into their own
society. Specifically, he writes that the Creator divided Rwanda into “three ethnic groups who
cohabitated as peacefully as fingers on the same hand: Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa pygmies.”28
This narrative supports the interpretation of the pre-colonial era as a harmonious period of
history:
In the original paradise, each would be happy with his lot and would give thanks
to God for the lot of the others. The Tutsi blessed God for the Hutus' good
harvest and the Twas' bountiful hunting; the Hutu praised God for giving the
Tutsis such beautiful inyambo cows and such generous quarry to the Twas.29
In this narrative, the divisiveness in Rwandan society originated only with the colonialists. This
interpretation conflicts with the scholarly consensus that inequalities did exist in Rwandan
society pre-colonialism. Catharine Newbury argues, “the vision that colonialism disrupted a
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perfectly harmonious system does not concur with the record: pre-colonial Rwanda was a state
with serious social inequalities, and some powerful political actors used their power arbitrarily
and abusively.”30 The vision of original harmony simplifies the historical interactions between
the three identities. The reasons Hutu killed become a mystery that originated with the
implementation of colonial rule. Rurangwa writes a reactive response by rejecting the myth of
Tutsi invasion, but in doing so the Hutu becomes a sort of inherent evil.
Rurangwa does not hide his hatred of Hutu, and considering his experience that becomes
understandable. He writes for instance, “The hatred of one Hutu, of the Hutus, of all the Hutus,
bores into me in that instant like the teeth of a harpoon that can never be removed, so deep does
it penetrate the flesh.”31 But he also disregards any intellectual responses or historical
contextualization to the murder. He argues that no study of the genocide can properly translate
the magnitude of the horror because words cannot represent such pain. He uses his personal pain
to dismiss the historical agency to the genocide. He writes, “I'm convinced that you cannot
simply reduce the explanation of the genocide to political motives, economic rationales, not
even to ethnic rivalries.”32 He further argues that the evil unleashed by the genocide remains a
mystery that “goes beyond our mental capacities and our powers of analysis.”33 He further decontextualizes history by confirming the re-framed linear narrative of pre-colonial harmony. The
genocide becomes an exceptional phenomenon and a binary between good and evil.
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THE HUTU RESCUER IN AN ORDINARY MAN
Writing after Terry George adapted his story into the 2004 film Hotel Rwanda, Hutu
hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina’s An Ordinary Man presents a different perspective from that
of Révérien Rurangwa. The hotel manager for two major hotels in Kigali, Rusesabagina
befriended high level contacts and used favors gathered over the course of several years to help
save over one thousand Rwandans at the Hotel Milles Collines. As a moderate Hutu married to a
Tutsi, his life was in constant danger during the genocide. He sheltered his family in the hotel.
Over time, the hotel took in more and more fleeing refugees. He used the hotel’s alcohol supply
to keep the Interahamwe out. Despite many attempts and threats by the militia to wipe out the
hotel’s inhabitants, Rusesabagina used his contacts in the army to avoid any massacres occurring
within the hotel grounds. His friends included the likes of Georges Rutaganda, later convicted
by the ICTR for genocide crimes. His relationships with such génocidaires became a point of
controversy in several political and intellectual circles, especially after he expressed several
critical comments of Paul Kagame. Nonetheless, the account establishes several important points
in conceptualizing the genocide. One, not all Hutu killed. While he certainly does not downplay
the fact that the majority of Hutu took part in the massacres, he argues that they still had a
choice. This breaks from the rigid conceptualization of the Hutu as inherently evil. Two, he
illustrates the role of history and the memory of history in the perpetration of these crimes.
Three, he critiques the Kagame regime for participating in the cycle of political elitism.34
Rusesabagina describes the genocide as exemplifying the violence of words. He writes,
“Words are the most effective weapons of death in man's arsenal. But they can also be powerful
tools of life. They may be the only ones.”35 He emphasizes that words on the radio stations,
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newspapers, and militia pushed ordinary people to commit horrifying atrocities. But for
Rusesabagina, he used words to negotiate the safety of 1,268 people. Words consisted of his
only tool for haggling away favors and defusing situations in which militiamen insisted on
killing those inside the hotel. He makes sure to emphasize that he does not view his actions as
heroic. Rather, he prides himself only for keeping his humanity in an inhumane context. He
writes, “I did what I believed to be the ordinary things that an ordinary man would do. I said no
to outrageous actions the way I thought that anybody would, and it still mystifies me that so
many others could say yes.”36 Fundamentally, Rusesabagina’s account grapples with the
question of why some people committed atrocities and others did not. He uses his memory from
the genocide to illustrate that morality and empathy did exist in Rwanda. As a result, his
memory fights the idea of using the massacres as proof to an inherent evil in mankind.
Rusesabagina negotiated with the génocidaires in order to save Rwandans. He balanced
negotiations between people who lived in both the “world of machetes” and the world of
“civilized conversation.” He describes the normalcy by which he negotiated for the lives of the
refugees with these military officials as terrifying. He explains that he saw these people not
through an extreme lens of good and evil, but rather a lens of “soft” and “hard.” He writes, “It
was the soft that I was trying to locate inside them; once I could get my fingers into it, the
advantage was mine.”37 He argues that he saved lives by treating the killers as rationale human
beings. He writes, “If you stay friendly with monsters you can find cracks in their armor to
exploit. Shut them out and they can kill you without a second thought.”38 He details an instance
where Georges Rutaganda saved several children from the Interahamwe. On the criticism for
maintaining his friendship with Rutaganda, Rusesabagina argues, “People are never completely
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good or completely evil.”39 Even the perpetrators performed acts of empathy. He argues, “in
order to fight evil you sometimes have to keep evil people in your orbit.”40 Rusesabagina does
not deny that evil existed within these perpetrators, but he does not describe it as inherent or
determined. He demonstrated the ability to manipulate them to feel a bit of empathy.
Ultimately, he seeks to place the good deeds of anonymous Rwandans in the collective
genocide remembrance. He writes about other acts of heroism by ordinary Rwandans who saved
others, “Their good deeds are lost to history. The murders were anonymous and irrational, but
the kindness and bravery were there in scattered places too, and that is a big part of what gives
me hope for the future.”41 He argues that these people viewed the world as a “decent place” and
believed in Rwanda’s restoration.42 He denounces the viewpoint of mankind's inevitability to
commit atrocities as “the fundamental perversion of genocide.”43 In other words, he argues
against the idea of an inherent evil in mankind. To remember the genocide in this manner means
playing “into the hands of those who excite racial hatreds as a device to acquire more power.”44
In this manner, Rusesabagina’s account fights genocide ideology by simultaneously fighting the
view that the genocide occurred spontaneously and naturally.
In addition to critiquing the rigidity of good and evil, Rusesabagina provides a historical
summary that critiques the simplified histories established by Rurangwa, the RPF, and the
international community. He argues that any explanation of the genocide must acknowledge the
role of history. He states upfront, “History is serious business in my country. You might say that
it is a matter of life and death.”45 He describes Rwandans as obsessed with their own history. He
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points out that Hutu extremists used history in their propaganda that demonized the Tutsi, but
also that Tutsi used a similar distorted history to maintain power during the colonial period. He
also complicates pre-colonial history by pointing to the role of mwami dynasties, royal
assassinations, violence, and an emerging cattle-owning class of Tutsi elites.46 He explains that
the duties of the royal advisers involved remembering the national history though poems, songs,
and stories. He writes, “In Rwanda, political power has always been linked with control of
history.”47 He calls the ethnic cleavage “artificial political distinction” amongst a relatively
unified nation.48 But he also remarks that the “two groups have been living uneasily alongside
each other for more than five hundred years.”49 While he does not expand his point, this may be
interpreted as pointing to larger trends of inequality around land and cattle.
He argues that there is no evidence of two separate races of Hutu and Tutsi; he points to
inequalities around wealth. He writes, “In precolonial Rwanda…it wasn’t land that was used to
reckon a person’s wealth. It was cows. Those who didn’t have cattle were forced to turn to
growing crops for sustenance and took on the identity of Hutu, or ‘followers.’”50 In this sense,
he includes the traditional client-patron relationship of ubuhake into his history.51 While he
confirms the unified national history, he also breaks by showing the emergence of a Tutsi elite
surrounding the mwami and points to the significance of ubuhake in the historical narrative.
Like the linear historical model, Rusesabagina places colonialism and the
implementation of the Hamitic hypothesis as the turning point in Rwandan history. But instead
of focusing on the genocide as historically determined, he showcases the malleability of history
by arguing that the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi became racialized into hatred during
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colonialism. He argues that dynastic elites adopted the Hamitic hypothesis to legitimize Tutsi
privilege. He writes, “What seems to have happened was that the ministers and priests closest to
the king started to conceive themselves as a special class of people.”52 He draws a line from this
political privilege to the colonial period. He argues that colonialism produced an inferiority
complex amongst the Hutu and a sense of privilege amongst the Tutsi. He writes, “The Tutsi
were told over and over that they were aristocratic and physically attractive, while the Hutu were
told they were stupid…This was the message that our fathers and mothers heard every day.”53
He further supports this illustration by including corvée into his narrative.54 While not a perfect
review, his inclusion of Hutu struggles during colonialism legitimizes the Hutu political
oppression that led to the Hutu social revolution of 1959.
He characterizes the past as a competing history in which years such as 1885, 1959,
1973, 1990, and 1994 contain contested meanings to national identity. He cites 1973 as an
example to this interplay of competing memories. In 1973, the government expelled his Tutsi
friend Gérard from school. When explaining why, Rusesabagina points to Burundian President
Michel Micombero massacre of nearly 2,000 Hutu during a Hutu uprising and the subsequent
refugee spillover into Rwanda. He contextualizes Gérard’s expulsion as an act of revenge by the
Rwandan government for Micombero’s massacre.55 He points to the ways in which the internal
politics of Burundi affected the internal politics of Rwanda, and therefore places the conflict in a
much larger regional context. While he does not emphasize Hutu suffering, he at least explains
their suffering at the hands of Micombero. In addition, he gives some agency to the
government’s expulsion of Tutsi students. This does not excuse the policy (he calls it “idiotic”
and expresses his guilt for his political power as a Hutu), but contextualizes it as a racist policy
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that emerged in response to another act of violence by the Burundi government. By linking
Burundi and Rwanda into one regional crisis, the reader learns of the double victimization
narratives and their subsequent politicization.56
He calls this politicization of history an obsession, writing, “We are obsessed with the
past. And everyone here tries to make it fit his own ends.”57 He establishes the subjectivity of
history in pushing Rwanda towards perpetration. He writes:
I am fully convinced that when so many ordinary people were swinging
machetes at their neighbors in the awful springtime of 1994 they were not
striking out at those individual victims per se but at an historical phantom. They
were not trying so much to take life as to actually take control of the past.58
He argues for a contextualization of the perpetrators as more than political pawns. They killed
for a reason, albeit an incredibly cruel and inexcusable one. By linking memory and history to
this explanatory narrative, Rusesabagina does not excuse the actions of perpetrators. Rather, he
contests explanations of the genocide that dismisses the perpetrators actions as random. By
giving them an explanation for their motives, he signifies that he could also give them reasons to
not murder.
This interpretation of history as a political cycle comes to fruition in his conclusion. He
severely critiques the Kagame regime. He accuses them of merely setting up another elitist
regime instead of embarking on reconciliation.59 In response to their claims of democracy, he
accuses them of merely employing “Hutus for hire” in order to rubber stamp the illusion of
democracy. He writes, “We have changed the dancers but the music remains the same.”60 In
doing so, he creates a cyclical political narrative. He attributes the “culture of impunity” to a
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lack of acknowledgment of the role of power cycles in Rwandan history. He writes, “The
dictates of the mwami were followed by the plunder of the country by Belgians and then the
corrupt ethnic visions of Habyarimana, with the balance of power always bouncing back and
forth between the races, and neither side learning anything from the ashes and bodies.”61
These critical statements came in the wake of his controversial lecture tour in which he
blasted the Kagame regime. There are reports that the Rwandan government originally liked the
film adaptation Hotel Rwanda. Director Terry George wrote an article recalling a private
screening in 2005 which Paul Kagame expressed his approval for the film’s role in revealing the
genocide to the larger world.62 But after Rusesabagina made critical comments of the regime, he
was persona non grata. In June 2006, Kagame said: “It [the portrayal of Rusesabagina as a hero]
has nothing to do with Rusesabagina. He just happened to be there accidentally, and he
happened to be surviving because he was not in the category of those being hunted.”63 The
Rwandan government soon began a smear campaign against Rusesabagina. In 2010, the
government accused him of funding the FDLR in the DRC from America.64 It is beyond the
scope of this study to examine the legitimacy of these claims, but it appears suspicious that these
claims only emerged shortly after Rusesabagina criticized the legitimacy of the 2003 elections.
There certainly exists a legitimate question concerning the nature of Rusesabagina’s friendship
with such figures as Rutaganda. The portrayal of Rusesabagina as an African Oskar Schindler
also raises concerns considering the use of the Mille Collines to save only privileged Hutu and
Tutsi. But the government’s criticism of Rusesabagina’s integrity also raises a number of
questions. For example, why did the Rwandan government allow the film to be shot on-site in
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Rwanda in the first place if they so objected to the story? One conclusion that can be made is
that by using his fame to challenge Kagame politically, Rusesabagina effectively sentenced
himself to a life of exile. Now considered a génocidaire, his exile signifies the politicization of
the genocide and its memory.

TUTSI POLITICAL DISSENT IN GOD SLEEPS IN RWANDA
Former Speaker of the Rwandan Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi gives an insider account
of the political rise of the RPF in late 1990s parliamentary politics in his memoir God Sleeps in
Rwanda. Sebarenzi (a Tutsi) grew up in Kibuye and witnessed the 1973 Tutsi pogroms. Facing
discrimination in the education system, his father sent him to a Congolese Island in the middle
of Lake Kivu to receive an education. After the Rwandan civil war commenced Sebarenzi, his
wife Liberata, and their young children managed to escape Rwanda to Burundi and the Congo.
He ended up watching the genocide unfold live on television in Michigan. He lost most of his
family. Returning in 1995 he took jobs at non-profits and with USAID, before becoming
influenced by friends to run for parliament. He was nominated for the Speaker of the Parliament
despite no experience in politics. He served until 1999, despite presenting ideas that conflicted
with Kagame and the RPF. He eventually fell out of favor with Kagame in 1999 and was forced
to resign. He sought exile. His account complicates the image of the RPF and Kagame. This
section should not function as a hagiography of Sebarenzi, but rather a testament to the RPF’s
decision to continue the cycle of political exclusion in post-genocide Rwanda.
Sebarenzi opens his account with his childhood memory of the 1973 Tutsi pogroms as a
way to introduce the role of cyclical victimization and power abuse. He describes the Rwandan
President as historically an authoritarian figure, one to whom Rwandans “listen closely, for what
he says could mean the difference between life and death. When you hear him, you don't form
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opinions. You nod your head in agreement.”65 He portrays Rwanda as both a complicit society
and violent one. He relays the ways in which political violence played out on the personal level
in his memory of 1973, a moment that also served as a loss of innocence due to his exposure to
the political meanings of Hutu and Tutsi.66 In 1973, Hutu raided their Tutsi neighbor’s land and
committed mass atrocities as part of a larger political conflict. Many of these neighbors actually
protected Sebarenzi and his family due to respect for the father.
While their Hutu neighbors protected their property, other Hutu arrived demanding to
kill Sebarenzi and his family. But before they could carry out the act, a distant drum rang
through the countryside signifying the end of the pogrom (called muyaga). Sebarenzi writes that
later he learned of the larger political context of the killings, “The massacre of Tutsi had been
going on for several weeks in other parts of the country, precipitated by fighting within the Hutu
leadership and growing dissatisfaction with the president's regime. In an effort to rally support
for himself, the president mobilized Hutu against a common enemy: the Tutsi.”67 This does not
excuse the perpetrators actions, but rather situates the political violence in a larger, volatile
context. This establishes the culture of fear and atrocity as power-related as opposed to
historically determined.
By focusing on cycles of power Sebarenzi ultimately expands the definition of
victimization by remembering Hutu victimization. When Sebarenzi returned to Rwanda in 1995
after the genocide, he noticed how the power changeover played out in the life of Tutsi and
Hutu. As a Tutsi he felt safe in RPF-occupied Rwanda, but he also felt a power shift because
many Hutu did not feel safe.68 He noticed the ways in which human rights violations committed
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by the RPF created a culture of fear among Hutu communities.69 Just as Hutu political power in
the 1970s instilled fear in Sebarenzi’s Tutsi community, the political changeover to Tutsi power
produced the same fear for Hutu. This cycle of fear contradicts the RPF’s claim as Rwandan
liberators because they partly stem from actual RPF human rights violations during the civil war
and in the Congo. They also stem from the emerging RPF autocracy in the late 1990s.
Sebarenzi illustrates a country and political system gripped by fear of Kagame and the
RPF, a narrative that flies in the face of the image of the RPF as heroic liberators explored in
such films as Kinyarwanda, Munyurangabo, and Hotel Rwanda. Instead, he depicts them as a
cunning military organization that disregards the Constitution, the rule of law, and slowly
imparted single-party rule in the late 1990s. He reflects:
When, in the wake of genocide, it [the RPF] didn't take advantage of its military
and throw out the [Arusha] Peace Agreement, I believed the RPF was seriously
committed to building a country based on rule of law...So when [Kagame]
slowly started weakening the parliament, the executive branch, the judiciary, we
didn't realize what was happening.70
Instead of openly installing a military dictatorship, Sebarenzi explains how the RPF overruled
the Constitution and rule of law bit by bit. Starting in 1997, Kagame (in complete violation of
the Constitution) started purging judges in the judiciary in favor of RPF-controlled appointees.71
Sebarenzi protested the smear campaigns and forced resignations as violating the constitution
but to no avail. On these purges Sebarenzi writes, “When Kagame decided that he didn't like
someone, they weren't just removed from power, they were ruined. Smear campaigns would
begin from which the victim's hardly ever recovered.”72 Some justices like Vincent
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Nsanzabaganwa died in mysterious circumstances, others disappeared.73 When questioned over
violations of the rule of law, one RPF leader lashed out at Sebarenzi by calling the current law
“leftovers” from the Habyarimana regime and therefore irrelevant.74
As the transitional government neared its end in 1999, the RPF continued to disrupt the
legislature in order to guarantee its interests. In particular, they forced a measure that gave
political parties authority over its parliament members.75 This allowed the RPF to control the
entire parliament by pressuring and intimidating the other political parties into becoming RPF
proxies. In a short period of time, the new measure helped sack nearly all parliament leaders
who disagreed with the RPF. Most of these former parliament members ended up in prison.76
Political leaders and civil society stayed silent throughout this process, and more RPF opponents
disappeared as people remained complicit to Kagame out of fear. Sebarenzi writes on this
silence, “Our tolerance abetted the growing dictatorship. The international community also kept
silent, trading Rwanda's seeming stability for democracy, not realizing that the economic
recovery and stability rested on shaky ground.”77 This complicity takes a personal tone in the
memoir as Sebarenzi writes about his own Kagame-orchestrated smear campaign, his eventual
forced resignation, the abandonment of his political allies, and his flight to exile in Uganda. The
illusion of stability masked a much deeper political purge as the RPF-controlled executive
branch gobbled up the judiciary and legislative branches.78
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God Sleeps in Rwanda presents several important contradictions to the official narrative.
One, he paints a picture of Kagame that contrasts with the predominant heroic characterization.
He portrays Kagame as a master manipulator. It took Sebarenzi nearly an entire year to schedule
a meeting with Kagame (who at the time held the posts of Vice President, Minister of Defense,
and Chairman of the RPF party). He describes the meetings as full of contradictions: Kagame
often voiced his approval for Sebarenzi’s legislative plans, but afterwards Sebarenzi received
threats and orders from RPF members. Kagame’s support of Sebarenzi’s political activities
always held a strategic twist. After parliament investigated corruption charges, “I later learned
that Kagame supported our investigation of these ministers because he wanted many of them out
of office himself. His support was tactical, not principled.”79 The memoir depicts Kagame as a
morally ambivalent leader, a master at masking his interests in maintaining power, and dead set
on imposing his will and vision on the entire state.80
Two, Sebarenzi’s story distinguishes the Tutsi survivor from the RPF supporter. His
childhood attests to the institutional inequalities facing Tutsi during the Hutu republic. Since a
majority of his family died during the genocide, his narrative speaks of the widespread sense of
lose in the Tutsi community. But he clearly defines the RPF as a political movement that (while
it certainly ended the genocide) held interests concerning power independent to many Tutsi. For
instance, he writes that many Tutsi circles held unpopular views of the 1990 RPF invasion.81 In
the late 1990s, many Tutsi survivors and former RPF financial backers ended up imprisoned or
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exiled due to ideological differences with the RPF.82 Sebarenzi’s story certainly demonstrates
that the well being of the survivor did not always coincide with the well being of the RPF.
Finally, Sebarenzi emphasizes that democracy will not exist as a long-term possibility
until reconciliation occurs. He argues that the current system contains deep flaws that impede
reconciliation. He defines reconciliation as bringing enemies together to confront the past,
something he sees contemporary Rwanda as lacking.83 He argues that this did not occur in
Gacaca (the local community-led courts for genocide perpetrators), where the objective
involved punishment as opposed to restorative justice.84 He argues that reconciliation must be
the principle form of nation building as opposed to Kagame’s brand of elitist capitalist
development and single-party rule.85 While one may argue that he idealizes the reconciliation
process, he at least tries to shift attention away from the state’s definition of reconciliation
towards a more intimate definition. Otherwise, he argues that Rwanda will remain a state stuck
in a historical cycle of power and state oppression.

HUTU VICTIMIZATION IN SURVIVING THE SLAUGHTER
Marie Béatrice Umutesi writes from a different perspective than Rurangwa,
Rusesabagina, and Sebarenzi: the plight of the Hutu refugee in Zaire from 1994 through 1997.
Leading Rwandan scholar Jan Vansina calls her memoir Surviving the Slaughter: the ordeal of a
Rwandan refugee in Zaire a “literary monument” that sheds light on the roughly 300,000
refugees who died between 1996 and 1997 at the hands of the RPF and other armed groups in
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massacres and death camps.86 In his review Vansina writes, “It is a story that has been
suppressed by all parties involved: governments, armies, international organizations, and
media.”87 She does not deny the suffering of Rwandan Tutsi, rather her memoir seeks to
remember that the thousands of Hutu refugees massacred by the RPF and its proxy armies also
fell victim to genocide.
The RPF killed several members of her family prior to the assassination of President
Habyarimana. She writes in great detail about her flight through Zaire escaping from the
invading RPF and the AFDL rebels.88 From 1994 to 1998, she fled from refugee camp to refugee
camp throughout eastern Zaire. She witnessed malnutrition, atrocity, rape, murder, and theft. As
part of the Hutu educated elite and a head NGO worker, she continued her efforts to empower
refugees in the Zairian refugee camps. In addition, she details the discrimination that fleeing
refugees experienced at the hands of many Zairians. She attests to RPF crimes in the Congo
between 1994 and 1997 from her traumatic memories, and she challenges the ways in which the
international community ignored the fact that many Hutu refugees were not génocidaires but
innocent women and children. She writes, “I have been through Hell, have known horror, and
now that I have escaped I want to testify in the name of all the men and women who did not
have my luck and who died in Hell.”89 As a survivor of the RPF’s purges in the Congo, her
written word allows her to document the horrors experienced by the dead. Her memory
functions as evidence of a conflict overlooked and covered up by both the RPF and the
international community.
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Umutesi starts her history of Rwanda during the Tutsi-ruled colonial era. Her narrative
revolves around the political nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities. She emphasizes that the
colonial system politically marginalized the Hutu and privileged the Tutsi. Utilizing her family
history, Umutesi brings up her family's experience of life under Tutsi colonial rule. She
describes it as an unfair system in which every Hutu served under a Tutsi ruler in a client-patron
system. She writes, “A Tutsi could even throw a Hutu out of his own home and occupy it
himself if he wanted to.”90 While survivor narratives like Rurangwa’s Genocide: My Stolen
Rwanda pushes the historical fact that colonialism divided Rwandan society, such narratives
often de-emphasize the exploitation of Hutu by the favored Tutsi elite. Umutesi inherited this
memory of victimization from her family history. She does not excuse the later violence against
the Tutsi by extremist Hutus, but she does provide an explanation by emphasizing that the Tutsi
exclusion developed after a particularly exploitive time for Hutus. What emerges is a history of
oppression directed toward groups excluded from political power.
Umutesi de-emphasizes the role of ethnicity in the genocide’s origins and places
increased emphasis on the role of regionalism, socio-economics ties, and the Tutsi refugee crisis
in Uganda. She places the rise of regionalism as an important factor in explaining tensions in
Rwandan society, pointing to the President Party’s concentration of power in north.91 She also
stressed the Hutu Republic’s failure to address the Tutsi refugee situation as another factor
because it intertwined the internal affairs of Uganda with that of Rwanda.92 She writes that this
allowed Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to use the Rwandan refugee situation to his
advantage, “Helping the Rwandan refugees recapture power in their own country was the most
appealing solution for the Ugandan president. It allowed him to get rid of these allies, who were
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becoming a nuisance, to legitimize his power with the Ugandans and to have a friendly regime
in Rwanda.”93 But she also takes a more bottom up approach by highlighting the food and
resource shortages infecting the lower classes of Rwandan society. Economic shortages created
a situation during the civil war where peasants murdered each other over small amounts of food
and money. She writes, “People did not want to acknowledge that if, for a few thousand francs
or a couple of bottles of beer, unemployed youth would kill innocent people in cold blood,
people with whom they themselves had no argument, they could kill thousands if given the
means.”94 This dire economic situation became an advantage to political leaders “who used
militias to impose their own law.”95 While on the surface her explanation risks removing
accountability from the perpetrators by blaming the system or bad politics, it also serves to recontextualize the genocide as a historical event that developed out of long-term regional and
economic historical trends.
Through this view of oppression on both sides, she reassesses the genocide. She writes,
“The Rwandan tragedy is complex. There are not simply victims on one side (Tutsi) and guilty
(Hutu) on the other as we have been led to believe.”96 She immediately refutes the idea of
binaries between good and evil. For example, she places responsibility on the RPF’s invasion as
a trigger for widespread massacres. She writes:
An attack by the refugee Tutsi would inexorably lead to massacres of Tutsi in the
interior of the country…I hoped that the refugee Tutsi would exhaust all possible
peaceful means before risking the lives of thousands of innocents. I didn't realize
yet that life isn't worth much when power is at stake.97
She distinguishes the motives of the invading RPF from the well being of the Rwandan Tutsi.
Her narrative emphasizes the political power play between the RPF and Hutu extremists as a
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determinant factor in explaining the context behind these massacres. What benefited the RPF did
not always benefit the Tutsi.
Even before the genocide, she experienced a silencing of her family’s suffering in the
north. She worked at an NGO with many Tutsi co-workers. They believed the RPF did not
commit atrocities. She writes of the day rebels arrived in her mother's village:
Women ran up and down all the streets calling the children, who were screaming
and crying, not knowing what was happening…Bodies of the people killed that
morning were found in ditches six months later, after the agreements for the
withdrawal of the RPF forces were signed and people returned to their homes.
Among the dead were my cousins Bizimana Laurent, Kazimana, and many other
members of my family.98
Among her Tutsi friends, she silenced herself from voicing what happened to her family. She
writes, “When I denounced the crimes of the RPF, I was treated like a Hutu extremist [by her
Tutsi NGO co-workers]. For the most part, to have some peace, I had to bear my sorrow in
silence.”99 Her family’s victimization in February 1993 became internalized. She writes, “No
one could speak out loud about his or her pain. Only the victims were blamed. The killers had all
the rights. It was only much later, in other circumstances, that I began to speak and write freely
about the death of my loved ones.”100 Her experience showcases the importance of expanding
the parameters of victimization not only to the Congo, but to also include the victims of RPF
human rights abuses during the civil war.
As the RPF took over Rwanda, Umutesi followed the mass of Hutu refuges into Zaire.
For several years she migrated from refugee camp to refugee camp, setting up NGO networks
devoted to aid. Her writing details a horrifying existence, from the uninhabitable conditions to
the always-present threat of a massacre by rebel or RPF forces. She fills her pages with
references to specific massacres, places, and events ignored or forgotten by most of the world.
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She unofficially adopts several orphans, suffering the heartbreak of losing them to disease or
separation during the mad scrambles to ford rivers. But most of all, Umutesi writes her memory
of life on the run in the Congo in a manner that humanizes the Hutu refugee. She argues that the
international community did not differentiate between the Hutu perpetrator and the innocent
Hutu refugees, especially at the horrifying refugee death camp of Tingi-Tingi.101 She writes, “I
had heard that some countries and international organizations had even declared that there were
no more Rwandan refugees in the eastern part of Zaire, apart from some Interahamwe and their
families who deserved, it seems, their fate.”102 Despite the RPF’s stance that they entered the
Congo to fight Interahamwe militias (who committed their own attacks on Rwandan soil), many
women and children died in the camps and on the run at the hands of the RPF and its sponsored
rebel groups.
She uses her account to specifically indict the international press and the UNHCR’s
complicity with forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees. She writes of the press:
When they [the international press] did mention the Rwandan refugees, when
they finally accepted that we still existed, the journalists were only interested in
the presence of members of the militia at Tingi-Tingi…Of our daily life, of the
Hell we had lived in since the destruction of the camps in eastern Zaire, of the
horrifying death that awaited those lost in the forest, of the massacres perpetrated
by the rebels, not one word.103
Eerily similar to the press’ complicity during the Rwandan genocide, Umutesi claims that this
time the press paid too much attention to the Interahamwe and not enough on the lives of the
innocent refugees. The murder of refugees by rebel forces was white washed. In addition, the
UNHCR started forcefully repatriating Rwandan refugees. Umutesi depicts repatriation as
effectively a death sentence.104 Local Congolese even formed bounty groups that made money
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by turning in Rwandans. On the mission of the UNHCR, she writes, “The UNHCR had only one
goal: repatriate the Rwandan refugees either willingly or by force. The measure of success was
simply the number of people repatriated, and not the welcome that was reserved for them once
they got there or whether or not they wanted to go.”105 Ignored by the press and the refugee
organizations, Umutesi discovered that only her legs could make a difference.
While Umutesi eventually escaped Zaire, she depicts her journey on the road as “Hell.”
The sick collapsed and died alone on the side of the road, just as hundreds of refugees passed
them on the side of the road.106 She writes of one revelation after coming across a girl of sixteen
abandoned on the road, left for dead, her body devoured by bugs. She writes of her revulsion:
What crime had all of these victims committed to deserve such a death? Where
was the international community that talked about human rights but withdrew
when they should have prevented the genocide of the Tutsi by the Hutu militias
and when they should have condemned the massacres of the Hutu by the RPF?
Where was this international community…which abandoned us once again and
let us wander in the forest like wild beasts and which allowed this young girl of
sixteen to collapse on the road like a dog, food for the ants of the equatorial
forest?107
She places the Tutsi genocide on par with the Hutu refugee experience, a claim the RPF
continually tries to diminish. Yet, Umutesi questions the difference by bearing witness to the
numerous people who died in silence. This specific image of the girl becomes her mission
statement against her feelings of powerlessness. She concludes, “Even now, more than a year
later [1998], the image of this girl haunts me and with it the feelings of futility and revulsion that
I felt every time that I found myself faced with the death that lurked all around me and against
which I was utterly powerless.”108 This image encapsulates the necessity for avoiding
intellectual interpretations of the conflict that set rigid victim-perpetrator binaries or place a
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geographic fence around Rwanda. People died on both sides, and neither side’s suffering should
be diminished in favor of the other. The refugee spillovers entailed mass death and suffering;
Umutesi’s memoir argues against pushing them aside.

CONCLUSION
When evaluating the implications of these memoirs on the historical remembrance of the
genocide, several points stand out. To begin with, the genocide extended far beyond the RPF
liberation. For many survivors, the mental trauma and physical injuries made living side by side
with perpetrators unbearable. While in most cases they endured, Rurangwa presents an extreme
example of those who chose exile. The lack of an immediate justice system made life difficult
for many survivors. Secondly, the immediate post-genocide Rwandan political environment saw
the rise of another elitist regime. While the international community generally hailed the RPF
for bringing a visible stability to the country, in reality the RPF merely continued the historical
legacy of elitist power. Despite their claims of rebuilding a unified nation state, their trajectory
appears eerily similar to the single-party rule of the Habyarimana regime. Finally, the events that
transpired in present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo are a byproduct of Rwandan
history, of which the memory of Hutu victimization has been silenced. These narratives do not
fit in the RPF’s liberation narrative. There exists a more complex history, a story that
encapsulates the entire region and where the line between victim and perpetrator is permeable.
Unlike official memorials, museums, or state-sponsored films, the written memory finds a way
to push beyond the limits of the constructed national history. Written in dissent, these four
memoirs provide a glimpse to a more complicated world, a cruel world, and a world in need of
re-evaluation from those who seek a full understanding of the Rwandan genocide.
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CONCLUSION
René Lemarchand writes that current Rwandan political discourse views genocide
remembrance as “remembering to forget.” He suggests a different memory discourse for conflict
resolution in the Great Lakes region⎯a “remembering to forgive.”1 This project has looked at a
major challenge to this idea: the narrowing of competing memories of Rwandan victimization
into one official historical and political view. In a context of dual victimization, the official
narrative leaves out the memory of atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army. But as
a regional phenomenon, this suppression of memory is hardly new. Looking beyond Rwanda’s
borders, acknowledging the history of genocidal suffering in the Hutu community may hold as
big a role in ending cycles of violence as remembering Tutsi victims.
Part of the problem in implementing reconciliation in Rwanda involves the fact that the
region is still living in the aftermath of the forgotten 1972 Burundian genocide. A twin-state to
Rwanda, in 1972 the Burundian Tutsi-Hima military killed somewhere between 100,000 to
300,000 Burundian Hutu.2 Triggered by a Hutu uprising against the Tutsi-dominated state, the
1972 massacres have been at the center of historical revision. After the violence ended, the
Burundian government only recognized the killings of Tutsi during the Hutu uprising as
genocide. The Tutsi military rationalized their violence as necessary for preserving power, and
they revised the official narrative to make their point. While reports indicate that somewhere
around 800 to 1,200 Tutsi died in the uprising, the Burundian government claimed that number
reached 50,000.3 On a more global level, the international community ignored the 1972
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genocide. When informed of the massacres, President Richard Nixon lashed out at the State
Department’s silence:
This is one of the most cynical, callous reactions of a great government to a
terrible human tragedy I have seen…Biafra stirs us because of Catholics, the
Israeli Olympics because of Jews; the North Vietnamese bombings because of
Communist leanings in our establishment. But when 100,000 (one third of the
people of a black country) are murdered, we say nothing.4
But despite the outrage, sadly not a single member of the Tutsi-led government or military has
been held accountable. The memory of victimization in Burundi played a large role in Hutu
extremism during the 1994 Tutsi genocide, and continued to de-stabilize Burundi into the 1990s
and 2000s.
But the Hutu refugee experience in Eastern Congo in the mid 1990s presents perhaps the
most contested memory facing contemporary Rwanda. After the 1996 RPA invasion and
takeover of Hutu-extremist run refugee camps, somewhere from 200,000 to 350,000 Hutu
refugees disappeared off the face of the map.5 While the RPA invaded and dismantled Hutu
refugee camps out of a legitimate threat of a counter-invasion, the subsequent violence killed
innocent Hutu in addition to Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces. The RPF admits to killing
thousands of Hutu, but argues that all casualties were génocidaires.6 The RPF maintains that all
innocent Hutu had already been repatriated, a claim that has since been disputed. While many
Hutu died from disease, many scholars and reports claim that the RPA and its proxy AFDL
rebels hunted down, rounded up, and massacred thousands upon thousands of innocent Hutu.7
As remembered by such survivors as Marie Umutesi, many others died from exhaustion fleeing
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from the Rwandan and rebel forces. Lemarchand and Reyntjens note that while the current
incarnation of the Hutu génocidaire guerilla force⎯the FDLR⎯endures and recruits out of a
distorted view of a double genocide, their claim of Hutu victimization at the hands of the RPA
are not unfounded.8 While some might argue that the violence in East Congo was not genocide,
the memories of victimization for thousand of Hutu has been suppressed in the current Rwandan
state. As indicated by Lemarchand the Reyntjens, the names of such refugee death camps as
Tingi-Tingi and Bukavu remain largely unknown to the international community as sites of Hutu
victimization.9 Many Hutu (both innocent and guilty of genocide crimes) live in a Rwandan
society run by the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity.
These two events⎯central to many Hutu memories of victimization⎯provide for a more
complicated narrative than the one presented in Rwandan film, memorials, and museums. Coexistence and reconciliation between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi presents many challenges to
peace building. For many scholars, the ways in which the present narrative conceptualizes the
conflict calls for a re-evaluation of the current historical model for remembering genocide.
Catharine and David Newbury in particular caution against viewing the 1994 genocide as an
African example of the Jewish Holocaust. Acknowledging the effect to which the memory of the
Holocaust influences interpretation of modern genocidal conflict, they write of a danger in
viewing contemporary conflict as mirroring the Holocaust narrative:
There is a tendency to place emphasis on ethnic divisions and hatred without
taking adequate account of the complex internal political and social dynamics
that have shaped both ethnic and class divisions, and competition over power in
Rwanda…Concentration on ethnic hatred and…comparisons with the Holocaust
has led some observers of the Rwandan genocide to assume that all Tutsi were
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victims and liberators of Rwanda in this conflict, and all Hutu were complicit in
mass murder.10
The predominant Holocaust model’s binary of good and evil simplifies the complex political and
class history of Rwanda. Lemarchand similarly emphasizes that when assessing the Great Lakes
region, the dual memories of genocide in both communities dismiss any simplified “good guybad guy” explanations.11 Both Lemarchand and Mahmood Mamdani point out that genocide
holds more in common with the challenges experienced in post-apartheid South Africa than
post-Holocaust Europe.12 As argued by Mackenzie Hamilton, the current Rwandan government
contains frightening similarities in its control of speech and official discourse to the
Habyarimana regime.13 Considering the dual narrative of victimization, any state building in
Rwanda must acknowledge that mass atrocities occurred in both communities performed by
both political and military regimes. The discursive evidence presented in this project adds to an
already enormous body of scholarly evidence that showcases the shortcomings of the official
historical narrative in making this point.
…
When looking at the Rwandan model for restorative justice, the need for recognition of
dual victimization becomes even more evident. Rwanda decided to implement a justice system
called Gacaca as a means of trying genocide perpetrators. Historically, Gacaca had been
employed as far back as the 16th century as a grass roots form of justice for reconciling
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community disputes.14 The traditional system promoted reconciliation in addition to punishment.
The system of Gacaca implemented in 2004 by Rwanda modified several elements of historical
Gacaca. This included the possibility of sentencing individuals convicted of genocide-related
crimes to prison terms, and the sentencing of prisoners who confessed voluntarily to community
service.15 The system contained three categories of genocide crimes. Category one included
individuals who contributed to the planning of the genocide or committed sexual crimes during
the genocide. Suspects who participated in murder or injury qualified for category two crimes.
Finally, category three included those who committed property crimes. The Gacaca law
designed these trials to be community oriented. Suspected perpetrators were tried in front of the
entire community. Witnesses delivered their testimony in front of the entire community.
While appearing on the surface as a successful example of grass roots justice, the justice
system silenced the memory of Hutu victimization from RPA crimes by not bringing RPA
perpetrators to trial. In Max Rettig’s fieldwork on the Gacaca court system, one Hutu woman’s
private testimony from 2007 gives an example to this silencing:
Hutus were killed after 1994. Some were shot in the camps; others in their
homes. RPA soldiers killed people in Sovu and Maraba and in the camps. RPA
soldiers killed people in Sovu and Maraba and in the camps. People were taken
away from their families and they never came back. There should be justice for
the crimes committed by the Inkotanyi [RPA] in 1994, 1996, and 1997. Some
survivors even came with the Inkotanyi to kill people in the camps and in
homes.16
One can argue that Gacaca provided a feasible justice model for a context in which the number
of Hutu perpetrators outweighed the judicial resources for conducting all trials in the official
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court system. But at the same time one can also argue that Gacaca continued the use of victor’s
justice in its silencing of RPA crimes.
The suppression of RPA crimes carried over to the larger international criminal court set
up for trying Rwandan genocide crimes. The United Nations formed the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try genocide perpetrators, but the UN negotiated exclusively
from the beginning with the government of Rwanda in determining whom to prosecute. This
marked a stark contrast to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), which
tried war crimes committed by both the Croat and Serbian governments that fought in the
Balkan wars.17 Instead, the UN formed the ICTR seeking to create a strong alliance with the
Rwandan government.18 An argument can be made that the Rwandan government used its victim
status as leverage by threatening to pull out after the ICTR attempted to try the RPA for war
crimes.19 In both the local and international justice systems for trying Rwandan génocidaires,
the RPF government dictated whom to prosecute.
A truth and reconciliation model presents one theoretical option for finding a depoliticized middle ground between Hutu and Tutsi victimization. The end of South African
apartheid in 1994 brought the challenge of how to transition to democratic rule. South Africa
was transitioning specifically to majority rule, which meant that the minority whites needed to
give up power to the majority blacks. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) commission sought to reveal the crimes committed during apartheid on both sides and
seek forgiveness as a means for unifying the nation. Instead of victor’s justice, the commission
sought to open up dialogues between the two sides. In addition, crimes committed by the ANC
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were also disclosed. By granting amnesty, the commission sought to implement an environment
that disrupted the cycle of violence between the whites and blacks.20
While not a perfect model, South Africa chose a reconciliation and state building
strategy that valued the revealing of African National Congress (ANC) and Afrikaaner crimes
over capitol punishment. Writer Antjie Krog observed many of the challenges, pitfalls, and
triumphs of the TRC model in her account Country of My Skull. The amnesty clause for
perpetrators endured major criticism from the ANC and the families of victims. Krog recalls
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar emphasizing, “But to humanize our society we had to put
across the idea of moral responsibility⎯that is why I suggested a combination of the amnesty
process with the process of victims' stories.”21 Krog observed that part of this humanizing and
healing of South African society came from the revealing of long-suppressed testimony. Krog
writes, “Now that people are able to tell their stories, the lid of the Pandora’s box is lifted; for
the first time, these individual truths sound unhindered in the ears of all South Africans.”22
While debates over amnesty generated politicized tensions in the country, in many cases
amnesty and truth created individual cases of forgiveness and reconciliation between whites and
blacks. A widow whose husband died at the hands of a notorious Afrikaaner police officer felt a
need, “to hold him by the hand, and show him that there is a future, and that he can still
change.”23 An anonymous letter from an Afrikaaner delivered to Archbishop Desmond Tutu
expressed, “I don’t know what to say, I don’t know what to do, I ask you to forgive me for
this⎯I am sorry about all the pain and the heartache. It isn’t easy for me to say this. I say it with
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a heart that is broken and tears in my eyes.”24 At the same time, the TRC allowed white victims
of ANC attacks the opportunity to tell their stories of victimization.25
Will directly transplanting the South African TRC model into Rwanda guarantee
reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi? No, each conflict contains its own distinct set of
variables. First and foremost, the Rwandan conflict produced more perpetrators than victims
while the South African conflict produced the opposite.26 In addition, the transparency between
perpetrator and victim is not as clear in the Rwandan case as in the South African case.27 While
the ANC did commit acts of violence against the whites during apartheid, the South African
conflict possesses a clearer distinction of identifying whites as perpetrators and blacks as
victims. Only whites held power in South Africa, while both Hutu and Tutsi took turns holding
power in Rwanda. This muddies the reconciliation process considerably in Rwanda because, as
Mahmood Mamdani points out, “the identification of perpetrator and survivor is contingent on
one’s historical perspective.”28 A new reconciliation model that takes into account these
distinctions will need to be designed. What the South African TRC model does illustrate is the
need for a shift in discursive and philosophical tone in any future Rwandan reconciliation model.
Krog writes on this shift in South Africa brought upon by the TRC:
The human rights of black people were violated by whites, but also by blacks at
the instigation of whites. So the Truth commission was forced to say: South
Africa’s shameful apartheid past has made people lose their humanity. It
dehumanized people to such an extent that they treated fellow human beings
worse than animals. And this must change forever.29
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While a more inclusive narrative may not be possible as long as the RPF remains in power, the
philosophy of the South African TRC shows the possibilities in a reconciliation process that
opens its doors to all competing narratives. As Rwanda comes to terms with its dark past in the
post-genocide era, this I.S. project confirms the necessity for a more inclusive official narrative
and reconciliation model as a means for preventing future conflict.
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APPENDIX A
THE HUTU TEN COMMANDMENTS, 19901
1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of
her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who:
• Marries a Tutsi woman;
• Befriends a Tutsi woman;
• Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in
their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, secretaries and more
honest?
3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the
supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor
• Makes a partnership with Batutsi in business;
• Invests his money or the government’s money in a Tutsi enterprise;
• Lends or borrows money from a Mututsi;
• Gives favors to a Batutsi in business
5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be
entrusted to Bahutu.
6. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.
7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October
[1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.
8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.
9. The Bahutu, whoever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate
of their Hutu brothers.
• The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the
Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers;
• They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;
• The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu ideology, must be
taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any
Muhutu who persecutes his brother Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a
traitor.
1

The Holocaust and Other Genocides: History, Representation, Ethics, ed. Helmut Walser Smith, 1st ed
(Nashville Tenn: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), 210.
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APPENDIX B
THE LIBERATION POEM FROM MUNYURANGABO1

Liberation is a journey,
Rwandese of Rwanda and Rwandese outside of Rwanda,
All you speak Kinyarwanda,
We descend from a common culture.
Come, we’ll sit here in Rwanda,
Immersed by the culture of Rwanda.
Let’s remember how liberation came,
Unleashing heavy burdens in my youth.2

When I was young and just a child I played in mud and heard of hate.
Rwanda readies children for war,
Children chosen and armed against enemies.
I heard that Tutsi were roaches and should be stomped,
With tails like snakes, they should be killed.
We were given bows and spears,
And foreign countries gave us guns,
Really.

Darkness came to Rwanda, machetes in place of peace,
I saw people killed,
1

“Chapter Ten: The Poet,” Lee Isaac Chung, Munyurangabo (Film Movement, 2009)
The poem begins emphasizing a common culture, a historical perspective pushed to combat the distorted
myths of Tutsi migration.

2
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Muslims and Christians worked together,
Joined by machetes and their will to kill.
And our Rwanda burned. Rivers flowed with bodies and corpses covered fields.
Rwanda’s youth led the battle.

Don’t you know that this is injustice?
That out Rwanda, its beautiful river and pools,
Its beautiful fields with roads and no famine,
Became a cemetery and a shame,
Don’t you know that this is injustice?

And the RPF army I was taught to hate,
Decided that it was time to defend Rwanda.
Should Rwanda die?
Should there be widows?
Should the dead be shamed?
They said, “no!”
War began in Kinigi, in the heat.
Everyone was involved, so understand my children,
It wasn’t about guns or weapons.
It was about a fight for truth.
I will thank them wherever I am.
Their heroics will be known worldwide,
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From Darfur in Sudan, to the Comoros Islands,3
They will be admired, and I’ll see them the way the Pope sees his church.

But now that they have conquered, I ask of them.
Free us from poverty and illiteracy since the liberation is a journey.
I’ll start with the family, the foundation,
I condemn that many men don’t allow their wives to have a voice.
They hit them and think they’re mindless.
Who gains from this?
Man of mustache and small mind,
Hairy chest and without pity.
You burden your wife to stay in the house.
You are killing our vision of being a strong nation.
And the children I see, working so hard,
Everywhere picking tea and coffee, but they can’t even afford soap.
What a shameful image of Rwanda.
Give children what he needs and he can become a king.
His parents will live in peace and his family will be safe.
Young girls miss school and are given a broom,
And they die in the valley because education is only for their brothers.
A wife works and her husband hits her.
Who will save her?
Where will liberation be?
3

The RPF sent military intervention forces to Darfur and Comoros. The stanza overall portrays the RPF as a
liberation force.
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And men work hard, sweat pours down,
But he makes no money and it’s never enough.
Don’t you see that this is injustice?4

Let liberation come, and let liberation be a journey.
Away from prostitution and toward wisdom.
To new projects done with fervor, the rich one can prepare a gift to give the poorest one.
And how poor is he?
A house of wheat and bed of wheat,
And he eats just wheat, and he’s thrown out like wheat.
Really.
Our beautiful Rwanda with beautiful river,
Beautiful pools and fields with roads,
And no famine.
Tell me. Will it remain a cemetery without justice?
Don’t you see this is injustice?

Let me speak further.
What happens in the village genocide courts?
Let just justice liberate, let truth replace lies in Rwanda.
Sitting together on the grass without division or hate,5
Without lying to each other.
And we live in peace and the guilty seek forgiveness.
4
5

The stanza reflects the RPF’s development goals.
“Sitting together on the grass” refers to the community Gacaca courts.
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Our future is already failing, unless we begin our journey well,
Helping widows and orphans.
And fool for the man in runs with nothing.
What is left is to share everything.
As we battle against hate, I wish you all the best.

And so I close here, a poet will speak again.
Peace to you in Rwanda, peace everywhere.
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APPENDIX C
PHOTOGRAPHS FROM RESEARCH VISIT (Dec. 2012-Jan. 2013)

I used my Copeland Fund to travel to Rwanda for three weeks from December 17, 2012
to January 8, 2013. Upon my arrival, I submitted and attained official permission from the
National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG). I met with an official in
genocide research in order to introduce myself and present my proposal. CNLG’s Executive
Secretary Mr. Jean De Dieu Mucyo signed off on a research permit that allowed me to conduct
research at the following memorial sites: Gisozi (Kigali Genocide Memorial), Murambi,
Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. Specifically, the permission allowed me to photograph the
sites.
The photos I took are disturbing. As described in chapter four, these memorials preserve
bodies and skeletons of victims. As I visited these sites, I wondered on the ethical implications
in taking photos of anonymous dead bodies. Sharing these photos with friends, family, and
fellow scholars also caused me to question my purpose in taking these photographs. I share these
photographs for educational purposes. In particular, they show how visiting these sites can be a
traumatic experience for visitors. As Rwanda moves on into the post-genocide period, these sites
have become important places of mourning and education for both Rwandans and foreigners.1

1

All photographs that appear in this Appendix are the property of Jordan Broutman.
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NTARAMA

Figure 1A: The protective roof over the church.
Figure 1B: Broken stained glass windows from the massacre.
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Figure 2A: Blood on the ceiling from machete attack.
Figure 2B: Shelves of skulls and bones inside the former church.
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Figure 3A and 3B: Site on brick wall where perpetrators smashed
the skulls of children. The memorial uses product to preserve
brain matter.
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Figure 4A and 4B: Damage from
grenade attack.
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Figure 5A: A Tutsi identity card displayed at Ntarama.
Figure 5B: Rosaries recovered from the remains of victims.
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Figure 6A: Machete from attack.
Figure 6B: Preserved clothing of victims draped on the walls.
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Figure 7A and 7B: The attacks from April 14 to April 16,
1994 killed around 5,000 Tutsi in the church grounds alone.
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NYAMATA

Figure 8A and 8B: Damage from grenade and artillery
fire.
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Figure 9A and 9B: The Nyamata memorial preserves the clothes of
victims in the church’s pews.
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Figure 10A and 10B: Like at Ntarama, the Nyamata memorial
preserves the blood that spurted onto the ceiling during the attacks.
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Figure 11A and 11B: Rwandan church memorials present
conflicting messages of the sacred. The former altar at Nyamata
displays machetes, identity cards, and victims’ rosaries, which
compliments the victims’ clothes in the pews. The memorial
illustrates how the sanctuary of the church did not save Tutsi during
the 1994 genocide.
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Figure 12: The Virgin Mary surrounded by a bloodstained wall from the
attacks.
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Figure 13: The tomb of rape victim Mukandoli Annonliata inside the memorial chamber
dug into the church’s foundation after the genocide.
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Figure 14: The Nyamata memorial includes a mass grave that visitors
can walk through. Bones are stacked on several stories of shelves.
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Figure 15A and 15B: Around 10,000 Tutsi died at the Nyamata
church in mid-April 1994. Visitors can often see the way the
victim died based on bone lacerations.
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MURAMBI

Figure 16A and 16B: The Murambi memorial preserves the remains of
Tutsi victims by dosing the bodies in limestone casts. The bodies are
slowly decomposing however, a process that can be seen underneath the
table in 16A.
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Figure 17A and 17B: The preservation technique allows visitors to see
the last moments of the victims. Often victims raised their arms over the
heads to ward off machete blows, a moment that Murambi preserves.
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Figure 18A and 18B: Some rooms are filled with mothers
cradling their children.
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Figure 19A and 19B: The bodies of babies are particularly
devastating to the visitor.

180

Figure 20: Immediately after viewing the rooms of preserved
remains. The tour moves to a site marking where a French flag stood
during Opération Turquoise. The French had an army camp next to
the mass graves.
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Figure 21: Site where French soldiers played volleyball. Mass graves sit
next to the volleyball court.
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NYARUBUYE

Figure 22: The sticks sitting in the hallowed out log were
used as sexual weapons by perpetrators.
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Figure 23A: The pilli-pilli sauce jug.
Figure 23B: The Nyarubuye memorial displays the
multitude of weapons chosen by the perpetrators.
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Figure 24A: A car jack stained with blood.
Figure 24B: A cartoon from the Hutu extremist propaganda
publication Kangura sitting amongst a pile of victims’ shoes.
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Figure 25: Somewhere between 40,000 to 50,000 are reported to have
died around the Nyarubuye church grounds.

Figure 26: A rock used by Hutu perpetrators to sharpen machetes.
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Figure 27A: A stove claimed to have been used by the
Interahamwe to cook Tutsi carcasses for cannibalization.
Figure 27B: The severed abdomen of a Virgin Mary
statue. The Interahamwe thought the statue looked like a
Tutsi.
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Figure 28: Mass graves for reburials. Bodies discovered in the area
surrounding Nyarubuye are reburied with respect in these mass
graves.
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KIGALI GENOCIDE MEMORIAL GARDENS

Figure 29: The Garden of Unity.

Figure 30: Stream descending from the Garden of Unity
to the Garden of Division.
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Figure 31: The Garden of Division.

Figure 32: The Garden of Reconciliation.
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“Maintenance of Memorial Sites a Collective Responsibility - CNLG.” AllAfrica.com.
Washington, April 17, 2012. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1001567265.
In this April 2012 article, CNLG Executive Secretary Jean de Dieu Mucyo expands
memorial site preservation from a government responsibility to a collective
responsibility. He states, "It shouldn't be looked at as a responsibility of the government
only; every Rwandan should have a stake in the maintenance of the memorial sites."
Bisesero in particular has fallen into disrepair. The article explains that Bisesero raised
concerns of collapsing in 2010, and renovations slowly commenced in 2011. CNLG
claims that renovation of one memorial site costs rwf100 million. As a result, the article
advocates for citizens to take initiative at local memorials. This article reveals the
memorial sites budgetary issues pertaining to preservation. At the same time, the
language used by Mucyo demonstrates how the government speaks to the public with a
collective voice. This does not leave public space to debate against their model of
memorialization.
“Many of us may have only a vague recollection of the atrocities that took place.”
Pittsburgh Post - Gazette. September 24, 2000, sec. WORLD.
This Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article reports from the Nyamata memorial site. The
newspaper interviews survivor and memorial caretaker Tharcisse Mukama. The article
appears ahistorical, generally describing the conflict as a simmering ethnic rivalry. The
article also interviews Dancira Nyiranazugu, survivor and caretaker of the Ntarama
memorial. The article discusses how the two caretakers view their jobs.
Mulugeta, Samson. "Rwanda Election Haunted / by Past People Split on how to Handle
Genocide." Newsday, Aug 25,2003.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/279733429?accountid=15131
This 2003 article from the time of Rwanda's first Presidential elections provides a
glimpse to how Kagame used the memory of the genocide to campaign for President.
The article reports that at one rally he asked the crowd to remember those who died in
1994 and to "confirm those who brought you peace and security." He also said that by
voting for him "you will be protected." The article also reveals Rwanda's descent to a
one-party state. Kagame's moderate Hutu opponent Faustin Twagiramungu explains that
Kagame has instituted a culture of fear and obedience that impedes the democratic
process. His party was outlawed and many party observers arrested.
Ngowi, Rodrique. “Genocide survivors guard the remains of the murdered multitudes.” The
Associated Press. April 2, 2004. Date Accessed: January 27, 2013.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
Journalist Rodrique Ngowi interviews Dancila Nyirabazungu and Tharcisse Mukama at
the Ntarama and Nyamata memorial sites in this 2004 article. They both give detailed
accounts of their survival in the massacres. They both speak of having their hearts let go
of the past, but they still cannot forget what happened to them. The article provides an
interesting account of survivors’ attitudes to memorial sites.
“Nyarubuye Memorial to Cost Rwf3 Billion.” AllAfrica.com. Washington, April 28, 2012.
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http://search.proquest.com/docview/1010287839.
This April 2012 AllAfrica.com article announces Rwanda's plan to construct a “modern”
memorial site at Nyarubuye. The article quotes a CNLG official who announces that
they have only identified 28,000 of the 51,000 bodies for proper burial at Nyarubuye. He
complains about the lack of help from the community in identification. The article also
explains that the new memorial structures will preserve the remains for over 1000 years.
The article provides a glimpse to the expensive challenges and long-term goals of the
CNLG's official mission towards preserving these sites.
Peck, Raoul. Sometimes in April. HBO Home Video, 2005.
Raul Peck’s HBO production tells a story of two Hutu brothers. One, a moderate Hutu
named Augustin is married to a Tutsi. The other Honoré, works for RTLM. Peck’s
interweaves between Honoré’s trial in Arusha in 2004 and the death of Augustin’s
family in 1994. The reconciliation between the two brothers potentially mirrors a
reconciling of Hutu identity.
“President: Hotel Rwanda is inaccurate.” BreakingNews.ie, June 4, 2006. Sec. Entertainment.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/744270783.
President Paul Kagame released an announcement that Hotel Rwanda contained many
historical inaccuracies. Kagame called Paul Ruseabagina’s presence at the hotel an
accident and downplays him as merely a survival opportunist. Kagame decried the ways
in which the film “re-wrote” history. The detraction came after Rusesabagina began
speaking out against the government.
Rice, Susan E. “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice: 15th Commemoration of the Genocide
in Rwanda.” Speech, Kigali, Rwanda, April 7, 2009. Outreach Programme on the
Rwandan Genocide and the United Nations.
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/commemoration/2009/index.shtml.
US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice commemorated the 15th anniversary of the
genocide by giving a speech in front of the KGM memorial. Rice spoke of her
experience walking through memorial sites and how the experience emphasizes the need
to prevent future conflict. Rice is generally considered a Kagame apologist, and is well
known for pushing against a U.S. intervention during the genocide.
Rurangwa, Révérien. Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda. London: Reportage Press, 2009.
Tutsi genocide survivor Révérien Rurangwa recounts his family’s massacre by Hutu
perpetrators in April 1994. He describes the horror as his neighbors mercilessly killed
his family and left him severely disfigured. He also writes of his experience living in
exile in Europe. He criticizes the Kagame government’s response to the genocide,
arguing that Rwandan is “all about forgetting.” His book illustrates his bitterness as his
Hutu perpetrators remain at large. He makes angry claims at an inherent evil in Hutus
that comes from his continued torment by Hutu exiles in Europe.
Rusesabagina, Paul. An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography. (New York: Viking, 2006).
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Written after the release of Hotel Rwanda, Paul Rusesabagina gives his account of the
survival at the Mille Collines. He answers his critics for his collaboration with Bernard
Rutaganda and Augustin Bizimungu during the genocide, arguing that only through
dialogue was he able to bring out empathy from perpetrators and save the Mille Collines
refugees. Like Rurangwa, he criticizes the RPF post-genocide policies. He expresses
particular anger at RPF war crimes that he witnessed in their aftermath. He argues that
humanity did exist during the genocide and that arguing that violence is humanity’s
norm plays into the hands of the génocidaires.
“Rwandans And The Need To Preserve The Bones of the Dead.” African Times. Los
Angeles, United States, August 15, 2004.
This 2004 African Times article briefly sketches the country's debate over preserving
remains at massacre sites. The article reports that the Government and family members
of victims believe that burying bones might remove proof of the genocide and minimize
the memory of the massacres. They advocate preservation as both a provider of evidence
and as an expression of memory. Opponents include genocide perpetrators who worry
that continued preservation could create further ethnic tensions for future generations.
Other Rwandan consultants believe that these sites could eventually lead to international
disapproval. The article also includes a short description of the Nyamata rape victim’s
tomb in 2004. While not overly detailed, the article does show public debate on the
memorials around the year 2004.
“Rwanda. Hotel Rwanda hero accused of funding terror,” The Ottawa Citizen, October 29, 2010,
sec. News, http://search.proquest.com/docview/761260400.
In October 2010, the Rwandan government accused Paul Rusesabagina of funding the
FDLR from his home in Belgian. Rusesabagina dismissed the allegation as simply part
of a ridiculous smear campaign.
Sebarenzi, Joseph. God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation. Reprint. Atria
Books, 2011.
Joseph Sebarenzi, former speaker of the Rwandan parliament, writes a harrowing
insider’s account of Rwandan politics in the late 1990s. The heart of his memoir rests in
his insider’s view of the RPF and Paul Kagame. He illustrates the Rwandan
government’s descent towards single party rule. Sebarenzi tells stories of politicians who
opposed the RPF and their subsequent disappearances. Eventually, Sebarenzi’s
opposition to a bill that effectively gave the RPF control of the legislature led to an ugly
smear campaign. Ousted from power, he fled for his life to Uganda. Paul Kagame
emerges as a manipulative politician with precise control over the state and bent on
preserving power. Sebarenzi uses his life story to theorize on a better reconciliation
model bent on inclusion as opposed to victor’s rule.
Speke, John Hanning. Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. New York: Harper,
1864.
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John Hanning Speke, British explorer and geographer for the Royal Geographical
Society, writes one of the first ethnographies of East African civilization in this account
from early 1860s. On a mission to find the source of the Nile River, Speke encountered
many of the major kingdoms of pre-colonial Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Speke
looks at East African civilization from a Victorian racial lens. Shocked at the
centralization of several of the kingdoms, he assumed that the rulers originated from a
lost Semitic race of Ethiopia. His account became a guide for the later German and
Belgian colonizers, and he is now considered one of the founders of the Hamitic
hypothesis.
Spottiswoode, Roger. Shake Hands With the Devil. Entertainment One, 2011.
Canadian director Roger Spottiswoode adapts Gen. Dallaire’s memoir to the cinema in
this 2011 docudrama. Spottiswoode’s film on one level faithfully adapts Dallaire’s
observations from his memoir. On a second level, he shows Dallaire reflecting in
flashback in a therapist’s office in the late 1990s. The film in this manner centers on both
post-traumatic stress disorder and the international failure in Rwanda. But Spottiswoode
also shows Paul Kagame in a heroic light, a point that Dallaire does not necessarily
agree with in his memoir.
Umutesi, Marie Béatrice. Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in
Zaire. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).
Hutu refugee Marie Béatrice Umutesi details her flight from the RPF from 1994 to 1997
in her memoir Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire. Her
account dissents from the RPF-dominant narrative by attesting to RPF war crimes in the
Congo. She argues that her experience qualifies as genocide as RPF and its proxy
Banyamulenge rebels hunted her and other Hutu refugees for several years as the
international community did nothing. Her memoir brings to light the silenced memory of
the Hutu refugee and argues that the genocide must be looked at as a regional conflict.
We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. Genocide,
Political Violence, Human Rights Series. Edited by Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo.
New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2011.
Totten and Ubaldo conducted interviews with survivors during the summer of 2006 in
the midst of the Gacaca process. Originally researching Gacaca, Totten and Ubaldo
decided to expand their research and focus on their subjects’ personal backgrounds. We
Cannot Forget is the end result to their expanded research that lasted until 2009. They
focused on Tutsi interviewees, and the book reveals the discrimination facing Tutsi
before and the challenges in re-adapting to society post-1994. Themes of loneliness and
fears of additional reprisal violence appear heavily in the interviews.
We Survived Genocide in Rwanda, edited by Wendy Whitworth. (Nottinghamshire: Quill
Press, 2006).
This Aegis Trust-released volume of testimonials includes an introduction from museum
founder James Smith. Smith’s introduction mirrors the museum’s representation of
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Rwandan history. The testimonies in the book come from several tour guides and
memorial directors’ who survived the genocide. The testimonies provide a diverse array
of stories from different regions of the country. Many of the testimonies conclude by
emphasizing the need for unity and reconciliation. Others provide a more skeptical
perspective, pointing out how hard it is to forgive.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Anderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Revised Edition. London and New York: Verso, 2006.
Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at Cornell University,
provides an interesting perspective on the history of the identity and the nation. Despite
all the writings on nationalism, he points out that there haven’t been a lot of good
definitions of the term. The concept of the nation and national identity has been accepted
without much challenge. Anderson defines nationalism as imagined political
communities. He also includes a chapter on memory and history that provides an
interesting perspective on the role of history in the formation of French post-revolution
identity. He quotes Renan’s argument that a nation must learn to forget divisive events in
order to become one. At the same time, these events often become part of a “family
history.” This book will help me define terms and provide secondary citation to the
history of nationalism.
Apter, David E. The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism.
3rd ed. Routledge, 1997.
David Apter, deceased Professor of Political Science at Yale University, traces the
emergence of the bureaucratic class in Ugandan colonial and post-colonial history. His
1997 introduction to the study provides an interesting re-evaluation of the scholarly
interpretation of colonialism. He argues that while colonialism is a critical point in
African history, too much focus on colonial rule diminishes the broader African
historical processes that occurred before and independent of colonialism. He argues that
the scholarship is shifting away from viewing colonialism as the fulcrum of African
history.
Bangura, Abdul Karim. “The Politics of the Struggle to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda:
Westerners Pushing Their Legal Approach Versus Ugandans Insisting on Their Mato
Oput.” Journal of Pan African Studies 2, no. 5 (July 2008): 142–178.
Noted multi-disciplinary scholar Abdul Bangura looks at the role of Acholi
reconciliation practices in northern Uganda and provides a comparative analysis to
Gacaca and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While the three
different contexts make a comparison problematic, he illustrates how they each provide
alternative models to an international justice model. He emphasizes that the South
African model emphasized the breaking of cyclical violence, an approach that does not
always necessitate capital punishment.
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Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Cornell Univ
Pr, 2003.
Michael Barnett, International Relations Professor at the University of Minnesota, writes
of the bureaucratic failure of the UN during the Rwandan genocide. A member of the US
mission to the United Nations during the genocide, Barnett writes of how the Security
Council refused to label the conflict a genocide in order to avoid legal ramifications. But
he also argues that the UN was not necessarily heartless or amoral. Rather, the limitation
upon the UN from the leading world power made non-intervention feel like a moral
option to many UN officials. Barnett does not excuse this weakness, rather he
contextualizes it as originating in bureaucracy that allowed its members to slip through
the cracks.
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. “Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local
Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Africa 76, no. 02 (2006): 131–150.
As a result of the vastly different narratives experienced between Hutu and Tutsi
between 1990-1994, research fellow Susanne Buckley-Zistel of the Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt argues that many Rwandans utilize chosen amnesia in order to coexist locally. She conducted fieldwork in areas near memorial sites such as Nyamata
district and Gikongoro. She argues for three reasons to this chosen amnesia: government
coercion, fear of other group, and pragmatism. Overall, she argues that there has been an
internalization of prejudice akin to decades of resentment internalized before 1994. She
argues that Rwandans resume their daily life only through a chosen amnesia, or in other
words remembering of what to forget. She argues that Rwandans don't necessarily deny
what happened, but to internalize the division as a coping mechanism. This chosen
amnesia risks covering up tensions and becomes vulnerable to manipulation by future
dictatorships. She argues that most reconciliation studies focus too much on a macro
perspective and not on a local perspective. This study emphasizes a bottom approach as
Buckley-Zistel concludes by arguing that the micro level should influence all nation
wide justice and reconciliation models.
Caplan, Pat. “‘Never again’: Genocide Memorials in Rwanda.”
Anthropology Today 23, no. 1 (February 6, 2007): 20–22.
Pat Caplan of Goldsmiths College writes a brief article and analysis of his trip to the
Kigali Memorial Centre and the Ntamara and Nyamata memorials. The article provides a
good bibliographical summary of key studies in dead body and memorial secondary
literature. The article mentions the political significance of the bodies and that many
scholars argue that the RPF is using the bodies to create a singular narrative. The article
concludes that there is no right way for memorializing the Rwandan genocide, as visitors
will read the memorials from different perspectives. While the bibliography is useful,
Caplan does not provide much of an argument.
Cieplak, Piotr A. “Image and Memory.” French Cultural Studies 20, no. 2 (2009).
Cieplak interviews 100 Days producer Eric Kabera as part of his critique on the effect of
image on memory. Kabera argues that “image is memory,” arguing that the image of
places like Nyamata transports trauma to the viewer. He also speaks of the ways in
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which image forces the viewer to acknowledge memory, a philosophy that can be seen at
Rwandan genocide memorials.
Chrétien, Jean-Pierre. The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History. New
York  : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books  ; Distributed by MIT Press, 2003.
East African scholar Jean-Pierre Chrétien of the University of Paris traces two thousand
years of East African history in this 2003 study. In doing so, Chrétien contextualizes the
recent violence in the region with centuries worth of anthropological, archaeological,
historical, linguistic, and political data. His book succeeds in contextualizing the history
of the East African civilization that European explorers of the Nile River “discovered” in
the mid-nineteenth century. He shows how both the racial influence brought upon by
Europeans and the pre-colonial legacy influenced the political violence of the present
day. René Lemarchand has critiqued his works on the Burundian genocide for its
overuse of the double genocide perspective.
Clark, Phil. “The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and PostGenocide Justice, Healing and Reconciliation in Rwanda.” In Clark, Phil and Z.
Kaufman (eds.). After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and
Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. London: Hurst; New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009.
Noted scholar of Gacaca Phil Clark provides a historical and political context around the
court system. He illustrates the historical tradition of Gacaca as a significant factor in
the government’s choice of a justice system. He also provides an informative discussion
of the different categories of crimes tried at the courts. Overall, he emphasizes that the
results are complicated and often vary from community to community.
Cook, Susan E. “The politics of preservation in Rwanda.” In Genocide in Cambodia and
Rwanda: New Perspectives. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2006, 281299.
Susan Cook of the University of Pretoria conducted field interviews with officials and
visited memorials in 2000. The Rwandan government was still in the planning stages for
memorialization and commemoration. She observed three strategies at genocide sites:
the preservation of human and structural remains, memorialization and commemoration
of victims, and documentation and research of events. She describes her experience
visiting Murambi in detail. She differentiates between preservation and restoration. She
argues that the decisions made on these two concepts will construct a frozen moment of
historical time at the site. The article seems a bit biased to the RPF. She buys their vision
on long-term education and forging international partnerships in remembrance. But she
acknowledges her research as incomplete as it came out in the beginning of the
memorialization phase in 2000. She acknowledges that the meaning at these sites change
over time.
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Dauge-Roth, Alexandre. Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda:
Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History. After the Empire : the
Francophone World and Postcolonial France. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010.
Alexandre Dauge-Roth, Associate Professor of French at Bates College, looks at the
complexities and memory implication to representing the Rwandan genocide in writing
and in film. For his section on cinematic depictions, he provides detailed analysis of
such films as Hotel Rwanda, Beyond the Gates, and Sometimes in April. He shows the
potential pitfalls in looking at these representations as history lessons. As cinematic
images, they represent a past with relatively little historical footage. He argues that such
constructed representations run the risk of indirectly fostering forgetting and genocide
denial. By trying to make a comprehensive genocide story, the leaving out of certain
details, events, and evidence can be viewed as genocide denial. If it didn't appear in the
film, it is left out of the constructed memory. In other words, Dauge-Roth says that the
genocide’s reality is contingent on the film’s representation of truth. Instead of an
interpretation, the film becomes a reality. How the genocide is represented becomes
accepted as a historical truth. He calls attention to the types of narratives such films
choose to tell, as their construction often shapes the viewers understanding of the
history.
Des Forges, Alison Liebhafsky. Defeat Is the Only Bad News Rwanda Under Musinga,
1896 -1931. Africa and the Diaspora: History, Politics, Culture. Madison, Wis:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
Alison Des Forges, the late historian and human rights activist, writes a detailed account
of Rwandan history from the 1896 royal coup to mwami Musinga’s removal from power.
Des Forges in particular illustrates the role of inter-clan rivalry and Queen Kanjogera’s
role in securing power for her son. Parallels from Des Forges’ account of the 1896
power grab can be applied to the current power play.
———. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human
Rights Watch, 1999.
Alison Des Forges writes a comprehensive account of the genocide compiled from
Human Rights Watch reports. Des Forges’ narrative depicts how the génocidaires
planned, organized, and perpetrated the massacre of Tutsi. Her account provides a
detailed narrative of the organized massacres of entire prefectures such as Gikongoro
and Butare. She also devotes an entire chapter that supplies evidence that the RPF
performed unprosecuted massacres and human rights violations before, during, and after
the genocide.
Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2009.
Le Ann Fujii of the University of Toronto Mississauga argues against the dominant view
that long simmering ethnic hatreds caused people to commit genocidal acts. She devotes
an entire chapter that reviews the literature illustrating that ethnicity not as important as
regional and political relationships in Rwandan history. Ethnicity is part of a constantly
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developing elitist ideology. Through field research, she argues that local ties and group
dynamics determined whether or not people joined or abstained from the killings. Her
argument adds to the literature by illustrating how the "local" contributes to larger
processes like genocide. She aims to discard the tendency to group collective groups (i.e.
the Hutu) as “the masses.” She presents a radical argument that ethnic hatred a
consequence as opposed to the cause of genocide. She acknowledges the pitfall of
conducting research in a politically repressive environment, but she also presents a case
for the authenticity of her interviews.
Guyer, Sara. “Rwanda’s Bones.” Boundary 2 36, no. 2 (June 20, 2009): 155–175.
Sara Guyer, associate Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
attempts to analyze the structure of Rwandan genocide memorials. Specifically she asks
simply whether or not they memorialize the genocide. Several Rwandan genocide
memorials display the bones of victims in crypts open to the public. She argues that this
structure attempts to create a ‘witnessing’ experience of genocide atrocities. She looks at
the accounts of journalists Andrew Blum and Phillip Gourevitch at the Nyamata,
Nyarabuye, and Murambi memorials. She emphasizes that anonymity of these bodies
makes the official remembrance narrative a representation of a population as opposed to
individuals. She (and long list of scholars) argues that this makes the bodies political
objects that justify the unquestioned power of the RPF. But she argues that displaying
the bones alone does differentiate between genocide and mass murder. In addition, she
argues that the anonymity of the victims fits the genocide’s ideology of dehumanization.
Overall, she articulates that the mere inclusion of bones and the overwhelming ‘sensory’
experience does not lead to a greater understanding of genocide.
Hamilton, Mackenzie. “Political Hegemony and its effect on civil society in post-genocide
Rwanda.” Seminar paper, Smith College: Rwandan Genocide in Comparative
Perspective, 2011.
Emerging Rwandan scholar Mackenzie Hamilton of Smith College analyzes the
suppression of free speech in post-genocide Rwanda. Hamilton argues that the
censorship techniques utilized by the RPF mirror the same techniques employed by the
Habyarimana regime before the genocide. Through analysis of Rwandan law and
through various human rights reports, Hamilton calls for the international community to
play closer attention to the RPF’s suppression of Rwandan civil society.
Hilker, Lyndsay McLean. “The Role of Education in Driving Conflict and Building
Peace⎯The Case of Rwanda.” In Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring
Report 2011, The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education. UNESCO, 2010.
In her UNESCO paper, Lynday Hilker of the University of Sussex writes of the
challenges in teaching history in post-genocide Rwanda. While she reports on education
in general, she also writes specifically how history is a discipline completely controlled
by the RPF. The teaching of history was actually outlawed in the mid-1990s until a
government-sanctioned official history could be implemented. Overall, her paper looks
at the ways in which political, social, and economical inequalities make the teaching of
history a challenge and a work in progress.
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Hintjens, Helen M. “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 241–286.
Helen Hintjens, faculty member of the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS),
traces the ways in which racial mythologies, colonial legacies, and threats to power
created the context in which the genocide occurred. She argues that genocide is similar
to Nazi Holocaust, a point that has been refuted by the scholarly community as two
separate historical contexts and processes. Such scholars as Johan Pottier have heavily
critiqued Hintjens’ writings, arguing that she follows the RPF official line. While
Hintjens does center the narrative on the colonial inheritance, her perspective is much
more complex than Pottier gives credit. Hintjens grew up in Rwanda, and her
perspective provides a detailed account to the multitude of reasons why the genocide
occurred.
Hochschild, Adam. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in
Colonial Africa. 1st Mariner Books ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999.
American author Adam Hochschild writes a powerful re-evaluation of the BelgianCongo colonial state. He analyzes how Belgian King Leopold basically created a private
colony to fund his kingdom. He used the state as a labor reservoir that killed thousands
upon thousands of natives and depleted the environment of many natural resources.
Hochschild’s work illustrates how colonialism created and accelerated many of the
political and social problems that plague the area to the modern day.
Horowitz, Sara. “But is it Good for the Jews? Spielberg’s Schindler and the Aesthetics of
Atrocity,” in Spielberg’s Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler’s List,
Indiana University Press, 1997, 119-139.
Horowitz, Professor of comparative literature at the University of York, critiques
Spielberg’s depiction of Jews, Gentiles, and women in Schindler’s List (1993). She
argues that Spielberg depicts classical stereotypes of Jews throughout the film. She also
critiques the eroticization of the Jewish female and the perceived re-establishment of
Jewish tradition through Christianity. These criticisms reveal break down the perception
of the film as a comprehensive historical representation. Rather, she argues that despite
the documentary-like tone to the film, it should be examined as a film filled with
aesthetic choices filled with biases.
Hron Madelaine. “Genres of ‘Yet an Other Genocide.’” In Film and Genocide. Edited by
Kristi Wilson and Tomás Crowder-Taraborrelli. Madison, Wis: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 2012, 133-156.
Madelaine Hron, Associate Professor at the Wilfrid Laurier University, argues that the
increase in feature and documentary films on the Rwandan genocide in the last decade
produced three sub-genres of Rwandan genocide film: (1) the “retrospective” that
attempts to represent specifically the events between April and July 1994, (2) the “postgenocide documentary” that looks at issues facing post-genocide Rwanda in
reconciliation and justice, and (3) the “interpenetrative” that illustrates the ways in which
the horror and memory of 1994 continues to traumatize present society. She reviews all
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three sub-genres in her article. She argues that ultimately the Rwandan genocide may be
an impossible history to depict in a comprehensive narrative, thereby breaking into
smaller sub-genres over time.
Ibreck, Rachel. “A Time of Mourning: The Politics of Commemorating the Tutsi Genocide
in Rwanda.” In Public Memory, Public Media, and the Politics of Justice, edited by
Philip Lee and Pradip Ninan Thomas, 98-120. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
An expert on Rwandan commemoration, Rachel Ibreck argues that while the Rwandan
government uses genocide memory through commemoration to create a conception of
politics, commemoration actually opens up the political space. Ibreck analyzes important
components to commemoration such as ritual, official discourse, survivor trauma, and
participation. Her methods include participant observation at commemorations at
Murambi and interviews with Rwandans. She provides a slightly different interpretation
than Lemarchand and Vidal, who argue that the RPF holds monopoly over public
discourse. While Ibreck doesn’t deny the RPF’s grip on civil society and the state, Ibreck
argues that commemoration of the genocide actually creates a social moment that breaks
the RPF’s illusion of stability.
Jacobs, Janet. “Sacred Space and Collective Memory: Memorializing Genocide at Sites of
Terror.” Sociology of Religion 72, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 154–165.
Janet Jacobs, Professor at the University of Colorado, analyzes the politicization of
memorials and the "social construction of memory" at Ravensbruck, Ntarama, and
Nyamata. She touches on arguments over the presence of religion at sites of terror,
traditional belief systems, preservation of artifacts, and the national politicization of
sites. She argues that these sites combine the feelings of the sacred and the profane to
create a sacred sense of human despair. Her argument ends by stating that by
remembering the visitor recognizes the power of life amongst the tragedy of human
suffering. While I agree with her reading of the memorials, I question whether
recognizing one’s individual life should be what the visitor feels at these sites. She
clearly states that what is being interpreted as sacred is human despair. But I think her
ending conclusion could be expanded into an analysis on the issues that these redemptive
conclusions create in relation to genocide memory.
———. “Women, Genocide and Memory: The Ethics of Feminist
Ethnography in Holocaust Research.” Gender and Society 18, no. 2 (April 2004):
223-238.
Janet Jacobs, Professor at the University of Colorado, critiques her methodology
performed during research on a feminist ethnography of gender and Holocaust memory.
She acknowledges the ways in which ‘double vision’ created ethical concerns. Her role
as observer doubled as perpetrator. The heart of her article rests on her conscious
emphasis on a feminist lens to her research. She expressed concerns of portraying the
same voyeuristic tendencies relating to gender as the Nazis. She also explains that her
approach created ethical concerns by diminishing the suffering of men and children. She
concludes by questioning the possibility of actually conducting a feminist ethnography.
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She acknowledges the concerns with “representing the victimization of women through
the lens of sociocultural objectification.”
Jefremovas, Villia. “Contested Identities: Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, Ethnography and
History in Rwanda.” Anthropologica 39, no. 1/2 (January 1, 1997): 91–104.
Villia Jefremovas, Professor at Queen’s College, writes of how ethnicity has been
historically as a means of exclusion. She traces this process from the pre-colonial
through the colonial and post-colonial eras. Jefremovas provides an excellent guide for
understanding the historical fluidity of the terms meanings. Her review of the
historiography provides an interesting parallel to the modern day, where she notes how
the RPF felt the need to re-write a “correct” history.
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006,
803-831.
Recently deceased New York University European History Professor Tony Judt argues
that the ways in which Europe remembers the Holocaust defines the continents’
restoration and redemption from the legacy of World War II. He also emphasizes that
this “Holocaust factor” did not begin in the immediate aftermath of the war. Judt, in his
lifetime a European Studies Professor at New York University, contends that this
influence developed over time. He maintains that the continent did not discuss Holocaust
memory immediately after the liberation. To support his claim, he distinguishes between
World War II memory and Holocaust memory. He cites “Vichy Syndrome,” referring to
the collective selective memory of post-war memory as a continent wide occurrence that
blurred out the memory of the Holocaust. Instead, exaggerated memories of resistance to
German occupation in many occupied territories dominated the widely accepted
historical narrative. References to the Jewish suffering and the Jewish voice did not fit
into the rebuilding of these territories. But as time past and Israel rose to power, newer
generations refocused on Holocaust memory. At that point, subsequent generations
began to historicize the collective responsibility of Europeans in the Holocaust. Judt
does well in emphasizing the changing historiography of Holocaust memory. He also
succeeds in demonstrating that the effects of the Holocaust did not end with the
liberations. Guilt, continuing prejudices, and overall shock all contributed to the
suppression of the Jewish voice for several decades. In that regard, the book holds value
in creating a lens for historians in sifting through the full out lies, half-truths, and
missing voices on Holocaust memory.
Katongole, Emmanuel. The Sacrifice of Africa: A Political Theology for Africa. Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010.
Emmanuel Katongole, Associate Professor of Theology at the University of Notre
Dame, re-evaluates the role of church and the nation-state in his 2010 account. An
Ugandan who witnessed mass atrocity in his youth, Katongole argues that colonialism
and the introduction of the nation-state violently changed the African discourse. He
proposes a shift away from the legacy of the colonial nation-state (an exploitive, dehumanizing relationship) in favor of a Christian narrative of humanization. He posits a
solution for solving violence as not only an embrace Christianity, but by separating it
from the national discourse.
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King, Elisabeth. “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for
Peacebuilding.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 (2010): 293–309.
Elisabeth King of Columbia University argues that the Rwandan government only
emphasizes memories of violence that coincide with their official narrative. She
compares testimony completed in 2006 with the public memory presented at the Gisozi
genocide memorial. The memory presented at Gisozi divides society into a Tutsi as
victim and Hutu as perpetrator binary. Tutsi and Hutu memory that does not coincide
with the RPF’s narrative are left out. This includes Hutu victims of RPF crimes, Tutsi
who feared the RPF, Tutsi who resent the success of Tutsi returnees, and mixed
Rwandans. King argues that this narrowing of the narrative impedes reconciliation and
justice. The article demonstrates the ways in which an exhibition like Gisozi mirrors the
official political narrative.
Kroslak, Daniela. The French Betrayal of Rwanda. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University
Press, 2008.
Daniela Kroslak, Africa Research Director of the International Crisis Group, analyzes
French complicity in the 1994 genocide. She asks the question as to what extent can
external countries like France be held responsible for the genocide. Her book provides
evidence that France took an active role in the civil war, gave resources and training to
the génocidaires, knew about the genocide, and did not respond in an ethical manner.
She concludes that the French should collectively be held responsible, and argues for an
international re-evaluation of international policy. She expands her argument in this
manner by criticizing America and Britain for complicity of RPF war crimes in the
Congo.
Linn, Ruth and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev. “Holocaust as Metaphor: Arab and Israeli use of the Same
Symbol.” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 11, no. 3 (1996): 195-206.
Ruth Linn and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, Professors at the School of Education at the University of
Haifa, argue that the Holocaust exists as a symbol to both Arabs and Israelis. For Arabs,
the symbol portrays the Jews as Nazis and the Palestinians as Jews. The Holocaust
becomes the spark that allowed Zionists to take over Israel in the late 1940s. For Israelis,
the symbol of the Holocaust justifies Israel’s existence in the first place. Linn and GurZe’ev incorporate voices from the Arab community to illustrate how the Arab Holocaust
narrative does not end in 1945. Rather, the Arab community claims that they are the
resulting victims to the Holocaust due to Palestinian subjugation after 1948. This shows
an alternative to Israeli memory of the political use of Holocaust memory.
Lemarchand, René. “Burundi 1972: Genocide Denied, Revised, and Remembered.” In
Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory. Edited by René Lemarchand.
Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2011.
René Lemarchand, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida,
writes of the ways in which the 1972 Burundi genocide has been ignored and discounted
in studies of eastern Africa. He succeeds in summarizing the factors that sparked the
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genocide, and looks at how the Tutsi-dominated government framed the conflict as an
exclusively Hutu-perpetrated atrocity. He argues that the 100,000 to 300,000 Hutu who
disappeared in 1972 have been effectively written out of history by the Burundi regime.
As a result to this suppressed memory, a lot of recent Hutu extremist groups have
politicized that memory in their ideology. He illustrates how the suppression of memory
contributes to the cycle of violence in Burundi.
———. Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. Woodrow Wilson Center Series.
Washington: New York, N.Y: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University
Press, 1994.
René Lemarchand traces the evolution of Burundian conflict in this 1994 study. His
study extends from the pre-colonial era to 1994 to illustrate the distinct state building
processes that led to the post-independence autocracy. In particular, he shows how the
process of kingship rivalries transformed into political identities during colonialism.
Overall, he emphasizes that the recent violence in Burundi came from a combination of
colonial and independent historical processes.
———. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. National and Ethnic
Conflict in the 21st Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
René Lemarchand analyzes the cycles of violence pervading Burundian, Congolese, and
Rwandan societies in his comparative study. His essays on Burundi and Rwanda look at
their relationship as “genocidal twins,” specifically in comparative memories of the 1972
Burundian genocide and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. For Burundi and Rwanda, he also
looks at the role of politicized forgetting and the shaping of official history. His chapter
on Rwandan political memory argues that the RPF-led government “thwarts” the
memory of Hutu victimization, a claim that made him persona non grata to Rwanda.
Overall, this work from Lemarchand is one of the best recent accounts on contemporary
East African political conflict.
———. “Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?” African
Studies Review 41, no. 1 (April 1, 1998): 3–16.
René Lemarchand provokes debate over the framing of the genocide as primarily a
conflict against Tutsi. He argues that understanding 1994 and the Hutu refugee killings
in the Congo by the RPF cannot be done without looking at the regional memory of
Burundi 1972 and Burundi 1993. The 1993 conflict in Burundi is framed primarily as
genocide against the Tutsi, when in reality it was as much against the Hutu. There has
been re-writing of history in Burundi to portray as Ndadaye as planning a genocide
against the Tutsi, thereby warranting his assassination. In Rwanda, Hutu extremists are
pushing a double genocide interpretation and that the source comes from the RPF
invasion. He argues that in the end there cannot be a good guy bad guy interpretation of
the conflict by the international community. The RPF frames the killings as only
Interahamwe and FAR combatants, thus rationalizing the revenge killings. Lemarchand
calls this the same mindset as holding all Tutsi collectively responsible for human rights
violations in Burundi. He calls for a South African style truth and reconciliation
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commission to get the truth out of what happened and to avoid the creation official
mythologies into the collective memory of Hutu and Tutsi.
Longman, Timothy and Théoneste Rutagengwa. “Memory and violence in post-genocide
Rwanda.” In States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa,
edited by Edna G. Bay and Donald L. Donham. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2006), 236-261.
Noted Rwandan scholars Timothy Longman and Théoneste Rutagengwa argue that the
RPF framed its interpretation of Rwandan history to correlate with its political goals.
They conducted fieldwork in three Rwandan communities to look at how Rwandan react
to the government narrative. In their bid for legitimacy, they interpret pre-colonial
Rwanda as a unified nation-state. This history places all the blame for divisionism on the
colonial legacy. The article argues that this demonstrates an attempt by the RPF to reshape the Rwandan collective memory formed under the former regime. The RPF used
such tools of memory as commemoration, memorialization, education, justice, national
symbols, and public addresses to create a new, unified national identity. Longman and
Rutagengwa point out that this official narrative competes with the RPF's own violent
history and post-genocide political oppression meant to establish political authority.
There are no commemorations of victims of RPF massacres. In their bid to change the
collective memory of Rwanda, Longman and Rutagengwa argue that many Rwandans
express much cynicism to the contradictions between the official narrative and the
government’s bid to leave out certain parts.
———. “Religion, Memory, and Violence in Rwanda.” In Religion, Violence, Memory, and
Place, edited by Oren Baruch Stier and J. Shawn Landres, 132-149. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2006.
Rwandan specialists Timothy Longman and Théoneste Rutagengwa examine the role of
the church in Rwandan genocide memorialization in this 2006 scholarly article. The
church committed widespread atrocities against Tutsi both historically and physically
inside during the genocide. As a result, Longman and Rutagengwa argue that the church
exists in between the preservation of memory and the sacred space. They argue that
memorials contain political meanings, but they also symbolize a grappling with the
meaning behind the sacred in Rwandan society. They also argue that the suppression of
memory at the Kibeho church, the site of a 1995 RPF massacre against Hutu refugees,
signifies a forgetting of those who lost their lives to the RPF even at church memorial
sites.
Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. Monthly Review Press,
1978.
Mahmood Mamdani, at the time a member the Makerere Institute in Kampala,
contextualizes Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians in the early 1970s through Ugandan class
formation. Employing a neo-Marxist approach, he argues that the Ugandan classes that
emerged in colonialism directly served the British metropolitan economy. He highlights
how the divisions in the state emerged from colonial constructed inequalities in labor,
land, and military power. Overall, his account refutes studies that utilize tribalism in
their explanations.
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———. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the
Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press, 2002.
Mahmood Mamdani, East African political scientist at Columbia University, reevaluates the preceding literature on Rwandan ethnicity and political history in When
Victims Become Killers. Seeking to make the genocide understandable, Mamdani argues
that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are first and foremost political identities. He also argues that the
genocide must be framed in a larger regional context and citizenship crisis, one that
incorporated Burundi, Uganda, and Congo. His chapters on the formation of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, the 1959 Hutu social revolution, and political meanings of
Hutu and Tutsi provide an informative argument for explaining how the genocide
developed.
Maquet, Jacques Jérôme Pierre. The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda; a Study of Political
Relations in a Central African Kingdom. London: Published for the International African
Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1961.
Ethnographer Jacques Maquet’s The Premise of Inequality provides one of the first
major studies on Rwandan community, kinship, and clan structure. His account, gathered
from field data compiled in the 1950s, provides informative data on the complexities in
Rwandan society. But he also writes from a perspective that distinguishes Hutu and
Tutsi as separate races. While he does not characterize Tutsi as invading in a colonial
manner, he assumes that Tutsi originated from a distinct race in Ethiopia. At the same
time he shows Hutu and Tutsi culture an interrelated and extremely similar. Emblematic
of historiographical attitudes of the mid-twentieth century, Maquet’s account has been
critiqued heavily by Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, and Jan Vansina as an
example of scholarship that does not question the historical progression to Rwandan
ethnicity.
Melvern, Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. London  ; New York:
Verso, 2004.
British The Sunday Times reporter Linda Melvern writes a detailed journalist account of
the genocide’s planning. She plays particular attention to the development of propaganda
through publications and radio. Her account provides an excellent description of the
meticulous planning on the part of génocidaires in the months prior to the genocide.
———. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Zed
Books second edition: 2009.
Linda Melvern provides an investigative account of the international community’s
failure to intervene in the 1994 genocide. She traces the ways in which the West abided
and aided (whether directly or indirectly) the génocidaires. She devotes an entire chapter
to explaining the role of the Akazu, emphasizing that the idea for a genocide emerged as
the FAR began to lose the war. She also focuses on the UN and the Western powers
refusal and active avoidance to apply the Genocide Convention policy for international
intervention. She shows that the genocide should have been prevented. She does not
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explore RPF war crimes in the Congo or the post-colonial state, which perhaps weakens
her account. But overall, A People Betrayed stands alone as a comprehensive report of
an international failure.
Newbury, Catharine and David Newbury. “The genocide in Rwanda and the Holocaust in
Germany: parallels and pitfalls.” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (2003): 138139.
Catharine and David Newbury, Professors Emeritus of Smith College, outline the
dangers in making direct comparisons between the Holocaust and the Rwandan
genocide. They illustrate the similarities first and then delve into the contextual
distinctions. They highlight how the genocide holds more similarities to South African
apartheid than the Holocaust. They caution in viewing new conflicts from a Holocaust
lens, arguing that such a framework often simplifies complicated political conflicts into
binaries.
Newbury, Catharine. The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 18601960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
Catherine Newbury, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Smith College, analyzes
the long-term transformation of Rwandan patron-client relationships in the Kinyaga
region. She argues against the primordial assumption of ethnicity by illustrating the
ways in which client-patron relationships changed with the expansion of mwami
Rwabugiri’s central authority and the arrival of colonialism. She shows how these
relationships, while originally mutually beneficial, became increasingly exploitive over
time. She shows a rural population increasingly exploited by Tutsi chiefs, and she argues
that the late 1950s Hutu revolution arrived partly from the political awakening of the
Hutu rural periphery. She uses oral testimony and history to illustrate the early social
relationships of pre-colonial Rwanda and then gradually shifts to colonial documents to
show the political relationship between the Belgium and the Tutsi elites. Her research
comes in response to primordial literature that argues that ethnic groups largely
unchanged from the pre-colonial to the colonial.
———. “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda.” Africa Today 45,
no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 7–24.
Catharine Newbury argues that contemporary Rwandan society consists of competing
histories. She showcases the ways in which different regimes and ideologies re-shaped
the pre-colonial and colonial history. For recent Tutsi ideologies, the pre-colonial era
becomes a romanticized utopia. For the former Hutu political regime, the Hamitic myth
of Tutsi migration and annexation became a part of their political discourse. Newbury
illustrates that these debates continue to hold a large presence in Rwandan society.
Newbury, David. “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties.” The
International Journal of African Historical Studies 34, no. 2 (January 1, 2001): 255–314.
Rwandan historian David Newbury of Smith College sketches the historical
complexities of pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda. In particular, he shows the historical
misconceptions of cattle, ethnicity, and dynastic rule. He draws from ecological,
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geographical, linguistic, and oral history to articulate a multitude of local and dynastic
identities. He shows that local cultural identity existed in conjunction with national
identity even up to the year 1900. By the time the Europeans showed up in late
nineteenth century, Rwanda was in the midst of an intense internal conflict derived from
regional and military rivalry and conflict. He places these factors as more important than
“ethnic determinism.” Overall, his sketch applies an excellent comprehensive
introduction to the pre-colonial history that moves away from the accepted colonial
interpretations.
Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire.” Representations, no.
26 (April 1, 1989): 7–24.
Pierre Nora, a French historian of new history, looks at the role of memory and history at
memory sites in the introduction to his multivolume work Les Lieux de Mémoire. He
distinguishes memory from history, calling history a representation of the past and
memory as crystallized link to the present of a historical moment. He briefly traces the
history of the link between memory and history, arguing that the two were at one point
connected and helped establish national identities. He argues that presently there is a
disassociation of memory from history. Memory is viewed as a private matter and
history an analytical discipline. Les Lieux de Mémoire (memory sites) are places in
which memory attached itself in order to serve a material, symbolic, or functional
purpose. He argues that these sites represent our present day view of memory as an
archival memory. These sites become rituals in our remembrance of the past. Instead of
focusing on their immediate reality, they call upon a self-referential memory. While
Nora makes many interesting points, there exists a body of literature that refutes the
clear distinction between memory and history. In addition, his analysis comes from the
highly nationalistic tradition of French history that scholars such as Jay Winter finds
limiting.
Peskin, Victor. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans. Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
Victor Peskin, Professor at Arizona State, looks at the international justice models
employed at the ICTR and the ICTY. He argues in the case of the Rwandan ICTR, the
model reflects a grave case of victor’s justice. He points to RPF’s strong-arming of the
UN into not prosecuting RPA criminals as particularly alarming. Overall, Peskin
provides an interesting perspective on the state of international justice.
Pottier, Johan. Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late
20th Century. African Studies Series 102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002.
Johan Pottier, Professor of Anthropology at the University of London, highlights how
journalists, diplomats, aid workers, and scholars re-contextualized the events that
occurred between 1994-1996 in Rwanda and East to coincide with a narrative that
supported the RPF. The book looks at the presentation and consumption of events
transpiring in Rwanda and East Zaire by the international community. Pottier argues that
the international community (ranging from journalists to politicians to scholars)
consistently hesitated in looking at a detailed historical and social context to the
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situation. This re-imagining and legitimizing of the RPF came in relation to international
sympathy, thereby giving them a “clean slate” (or “genocide credit” in the words of Filip
Reyntjens) for halting the genocide. He argues that international opinion needs to recontextualize these recent events into a more complicated politico-historical narrative.
Prunier, Gérard. Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and The Making of a
Continental Catastrophe. Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
French scholar Gérard Prunier from the University of Paris analyzes the greater regional
crisis brought on by the Congolese war in his 2009 study. His book articulates the ways
in which the Rwandan genocide contributed to the Congolese refugee crisis and the
subsequent continental wars in the Congo. His book traces the evolution of the
Congolese conflict from the genocide to 2009, arguing that the genocide represented a
symptom of international indifference and the failure of the African nation-state.
———. The Rwanda Crisis. Columbia University Press, 1997.
Gérard Prunier provides a comprehensive account of the genocide that spans from the
pre-colonial through the post-genocide refugee crisis. He argues against the idea of the
Hutu-Tutsi conflict as ethnically determined. Rather he shows how elites, peripheral
groups, and myths created a violent and exclusionary society. Prunier provides
exhaustive detail on how the social and political transformations of Rwanda from
Rwabugiri to the genocide, which debunks any perceived randomness to the genocide.
He argues that the genocide emerged as a distinct political process related to the Uganda
refugee crisis and the power play between the RPF and the Habyarimana regime.
Rettig, Max. “Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?” African
Studies Review 51, no. 3 (December 1, 2008): 25–50.
Max Rettig looks at the controversies surrounding the Gacaca justice system. He
conducts interviews with a wide range of participants to illustrate how RPA war crimes
do not stand trial, inequalities exist amongst the justices, and witnesses often feel
intimidated by the public nature to their testimonies. He reports that in particularly bad
cases some Rwandans use genocide accusation for their self-interest. Overall, Rettig
provides an interesting contradiction to the official discourse concerning Gacaca.
Reyntjens, Filip and René Lemarchand. “Mass Murder in Eastern Congo, 1996-1997.” In
Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory. Edited by René Lemarchand.
Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2011.
Reyntjens and Lemarchand illustrate the silencing surrounding the East Congo conflict
that began after the RPA invasion. While acknowledging the threat the RPA faced from
ex-FAR forces, the paper argues that the RPA covered up major human rights violations
of Hutu civilians. While they admit to killing many Hutu, they argue that they only
killed guilty genocide perpetrators. The study highlights the suppression of Hutu
victimization in eastern Congo and the ways in which perpetrators in the FDLR forces
feed off this sense of victimization to continue their fight against the RPA.
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Reyntjens, Filip. “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World:
Governance in Post-genocide Rwanda.” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (January 1, 2011):
1–34.
Filip Reyntjens, Professor of African Law and Politics at the University of Antwerp,
provides a detailed critique of the Kagame-led Rwandan post-genocide government. He
declares the regime a repressive dictatorship through anecdotal, economical, historical,
judicial, political, and scholarly evidence. He details specifically how the RPF
manipulated its way out of answering for widespread human rights violations in the
Congo, unfair elections, and the suppression of free speech. He argues that the RPF are
masters in creating an image that impresses Westerners, but suppresses their own people.
———. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. 1st
paperback ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Filip Reyntjens follows the works of his contemporary Prunier by writing on the
political dynamics of the Congolese conflict. He emphasizes the role of Rwanda,
specifically how a guilt-ridden “genocide credit” emerged amongst Western powers in
its foreign policy with Rwanda. In other words, the West looked the other way as the
RPF government committed atrocities in the Congo because of the RPF government’s
skill in making the international community feel guilty over not intervening in 1994.
Overall, Reyntjens provides a detailed explanation to how these dynamics played out in
the Congo.
Rousso, Henry. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944. Translated
by Arthur Goldhammer. Harvard University Press, 1994.
Influential French historian Henry Rousso posits a groundbreaking re-evaluation of the
Vichy Regime. He critiques the French myth of a widespread resistance during the
occupation, arguing that after the war the French people repressed the memories that
demonstrate the popularity of Vichy (in particular the mass deportation of French Jews)
in favor of the resistance myth. He spends particular attention to the ways in which the
myth of resistance attached itself to ideologies and political movements (such as the
Gaullists). As a larger historical work, Rousso brings forth a wide range of questions
pertaining to the role of mythmaking after conflict and the suppression of divisive
memories in the name of national unity.
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and
Recovery. 1st American ed. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003.
Independent scholar of cultural history Wolfgang Schivelbusch examines the role of
post-war defeat and memory in The Culture of Defeat. He draws from three cases to
make his argument: the American South post-Civil War, France after the FrancoPrussian War, and post-World War I Germany. Particularly in his introduction,
Schivelbusch illustrates how victors will use the memory of defeat to vanquish the
previous regime. But for the losers, the memory of defeat may become a part of national
identity, culture, and worldview. Schivelbusch moves away from victor’s history and
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argues that cultural history should also acknowledge the role of defeated communities
and societies in national and social identity.
Semujanga, Josias. Origins of Rwandan Genocide. Humanity Books, 2003.
Canadian-Rwandan scholar Josias Semujanga examines the ways in which a discourse of
hatred overtook modern Rwanda. His study includes several helpful citations from the
early German missionaries and explorers. Like Twagilimana, Semujanga de-constructs
the origins of the Hamitic myth. He acknowledges the difficulty in classifying the social
meaning of “Hutu,” “Tutsi,” and “Twa” in the pre-colonial era. While Semujanga does
well in de-constructing Hamitic myth, he appears to fall in line with the RPF narrative
by linking Filip Reyntjens (a persona non grata) with the Hutu extremist historian
Ferdinand Nahimana. He argues that one ideology existed in the pre-colonial era, an
argument that falls in line with the RPF official history.
Songolo, Aliko. “Marie Béatrice Umutesi’s Truth: The Other Rwanda Genocide?”
African Studies Review 48, no. 3 (December 1, 2005): 107–119.
Aliko Songolo, Professor of French and African Languages at the University of
Wisconsin, writes of the ways in which Marie Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaughter
humanizes the conflict in eastern Congo. The book review also posits the question of
accepting that another Rwandan genocide occurred in eastern Congo. Songolo’s concept
of a personal memoir that historicizes the personal illustrates the significance of the
personal written word in finding justice for silenced memories.
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2003.
American writer, scholar, and activist Susan Sontag analyzes the cultural effects of
visual images from atrocities, disaster, and war. Her analysis of photography in
particular brings up many ethical questions on bearing witness from a distance. Amongst
her many insights, Sontag questions the duty to remember divisive events in a culture
that circulates divisive images to a wide audience. She theorizes on a limited memory,
one that will bring people together to make peace as opposed to preserving divisions for
the next generation. While many memoirs and testimony assumes a duty to remember
atrocities, Sontag critically analyzes the implications of such an assumption.
Stearns, Jason K. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the
Great War of Africa. 1st ed. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
American writer Jason Stearns writes of his experience reporting from eastern Congo in
his 2011 account. Stearns uses a combination of interviews, history, and his reports to
detail the wide range of actors involved in the Congolese war. He divides the conflict
into three phases: the first war, the second war, and (at the time of the book’s writing) an
uneasy limbo between war and peace. The book provides great detail into how the
internal politics of Rwanda played out in the Congo.
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Twagilimana, Aimable. The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide. University Press of America, 2003.
Rwandan scholar Aimable Twagilimana deconstructs the Hamitic hypothesis in his 2003
study. Twagilimana argues that both Tutsi and Hutu elites utilized the Hamitic myth to
their own advantages. He emphasizes the ways in which the Hamitic myth masked the
role of regionalism in the political power play. Overall, Twagilimana adds a formidable
study to the historiography that informs the reader on the ways in which the Hamitic
myth changed over time politically.
Uvin, Peter. “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International
Community in Rwanda After the Genocide.” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 2 (April 1,
2001): 177–189.
Peter Uvin, Tufts University’s Henry J. Leir Professor of International Humanitarian
Studies, looks at the donor, justice, and human rights issues facing Rwanda. Specifically
he lays out the competing arguments between Kagame apologists and critics. In their
analysis, critics often point to the Tutsification of civil society and Congolese human
rights abuses. Apologists look make a practicality argument, arguing that the regime
cannot use Western justice to try everyone due to its magnitude and that the country is
not ready for democracy. He concludes that the donor community has become too
involved in the post-conflict Rwandan agenda. Uvin goes as far as saying that Rwandan
development almost resembles colonialism. He calls for more donor transparency and
dialogue with the people on the ground.
Van Vree, Frank. “Indigestible images. On the ethics and limits of representation.” In
Performing the Past: Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe. Edited by Jay
Winter. (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 257-283.
Van Vree, professor of journalism and culture at the University of Amsterdam,
researched the use of concentration camp footage and images as a representation of
moral thinking. He provides detailed descriptions of Night and Fog, Fateless, and
footage shown at Nuremburg with thoughtful analysis. But his main argument remains
unclear until the final few pages. He moves from examining the role of concentration
camp footage and images as baring witness and providing evidence to Nazi atrocity to
analyzing the formation of memory through these horrific images. He cautions against
narratives that use Holocaust memory as a form of melodrama, instead emphasizing the
need to use these images to present a narrative that offers zero comfort. He concludes
that archival memory and working memory have been blurred together, meaning that our
knowledge and memory of the Holocaust stems from these images. While a perfect
representation is impossible, he argues that Holocaust representation is meant to promote
moral thinking. As a result, “indigestible” images that reflect on such questions become
an appropriate use for cinematographic Holocaust works.
Vansina, Jan. Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: the Nyiginya Kingdom. Africa and the Diaspora.
Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.
Jan Vansina, leading scholar of pre-colonial Rwanda from the University of Wisconsin,
traces the history and development of Nyiginya kingdom through the use of oral
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histories. He argues that the emerging power in the aristocracy diminished kingly power
and led to internal rivalries. He provides a general overview of the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth century Rwanda, playing close attention to the ways in which
internal rivalries fostered a culture of violence in which the majority of the citizenry
suffered as a result. While he does not directly challenge the modern interpretation of a
harmonious pre-colonial Rwandan past till his conclusion, his argument denounces the
idea that pre-colonial Rwanda as a harmonious nation. In addition, he argues that the
social divisions formed independent of the emerging colonial enterprise.
Vansina, Jan. “Yesterday’s Memories and The Ambiguity of Immediate History.” African
Studies Review 43, no. 3 (December 1, 2000): 135–143.
In his book review of Marie Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaughter, Jan Vansina calls her
account a “literary monument.” He commends the book for humanizing the Hutu refugee
and accounting for the atrocities committed by the RPA and AFDL rebels during their
flight through the Congo. Vansina speaks of the significance of such an account in light
of the silencing of the Hutu refugee experience in the Congo.
Verdery, Katherine. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change.
The Harriman Lectures. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Anthropologist Katherine Verdery of the University of Michigan analyses the
politicization of dead bodies in Eastern Europe. She uses dead bodies as a lens for
arguing that Eastern Europe underwent a cosmic transition during the post-socialist
movement. She argues that understanding Eastern Europe's transformation requires more
than simply analyzing new governments, economics, and pluralism. She argues that dead
bodies contain political and social symbolism. The book covers how such concepts as reburial and preservation helped re-orient people’s worldview concerning moral order,
history, and national identity. She demonstrates that political and cosmic worldviews are
inter-related. This book provides an excellent theory for analyzing dead bodies for
societies in political and social transition.
Williams, Paul Harvey. Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities.
English ed. Oxford  ; New York: Berg, 2007.
Paul Williams looks at the global trend of commemorating atrocity through museums
and memorials. His scope ranges from Holocaust museums, 9/11 commemorations,
Cambodian genocide memorials, to Native American remembrance. For Rwanda, he
looks specifically at the role of objects and their conceptualization as evidence. He looks
specifically at Nyamata and argues that the presence of bones fulfills an urge within the
visitor of actually witnessing the event. His book provides an interesting comparative
study of various memorial settings that use similar storytelling tools to commemorate the
past.
Winter, Jay. “Introduction: The Performance of the Past: Memory, History, Identity.” In
Performing the Past: Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe. Amsterdam,
Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 11-23.
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Jay Winter, Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale, in this 2010 introduction
argues against the predominant French scholarship conclusion of differentiating memory
and history as separate concepts. He discusses how both are “performative” and
“constative.” The act of remembering and/or documenting history both adds and
preserves from the narrative. Winter asserts that mankind continually recreates, reclaims,
and reshapes history through memory performances. The article briefly touches how
historical recreation, memoirs, film, museums, and drama are all a part of historical
remembrance. He defines historical remembrance as “a story about a shared past, the
shape and content of which tell a group of people who they are and from whence they
came.” His focus is not to focus on the historical errors in memory, but rather to push for
historiographical responsibility in its interpretation.
———. Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th
Century. Yale University Press, 2006.
Jay Winter, Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale University, examines the
relationship between the twentieth century memory phenomenon and World War I.
Leading scholar of World War I history, he argues that “memory boom” came out of a
need to acknowledge and commemorate the suffering experienced from victims of war.
He provides thoughtful definitions over the broad terms of memory and collective
memory. He argues against the idea of a state memory, instead arguing that memory is
an individual process that can be shared by collective of people. He offers the term
“historical remembrance” as a way of bridging the gap between history and memory. In
this model, history and memory check each other for inconsistencies and inaccuracies.
———. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History.
Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
In this 1995 work, distinguished WWI scholar Jay Winter dissents from the modernist
interpretation of the initial European WWI memorialization. Through an analysis of
European culture, he argues that Europeans used traditional (classical, romantic, and
religious) themes to remember and bereave the dead. He analyzes film, monuments,
poetry, literature, and art to showcase the cultural effects from the war. In line with his
argument on traditional bereavement, he argues against the strict interpretation of
memorials as national symbols. Rather, he argues that World War I sites of memory
initially served a functional purpose as a site of morning and collective grief. As new
generations emerged having not lived through the war, Winter argues that then did the
more nationalist interpretations grasp onto these memory sites. While one should
exercise caution against applying this argument to memory sites outside of World War I,
many of the same mourning elements exist at Rwandan memorial sites.
Young, James Edward. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
James Young, Associate Professor of English and Judaic Studies at the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst, details a wide set of complex issues within Holocaust
memorials in Europe, Israel, and the United States. Ranging from concentration camp
memorials, museums, and monuments, Young shows the ways in which Holocaust
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memorials suppress and re-imagine the Holocaust. He plays close attention to role of
politics in the shaping of memorials. He argues that a wide range of political, social, and
contemporary factors constructs public memory. His work corresponds with the issues
facing Rwandan memorials, and his constructivist argument provides further questions
to any Rwandan study that critiques the Rwandan genocide memorial model.
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